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ABSTRACT

The full importance of investment and capital as a
driving force in American life and the development of
landscapes is only beginning to be understood by mainstream
American geography.

The regional approach, important in

testing theories and uncovering linkages in life processes
has the potential to contribute to the understanding of how
capitalism shapes landscapes.

It is perhaps in the

formation of regional economies and landscapes that
capitalism most thoroughly influences the worlds in which
people live; it determines their housing, their jobs, their
environs.
This dissertation examines the impact of different
phases of capitalism on the Upper Tennessee River Valley;
present-day Roane and Loudon Counties, Tennessee.

The

Upper Tennessee River Valley in 1995 is in many ways a
fairly ordinary rural area, similar to many locales in the
Great Valley of the eastern United States: the region is
not in the immediate hinterland of any major metropolitan
area; agriculture and small-scale industry are predominant;
employment opportunities are limited.

Yet, if we take a

look at the region's history, the period between the close
of the Civil War and the turn-of-the-century emerges as one
of interest and importance. It was during this time that
factory-scale industrial production began in the region,
vii

and that its present-day central places -- Rockwood,
Harriman, and Lenoir City -- were established.

The story

of the Upper Tennessee River Valley reveals much about late
nineteenth and early twentieth century America, and
especially about how regions and cities develop during
different phases of capitalism.
Most of the capital for regional development during
the study period came from outside of the region.

Northern

businessmen and financiers were drawn to the Upper
Tennessee River Valley by natural resources, a positive
investment

environment, and key development proponents. As

the brand of capitalism practiced in the region became more
advanced during the latter 19th century, its effects became
more pervasive.

Industrial capitalists had access to

limited amounts of capital, and were content with
establishing communities to shelter workers needed for
production.

Corporate capitalism was characterized by

comprehensive development projects designed to accrue
profit from a multitude of activities.

Thus, the

urbanization process was more thoroughly planned,
administered, and orchestrated during this phase.
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Introduction
CAPITAL INVESTMENT and REGIONAL PLACE-MAKING

At the 1981 Annual Meeting of the Association of
American Geographers, John Fraser Hart devoted his
presidential address to regional geography.

In it, Hart

stated: "regional geography is the proving ground where
theories are tested empirically ... the region provides the
essential unifying theme that integrates the diverse
subdisciplines of geography. 111

Regional historical

geography has the potential to uncover the linkages in a
region at a certain time (synchronic analysis), as well as
elucidate the mechanisms of change and their transmission
(diachronic analysis) . 2
The full importance of investment and capital as a
driving force in American life and the development of
landscapes is only beginning to be understood by mainstream
American geography.

Much of the contemporary analysis of

the influence of capitalist activity on spatial patterns
has been conducted by Marxist geographers, who have sought
to elucidate the "specific patterns and processes [that]
characterize capitalist society, and ... how they change with
the further development of capitalism. 113

They have argued

1John Fraser Hart, "The Highest Form of the Geographer's Art", Annals
of the Association of American Geographers 72 (4): 1982, 557-559.
2Aaron Kellerman, "Structuration Theory and Attempts at Integration
in Human Geography", The Professional Geographer 39: 1987, 267-274.
3Neil Smith, Uneven Development: Nature, Capital and the Production
of Space (Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, Inc., 1990), xii.

1

that under capitalism, the economic system is dominant and
is the basic organizer of space, and that therefore
"changing any part of society ... involves changing the
relations of production that guide human development." 4 A
variation on this view is expressed by Massey, who
advocates a transition from analyzing geographical space as
a passive surface to recognizing its role in influencing
investment patterns and concomitant social conditions. 5
Recently, geographers who do not fully embrace Marxist
arguments have also begun to explore the importance of
capital to the formation of spatial development patterns.
Mosher, in her study of Vandergrift, Pennsylvania, analyzed
the impact of corporate capitalist business methods on
urban development, settlement patterns, and industrial
production in a local context. 6

Researchers from other

disciplines, such as Olivier Zunz and Alfred Chandler, Jr.
have explored the ramifications of corporate capitalism,
focusing on business organizational framework and the
development of the managerial class, respectively. 7
The regional approach, important in testing theories
and uncovering linkages in life processes, has the
4Richard Peet and Nigel Thrift, "Political Economy and Human
Geography," in R. Peet and N. Thrift, Eds., New Models in Geography,
Volume One (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989), 13.
5ooreen Massey, Spatial Divisions of Labour: Social Structures and
the Geography of Production (London: MacMillan Publishers, 1984).
6Anne Mosher, "Capital Transformation and the Restructuring of Place:
The Creation of a Model Industrial Town." Ph.D. dissertation, The
Pennsylvania State University, 1989.
7olivier Zunz, Making America Corporate, 1870-1920 (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1990); Alfred Chandler, Jr. The Visible
Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1977).

2

potential to contribute to the understanding of how
capitalism shapes landscapes.

It is perhaps in the

formation of regional economies and landscapes that
capitalism most thoroughly influences the worlds in which
people live; it determines their housing, their jobs, and
their environs.

As Smith states "capitalism transforms the

shape of the entire world ... no God-given stone is left
unturned ... no living thing is unaffected. 118
Moreover, it is within regions that one might expect
to see capital investment's relationships to culture,
folkways, and collective mores work themselves out.

Harvey

believes that "capital ... reaches out to dominate the living
process -- the reproduction of labor power -- because it
must. 119

This requires innovation that "must extend to

lifestyles, organizational forms (political, cultural, and
ideological as well as bureaucratic, commercial, and
administrative) and spatial configurations. 10

The regional

approach provides for the analysis of capitalism's impact
on these types of phenomena within a defined, relatively
cohesive spatial area.

8 smith, Uneven Development, xvi.
9oavid Harvey, The Urbanization of Capital: Studies in the History
and Theory of Capitalist Urbanization (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1985), 27.
lOibid., 126-27.

3

Economic Transformation and Phases of capitalism
Capitalism is not monolithic or unchanging.

It is

constantly evolving in an effort to "meet the urgent
demands of ... crisis

to open up new opportunities for

super-profits, to find the new ways to maintain social
control, to stimulate increased production and
consumption. 1111

The nineteenth century was an era of

particularly rapid change, in that capitalism seems to have
gone through three distinct stages: mercantile, industrial,
and corporate. 12
Mercantile capitalism, the economic system under which
the European settlement of the North American continent
took place, was involved in the buying and selling of
various commodities but had little if any connection to
their production.

It created a supranational space economy

within which resources, people, and products could be
mobilized through the operation of price-fixing markets. 13
Merchants bought cheap in order to sell high, and
mediated between geographically-dispersed producers at low
levels of development.

Their role was to lower the cost

and speed up the circulation of commodities (as well as
capital) by specializing in the marketing function.

w. Soja, Postmodern Geographies: The Reassertion of Space in
Critical Social Theozy (New York: Verso, 1989), 34.
12 Ibid., 3-5.
13oavid Harvey, Social Justice and the City (London: Edward Arnold
Ltd., 1973).
11 Edward

4

Profits were accrued in the efficient performance of this
role . 14
The early phases of the industrial capitalist system
which emerged out of the mercantile system in the United
States after 1830 were marked by a sustained effort on the
part of capitalists to control production and to buy labor
in the same way in which raw materials were bought: as a
definite quantity of work, completed and embodied in the
finished product. 15

The basic components of the industrial

capitalist economic system were factories, mills, and
workshops which provided employment to thousands of
workers, and in doing so stimulated the urbanization
process.
Within the industrial capitalist system "proprietarycompetitive" business entities were the predominant form of
productive property organization.

These were partnerships

or proprietorships that owned and managed single productive
facilities.

Success in competition between these

enterprises depended upon the exploitation of labor and
natural resources as productive inputs, the invention of
increasingly efficient and profitable mass production
technologies, and the conception of products that would
meet market demand. 16

The balance of these components for

success varied by industry.

While the production costs of

14 Harvey, The Urbanization of Capital, 37-40.
15Harry Braverman, Labor Monopoly and Capital: The Degradation of
Work in the Twentieth Century (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974).
16Martin Sklar, The Corporate Reconstruction of American Capitalism,
1890-1916 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).

5

some manufacturers were dominated by the costs of obtaining
resources or labor, others required large amounts of
investment capital to fund the construction of production
facilities and technical innovation.
Manufacturers in the most capital-intensive industries
such as iron and steel, railroads, and textiles began to
increase production capacity in order to achieve economies
of scale.

They also began to integrate resource

acquisition, production facilities, and marketing within
single business entities in order to improve production and
distribution.

Forward integration by manufacturers took

the form of expansion into the warehousing and sales of
products.

Backward integration was attained by gaining

control over the processes that preceded manufacturing,
such as resource extraction and refining. 17
Vertical integration was an expensive proposition for
manufacturers and was dependent upon increased capital
accumulation.

As the problems of capital inflexibility

converged with the intensely competitive conditions of the
late nineteenth century, pressures began to develop that
were too great to be withstood by old-style business
institutions.

Capital-intensive producers began to

reorganize legally into ownership structures that had large
umbrella companies owning smaller subsidiaries.

The

business entity that emerged from this process, the
corporation, was based upon limited-liability ownership by
17 zunz, Making Americ3

Corporate,.

6

several individuals.

Investment capital was generated by

the corporation as potential owners purchased corporate
stock, and in turn provided funds for vertical integration,
facility retooling, or product development. 18

The

emergence of a national market for industrial securities
was a key development, for without it the spread of stock
ownership would have been delayed, and the creation of
large industrial mergers would have been very much more
difficult. 19
As the corporate business form emerged, other
organizational changes occurred within business
enterprises.

One of the most significant of these was the

functional separation between owner-stockholders and
managers within companies.

Corporations developed

management structures that were hierarchical in nature with
stockholders and board directors at the top, and plant
managers, superintendents, foremen, skilled, semi-skilled
and unskilled workers following respectively at lower
levels.

To coordinate the flow of information through this

hierarchical management structure, management practices and
accounting procedures were routinized and standardized.
Headquarters and regional management planned production
strategies and oversaw the movement of raw, semi-finished
and finished materials to and from various resource
18 Leslie Hannah, The Rise of the Corporate Economy; and Zunz, Making
America Corporate.
1 9Thomas R. Navin and Marian V. Sears, "The Rise of a Market for
Industrial Securities, 1887-1902," Business History Review Vol. XIX
(June 1955), 105-138.
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extraction areas, production points, and markets on a
weekly basis.

Top echelon company managers and directors

assembled periodically to assess business performance and
formulate future production and marketing policy.

Through

this corporate system information moved upward to top-level
management, and policy flowed downward from the top through
the hierarchy to individual production and work sites.
This constant flow of information and policy was ensured by
the growing number of white-collar middle managers and
clerical workers employed by companies. 20
The impact of corporate systems in the United States
were felt on both large and small scales.

From a large

scale perspective, corporate systems translated spatially
into the creation of linkages between corporate
headquarters and production sites as well as those between
resource extraction sites, production points, distribution
and marketing facilities.

Control over the system emanated

from corporate headquarters usually located in large
cities.

Production sites and other corporate facilities,

although sometimes located close to corporate headquarters,
were more often widely dispersed.

It was during this

period of corporate integration of production and marketing
functions that American cities and surrounding regions
became economically linked and functionally interdependent
within the national economic system. 21

At smaller scales,

20zunz, Making Americ2 Corporate.
21 Michael P. Conzen, "The Maturing Urban System in the United States,
1840-1910" Annals of the Association of American Geographers 67
(1977): 88-108.

8

the advent of corporate capitalism spurred physical and
social change that transformed localities and societies.
Accompanying the modification of production processes
and technological innovation was a reevaluation of labor.
Corporate efficiency experts and managers began to see
labor as a production cost to be minimized.

New production

technologies and the accompanying reassessment of labor
intentionally deskilled the workforce.

Consequently,

occupations within many productive facilities became skewed
toward semi-skilled and unskilled positions (which paid
less) as new production techniques were introduced. 22
The advent of the corporate economy met with protest.
Tensions existed between the new corporate mores and preexisting economic and social practices.

Skilled craftsmen

who once had powerful roles within the production process
were often reluctant to accept corporate wage scales and
work regimes.
production.

They organized unions and disrupted
Corporations also found that some production

sites did not fit very well into their schemes, when local
attributes such as property ownership patterns conflicted
with company goals.

The corporate system combatted

resistance to its agenda on two fronts.

Within the

productive realm, plants were rebuilt and the work
structure was modified to phase out troublesome jobs and
work relationships.

In relation to labor itself, some

22 Jeffery Haydu, Between Craft and Class: Skilled Workers and Factory
Politics in the United States and Britain, 1890-1922 (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1988); and Hannah, The Rise of the
Corporate Economy.
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manufacturers attempted to influence social relations away
from the workplace in the community and home by providing
housing, building infrastructural facilities, and
controlling commercial functions on tracts of land adjacent
to their factories.

In the extreme, some manufacturers

built company towns, where not only the built environment
was under the control of the corporation, but also the
political, social and religious institutions.

capitalist systems and Place Making
Spatial or regional inequality has always existed in
relation to the attractiveness of a particular area or
areas to the dominant form of economic activity.

At any

given point in time, there is an uneven distribution of the
conditions and resources necessary for profitable
production.

This uneveness plays a major role in.the

distribution of investment, as some places attract capital
and others don't according to the needs of specific
economic and production technologies.
This geographic inequality is relative.

It will

respond to changes in the geographic distribution of the
requirements of production.

Examples of such change would

be things such as actual changes in the distribution of
population (labor force), input resources, or changes in
relative distances caused by innovations in transport
and/or communication.

Also, the pattern of spatial
10

inequality may be altered as a result of changes in the
requirements of the production process itself.

In other

words, technological innovation may cause change in the
locational demands of profitable economic and productive
activity over time.

Such innovations and changes in the

requirements of production are usually the direct result of
actors operating in response to the profit motive in
capitalist economies.
During any particular period, new investment in
economic activity will be geographically distributed in
response to the pattern of spatial differentiation which is
based on the aforementioned factors.

This response by

actors in capitalist economies to the inequality of
geographic opportunities will vary as different forms of
economic activity incorporate or use the uneven spatial
surface in order to maximize profits.

The response to

geographic inequality may also deviate according to the
structure of the ownership of capital (for example, small
single production plants versus integrated industrial
complexes under single ownership).

The use of the earth's

spatial surface will be a product of the interaction
between the existing characteristics of spatial
differentiation and the requirements at a particular time
of the particular process of production.

Also, since

different industries will use geographic variation in
different ways, it follows that those industries will

11

subsequently contribute to the formation of different
patterns of spatial inequality.23
The mercantile capitalist system dominated the initial
era of settlement in the United States.

Merchants were the

driving force of the early American economy, buying and
selling goods in regions.

They were, in effect, middlemen

who gauged supply and demand of commodities, and attempted
to obtain profit from the buying-selling process. 24
During the colonial and early post-colonial era, the
largest cities that were products of this system were
coastal (Boston, New York, Philadelphia) and geared towards
international trade.

Large numbers of settlers had moved

westward by the turn of the nineteenth century, however,
and frontier regional economies began to develop.

The

urban places that were established at interior locations
during the early 1800s were those accessible by river or
road.

Farmers brought surplus agricultural goods such as

corn, wheat, eggs, cotton, and meat to town by wagon, or
down river by flatboat.

Merchants at country stores paid

or extended credit to farmers for these items.

Later, the

merchant sold agricultural and other goods to incoming

23 Richard Walker, "Class, Division of Labour and Employment in
Space," in D. Gregory and J. Urry, eds., Social Relations and Spatial
Structures (London: MacMillan Publishers, 1985), 164-189. Massey,
Spatial Divisions of Labour; Massey, "In What Sense a Regional
Problem?," Regional Studies 13 (1979), 233-243.
24william N. Parker, Europe, America, and the Wider World: Essays on
the Economic History of Western Capitalism, Volume 2 - America and
the Wider World (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 112115; Peter d'A. Jones, The Consumer Society: A History of American
Capitalism (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1965), 19-23, 31-34.
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settlers, and to those passing through on their way west. 25
Merchants were not explicitly involved in place-making, per

se, as they had relatively small amounts of excess capital
and little stake in urban aspects other than the market
function.
The transition from mercantile to industrial
capitalism was spurred by the realization that the
subcontracting and putting out systems of production were
inherently inefficient, as well as by the development of
new types of machinery.

Problems of irregularity of

production, loss of materials in transit, slowness of
manufacture, lack of uniformity, and uncertainty of the
quality of products manufactured were frequent.
Centralization of industrial employment was a solution,
because it allowed for the development and enforcement of
regular hours of ~ork, and the monitoring of worker
efficiency and the quality of commodities produced. 26
In order for centralized production to be successful,
a stable labor force was needed, preferably proximate to
the production facility.

In established urban places,

factory owners responded to worker need for housing by
providing shelter that would provide the right mix of skill
types for production.

In and around nineteenth century

American cities, mill owners built a variety of housing
25 sam B. Hilliard, "A Robust New Nation, 1783-1820," in Robert D.
Mitchell and Paul A. Groves, Eds., North America: The Historical
Geography of a Changing Continent (Savage, MD: Rowman & Littlefield
Publishers, Inc.), 170-171.
26 Braverman, Labor Monopoly and Capital, 63-67.
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types to be used by workers.

In a typical town or city,

for instance, rows of small uniform structures were built
on land adjacent to the mills.

Larger houses were

constructed for foremen at advantageous positions, from
which the home activities of mill workers could be
monitored and bosses could easily keep track of work
attendance. 27

The result was the creation of distinct

districts of company housing, which were added to
preexisting urban patterns.
The involvement of factory owners in providing housing
was not limited to large urban areas.

Throughout the

nineteenth centur~, manufacturers located their production
facilities at rural sites near raw materials and power
sources.

In these cases, pools of labor and housing stock

were limited or nonexistant.

Workers and independent

developers might eventually produce sufficient housing, but
in many instances industrialists took matters into their
own hands, recruiting labor and providing housing for them
in isolated and often self-contained company towns.
Industrial capitalists spent time and money establishing
these places because they believed that their efforts would
be rewarded through more efficient industrial production
and increased profits. 28

27 oaniel Nelson, Managers and Workers: Origins of the New Factory
System in the United States, 1880-1920 (Madison: The University of
Wisconsin Press, 1975), 90-95.
28 Ibid; Crandall A. Shifflett, Coal Towns: Life, Work, and Culture in
Company Towns of Southern Appalachia, 1880-1960 (Knoxville: The
University of Tennessee Press, 1991), 33-38.

14

The scale of capitalist enterprise increased
significantly as corporate capitalism emerged in the late
nineteenth century.

The concentration and centralization

of capital in the corporate structure created situations
which had not previously existed.

Corporate management

became responsible for the administration of a myriad of
activities, at disparate locations. 29

Among the activities

important to corpcrations was the creation and
administration of places, where business functions such as
production could be undertaken with the utmost efficiency.
Because corporations had developed innovative ways of
increasing their access to capital (such as open ownership
structure), they had larger amounts of money to spend on
place-making than their industrial capitalist predecessors.
Industrial capitalists hoped to increase efficiency and
profit margin through gathering labor and machinery in one
place, and closely monitoring the production process.
Thus, their access to capital limited by personal wealth,
place-making was usually unplanned and undertaken on a
cost-minimization basis.

Corporations, on the other hand,

viewed place-making as an integral part of their profitmaking strategies.

Large industrial corporations,

confronted with the logistical demands of coordinating
multiple locations, dispersed resources, and distant and
sizable markets, sought to shape and control production
29chandler, Jr., The Visible Hand; Sklar, The Corporate
Reconstruction of American Capitalism; Zunz, Making America
Corporate.
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sites.

This was accomplished through the preplanning of

communities, as well as investment in other aspects of the
reproductive sphere 30 (such as housing, public
infrastructure, stores, churches) . 31

Some corporations

utilized variations of this strategy, to accrue profit from
the place-making process itself.
Despite the previous discussion, place-making is still
a largely unexplored process.

The capital phases model is

a general framework that provides some explanation of the
process, however, it still needs confirmation as well as
more developed details and nuances to provide satisfactory
explanation.

The goal of this study is to shed light on

capitalist urbanization and development processes.

The

analysis uses the synthesizing and integrative
characteristics of the regional approach to gain a better
understanding of capitalist place-making, and ultimately,
of the operation of capitalism itself.

30 The term reproductive sphere refers to the those activities
undertaken by institutions in order to enforce a particular order
and/or a particular vision of reality (for example, companies
intentionally creating conditions they believe are conducive to the
continuance of efficient industrial production). See Richard Peet
and Nigel Thrift, "Political Economy and Human Geography," in R.
Peet and N. Thrift, Eds., New Models in Geography, Volume One
(London, Unwin Hyman, 1989), 3-29; Ray Hudson and David Sadler,
"Contesting Works Closures in Western Europe's Old Industrial
Regions: Defending Place or Betraying Class?," in M. Storper and A.J.
Scott, Eds., Production, Work, Territory: The Geographical Anatomy of
Industrial Capitalism (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1986), 172-193.
· 31 clyde Griffin, "Community Studies and the Investigation of
Nineteenth Century Social Relations," Social Sciences History 10
(1986), 315-338; Frances G. Couvares, The Remaking of Pittsburgh:
Class and Culture in an Industrializing City, 1877-1919 (Albany: The
State University of New York Press, 1984); Stanley Buder, Pullman: An
Experiment in Industrial Order and Community Planning, 1880-1930 (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1967).
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The study Area
This study examines the impact of the different phases
of capitalism on the Upper Tennessee River Valley; presentday Roane and Loudon Counties, Tennessee (Figures I.1,
I.2).

The Upper Tennessee River Valley in 1995 is in many

ways a fairly ordinary rural area, similar to many locales
in the Great Valley of the eastern United States: the
region is not in the immediate hinterland of any major
metropolitan area; agriculture and small-scale industry are
predominant; employment opportunities are limited.

Yet, if

we take a look at the region's history, the period between
the close of the Civil War and the turn-of-the-century
emerges as one of interest and importance. It was during
this time that factory-scale industrial production began in
the region, and that its present-day central places -Rockwood, Harriman, and Lenoir City -- were established.
The story of the Upper Tennessee River Valley reveals much
about late nineteenth and early twentieth century America,
and especially about how regions and cities develop during
different phases of capitalism.
The Upper Tennessee River Valley was profoundly shaped
by the three phases of capitalism which were dominant in
the nineteenth century, and these phases are relatively
easy to isolate when analyzing its history.

The mercantile

capitalist phase was dominant in the Upper Tennessee River
Valley until the close of the Civil War (1865).

During the
17

KNOX
r ....:-

.. ,.:

CUMBERLAND

~
? -#,.1
l·\~

~-*

_§,

McMINN

~---

Y/ t.;,,;;, ;;

-~C,

,.. - · ..f

'~
"'..,;· -.,

....-9

,

~
('

MONROE

'····,...

i
..

.

---~

~ ...

\

'

4~:

....

BRADLEY

·..._.

POLK

•

¼,.
TENNESSEE

.

J

\..

··-····-··-··~GEORGIA
;

t

f--l
(X)

Figure I.1.

The Regional Context:

O

j •

1(;"~'-.,

~,:

~

'~

r·
..
-··
. . <,_,,,.~~~---.✓.-------h . "Ji-s-t
I I
7
/

.j

~,.......

-.,rt,··-' '···· ····•·'%...,.#~-"'

r

2s

mi~,

/
(I·,

•

I

;____~
N. CAROLINA

~

■■--o••-··----··-··-··-·•,·:··:',
GEORGIA
· .. ■,,_::

East Tennessee

0

15

miles

w:.

. ,r'
-:-:-:-:--

·~-:-:❖:❖-

MEL TON HILL L.

~'Q
·--~

·,'<
; J)

...•·· .-·

_

.

..-···

Rockwood

•

;t

FT. LOUDOUN L.

tg1~,~~'(®',
ROANE

Loudon
LOUDON

~'t:mm,
~=-=:~; ~~~=~-.
: =~~

~k
f-'
I.O

Figure I.2.

The Regional Context:

The Upper Tennessee River Valley

-~~:?-.

i~~

antebellum era, the Appalachian Mountains were a barrier to
inmigration from the east.

Settlers who traveled into the

region via the Great Valley found little flat, fertile
land.

Many of these migrants moved on, farther to the

south and west, in search of better opportunities.

The

ones that stayed engaged in mixed-use agriculture on small
valley farms.

This agricultural economy was administered

by a few important merchants in small towns close to the
region's three connected rivers -- the Clinch, the Emory,
and the Tennessee (Figures I.1, I.2).
The industrial capitalist phase in the Upper Tennessee
River Valley began with the activities of former Union
soldiers, who initiated the first factory-scale industrial
production in the region in 1867.

These industrialists

were enticed to invest in the region by the availability of
coal and iron ore deposits in and around Walden's Ridge.
They constructed manufacturing facilities close to these
mineral deposits, and established a community in an effort
to facilitate the production process.
Land companies began the corporate or advanced capital
phase in the region in 1889.

Attracted by industrial

possibilities, they came into the Upper Tennessee River
Valley and purchased hundreds of thousands of acres of land
as part of their development schemes.

Each land company

had access to large amounts of capital to use for
development, and each initiated comprehensive development,
20

including resource extraction, industrial production, and
the establishment of cities.

The Transformation of a Region
Prior to the Civil War, the economy of the Upper
Tennessee River Valley was dominated by agriculture.

In

1860, the total cash value of farms in Roane County,
Tennessee was over 3.4 million dollars, while the capital
invested in all manufacturing establishments was less than
$338,000. 32

The industry that did exist at this time was

largely involved in the processing of agricultural
products. Agriculture-based industries such as flour
milling, liquor distillation, leather production, and wool
carding accounted for about fifty-five percent of the
slightly less than $294,975 in manufacturing goods produced
in Roane County in 1860.33
By 1890, the estimated value of manufactured goods
almost doubled that of agricultural goods in Roane County.
The cash value of farms in the county and the value of
crops produced on them had leveled off since 1870, while
the capital invested in manufacturing had risen sharply
over the same period. 34

Moreover, by 1880, Roane County

32 u.s., Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Eighth Census,
1860: Agriculture (Government Printing Office, 1865), 136; U.S.
Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Eighth Census, 1860:
Manufactures of the United States in 1860 (Goverment Printing Office,
1865), 572.
33 Bureau of the Census, Eighth Census, 1860: Manufactures, 572.
34 Bureau of the Census, Ninth Census, 1870, Tenth Census, 1880,
Eleventh Census, 1890: Agriculture; Ninth Census, 1870, Tenth Census,
1880, Eleventh Census, 1890: Manufactures.
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had more capital invested in iron and steel production
facilities ($700,000), and more workers employed in the
production of those commodities (400) than all other
counties in the state of Tennessee except for Hamilton
County, where the city of Chattanooga was growing
rapidly. 35

Twenty years later in 1900, the ce_nsus reported

that the county ranked eighth in capital invested in
manufacturing establishments in the state, but only twentyeighth in population. 36
These statistics illuminate the fundamental changes
that took place in the region during the decades following
the Civil War.

They do little to indicate why these

changes occurred or what
consequences were.

their economic and spatial

They also give no hint of the nature of

the places created, or of their people. These unanswered
questions provide the structure for a geographical
interpretation of regional transformation and place making
in the Upper Tennessee River Valley.

3 5sureau

of the Census, Tenth Census, 1880: The Manufacture of Iron
and Steel, 30-31.
36 Bureau of the CensJs, Twelveth Census, 1900: Population,
Manufactures.
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A conceptual context for understanding Regional
Transformation and Place Formation
Harriman, Rockwood, and Lenoir City are a few of many
small cities found in the Upper Tennessee River Valley
northeast of Chattanooga and southwest of Knoxville (Figure
I.1, I.2).

These places are different from their neighbors

in that they are all company towns.

They were created by

business enterprises that, to varying degrees, owned
production sites, housing, infrastructure, and commercial
facilities.

Rockwood began as a by-product of the Roane

Iron Company, the first large-scale manufacturing facility
to locate in the region, founded by former Union
army officers in 1867.

Harriman, Lenior City, and Cardiff

were planned towns, developed as part of large proposed
industrial complexes by land companies during the 1890s.
The common thread among these towns is that their
development was based almost solely on the intended
exploitation of the minerals of the region for use in the
large-scale production of iron, steel and other heavy
industrial products.

Each was a product of the economic

transformation that was taking place in the Upper Tennessee
River Valley during the post-Civil War period.
The economy of the region was transformed from one
that was agriculture-based to one that was industry-based.
This change was a product of successive "rounds" of capital
investment.

The rationale and actions of business
23

organizations: the Roane Iron Company, the East Tennessee
Land Company, the Lenior City Company, and the Cardiff Coal
and Iron Company, were responses to and products of the
economic, political, social, historical, and geographic
contexts in which they operated.

The regional

transformation that took place in the Upper Tennessee River
Valley must be explained in terms of the varying situations
within the iron and steel industry, the national financial
market,

and the national transportation network, as well

as prevailing societal attitudes and values as they emerged
in East Tennessee and the industrializing Northeastern
United States after 1865.
The transformation of the economy of the Upper
Tennessee River Valley between the close of the Civil War
and the beginning of the twentieth century can be viewed as
the result of three distinct rounds of capital investment.
The first was in effect in the region prior to the Civil
War, and was predicated upon the buying and selling
activities of merchants.

Little resource processing was

undertaken during this round.

The second round, which took

place in the period between 1865 and 1885, had
characteristics of early industrial capitalism: in general,
industrial companies had restricted access to capital and
operated on thin margins of profit.

It resulted in the

operation of an iron production facility (the Roane Iron
Company) and the founding of a community (Rockwood,
Tennessee).

The third, in the late 1880s and early 1890s,
24

exhibited more sophisticated use of capital, and produced
three resource-based industrial complexes and three
communities (Cardiff, Harriman, and Lenoir City).

I argue

that the different ways in which capitalists operated
during the three rounds determined why capital was funneled
into the Upper Tennessee River Valley,

and how capital was

used differently during the three respective investment
periods to ultimately create different types of places
(i.e. Rockwood, Harriman, Cardiff, and Lenoir City) . 37
This chapter presents an outline of regional
transformation as it occurred within the context of the
advent of corporate capitalism in the United States in the
period between the close of the Civil War and the beginning
of the twentieth century.

In this outline, I identify two

conceptual and spatial themes that tie regional
transformation and place making to the way in which capital
is accumulated and utilized.

The ways in which these

themes were played out in various industries and the Upper
Tennessee River Valley during the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries are investigated in subsequent
chapters.

37 rt should be noted that although these rounds of investment are
being viewed as distinct and separate, it is recognized that they are
related. The success of the earlier capital outlay in production and
accumulating profit served as an impetus to the second later period
of investment. They stand out in the region's history because no
other capital investment of any magnitude has occurred there in the
last century, leaving a settlement landscape in large part created in
the mid to late nineteenth century.
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Spatial Themes in Regional Transformation and the Creation
o:= urban- Industrial Places

Two interlocking spatial themes emerge from this
discussion of capital phases and place-making.

Theme I: Access to Capital and Urban-Industrial Development

The rise of corporate capitalism encompassed changes
in the organization makeup, management, financing, and
spatial arrangement of American business.

Between the

small, single plant company which predominated in the early
part of this period (the late 1860s and early 1870s), and
the large, integrated corporate system which came to the
fore in the early twentieth century, there were variations
in business operation methods and techniques which were
attempts to accrue profit more efficiently.

Not the le~st

among these were methods of financing business operations.
An analysis of regional change in the Upper Tennessee

River Valley indicates that companies involved in
transforming the economy and landscape of the region were
intermediate variations in the spectrum of movement toward
corporate capitalist financing methods.

The second round

of capital investment in the region, which occurred during
the late 1860s and early 1870s, basically followed the
early industrial capitalist model in which small businesses
and production facilities were owned by one family or a
26

small group of pecple and produced for local and regional
markets. The capital for this round of investment came from
outside the region, mostly from former Union soldiers that
were exposed to the area during the Civil War.

These men

had access to personal capital, and that of smaller
regional financial institutions (Chattanooga and
Indianapolis banks, for example).

Also, however, local

actors and the Tennessee state government created an
environment that encouraged industrial capital investment
during the early post-Civil War period.
Nevertheless, small businessmen faced two general
financing problems.
difficult to obtain.

First, risk capital for expansion was
Owners of small industrial

enterprises frequently had to borrow short-term money for
long-term investment, in the hope they could repay their
loans out of large immediate earnings.

This accounts for

the fact that th~y frequently went bankrupt during bad
times.

Yet access to long-term financing from outside

sources was nearly impossible because few investors were
willing to put money into small enterprises and few owners
would let contributors have any voice in the business.
Second, it was difficult for an owner of fixed capital to
transfer any part of his/her investment to an outsider.
Even a highly successful business enterprise might not

attract buyers, because to run a such a business required
specialized skills in addition to capital.

These skills

were usually possessed only by persons already involved in
27

the industry.

Consequently, potential buyers were to be

found only among rivals, which limited the opportunity to
sell to a merger with the firm of a competitor. 38

Clearly,

then, the owners of American industrial business concerns
during this period were in a disadvantageous position with
respect to obtaining capital for expansion or liquidating
their fixed investment.
The search for capital flexibility by American
businessmen led to, among other things, the "trust"
movement of the 1880s.

The first American industry to

develop the trust form of organization was oil refining
under the leadership of John D. Rockefeller's Standard Oil.
In 1882, the owneis of several refineries agreed to turn
their stock over to a group of trustees, receiving in
exchange as evidence of ownership, pieces of paper known as
"trust certificates."

The board of trustees was then

specifically authorized to act as a board of managers with
the power to make operating and investment decisions in the
best interests of the holders of the trust certificates
(the former refinery owners).

Several advantages were to

spring from this arrangement.

Strength from unity was an

one, both against other refiners and against violent price
fluctuations.

Also, the trust arrangement was thought to

be a method of circumventing the restrictions of the common
law against corporations doing business in several states.
Not among Standard Oil's original objectives was the search
38 Navin and Sears, "The Rise of a Market for Industrial Securities."
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for capital liquidity.

The organization never sought an

active public market for its trust certificates.

Standard

Oil had started a trend, however, and other businessmen,
recognizing the marketable value of the new financial
instrument, seized the opportunity to raise capital and
sold their certificates to the public. 39
Access to large reserves of capital, specifically
through dealings with trust companies in American financial
centers 40 , made possible the larger-scale economic
transformation and place formation that occurred in the
Upper Tennessee River Valley during the second round of
capital investment which occurred during the early 1890s.
Land companies, which were the agents of industrial
development and community formation during the second
investment round, were able to operate at a large-scale
because they had the capital to do so.

This is no small

point, because in general capitalists and industrialists in
Tennessee and the Upland South did not have very large
reserves of capital during this period, nor did they have
access to any institutions that did.

The land companies

obtained their capital from important American financial
centers outside the region, where large sums of money could
be obtained using sophisticated financial methods.

The

39 Navin and Sears, "The Rise of a Market for Industrial Securities,";
Chandler, The Visible Hand, 318-319.
40 Trust companies were offshoots of the original trust organizational
concept. Their general function can be explained as follows. If a
man trusted another, he placed his money in a trust fund in the other
man's care. When the other man established a company to handle a
number of trust funds, he called it a trust company.
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availability of large amounts of operating capital made all
of the difference in regional transformation; it enabled
the land companies to acquire mineral lands (backward
integration), pre-plan town sites, and build infrastructure
as part of their industrial development schemes.

This was

not the case during the first round of capital investment
in the region.
A corollary to this is that the land companies, and
perhaps Roane Iron Company during its later years, had to
have an avenue of association with these financial
institutions to gain access to their financial services and
large potential reserves of capital.

As Navin and Sears

point out,
It was very important to win the backing of investment bankers,
for they were the men who had come to occupy, through their
work with goverment bonds and rail securities, a central
position in the market for new issues ... We can only suppose in
the absence of specific evidence, that industrialists had been
making repeated attempts to attract the assistance of the
investment banking community ... In general, the only occasions
when bankers could be induced to handle industrial issues was
(a) when called in on the conversion of trusts to corporations,
(b) when a well-established industrial company wished to float
a bond issue for working capital purposes, or (c) when a
successful company wished to recapitalize in order to buy out
its satellite plants. 41

Thus, it was no easy thing to obtain the services of
investment bankers and trust companies during the late
nineteenth century.

Companies and business entities that

wanted to work with them had to be a known quantity or have
a connection, most likely through financial, railroad or
industrial business circles.

The question is "How many

41 Navin and Sears, "The Rise of a Market for Industrial Securities,"
124.
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businessmen that had investment-business interests in the
Upper Tennessee River Valley would have access to these
sources of capital?"

The odds are that very few would,

especially with the small amount of development that had
taken place in the region prior to 1890.

This is why I

believe that a small set of very important businessmen,
whom I will refer to as "capital injectors" 42 , were in
large part responsible for the economic transformation of
the Upper Tennessee River Valley during the mid to latenineteenth century.

Some men in this group of were local

and some outsiders, but they can be isolated and their
connections to outside capital sources and regional
development analyzed.
Theme II: The Involvement of Business Organizations in
Making Places

The extent of involvement and investment in the
creation of places was a reflection of the goals that
companies hoped to achieve by producing housing, services,
planned developments, and commercial functions.

Place-

making was part of a business strategy in which companies
evaluated their objectives and the economic context in
which they were operating, and formed places on the
landscape to meet their needs.

Of course, these needs

42 The actors whom I define as "capital injectors" would have been
those businessmen with both interests in urban-industrial development
in the Upper Tennessee River Valley and access to large financial
institutions (through various associations) in important financial
centers such as New York, Boston, and Philadelphia.
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might change over time, and new alternatives become
possible as the economic context of business operation
changed, and as new methods of production, organization and
financing were adopted.
Thus, in their barest essence, places created by
companies were spatial strategies to accumulating profit
through the targeting of specific perceived business needs.
One of the most obvious and constant of these needs,
especially for industrial producers, was labor supply.

At

rural sites close to resource deposits or power sources,
pools of labor were almost nonexistant, making it necessary
for companies to attract and shape their own labor
supplies.

This could be done through the place-making

process by the supply and mix of housing,

the

availability, size and cost of residential lots for sale,
or restrictive deed covenants making particular activities
or land uses illegal.

Other various perceived needs such

as the attraction of new industry, or the enticement of
real estate investors, could also be addressed by companies
through various means in their place development process.
Analysis of the types of places created by companies
during the two later capital investment periods (Rockwood
as representative of the industrial period, Harriman,
Cardiff, and Lenoir City of the corporate) will reveal
different strategies in place-making.

There are several

reasons for this difference in place-making strategy.
First, companies operating during the third round of
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investment were more sophisticated both organizationally
and financially than those during the second (Theme I).
This made it much more possible for them to manifest their
operational needs on the landscape through large-scale land
acquisition and the construction of pre-planned towns,
because the new organizational forms and financing methods
made capital available for this.

Companies operating under

the early industrial capitalism model (such as Roane Iron
in the late 1860s and early 1870s) would not have had
access to this capital, and had to create their places from
thin margins of profit and smaller reserves of local and
regional loan capital.
Second, the intentions and needs of companies
operating during the two periods (in relation to production
and profit making) were probably somewhat different.

The

Roane Iron Company at its outset was concerned with
operating a small-scale iron production facility, and
retaining a small, but constant labor force to work in the
facility by the construction of an unplanned settlement.
In contrast, the land companies were umbrella companies
that administered the acquisition of thousands of acres of
land, the layout of town plans, and the attraction of
industry to the towns. 43

These were obviously two

different business approaches, tempered by the economic
contexts in which they were undertaken.
43 The vertically integrated business organization of the land
companies can be viewed as an offshoot of the operating methods which
were becoming predominant in the rise of corporate capitalism.
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Third, the companies operating in the two investment
periods created places having had different amounts of
exposure to the ideals of the urban reform movement which
was underway during the latter part of the nineteenth
century.

When the town of Rockwood was initially developed

in 1867, the social and sanitary reform movements in the
United States were in their infancy, and their tenets had
not yet become widely known.

Because of this, it can be

assumed that even if the Roane Iron Company had the capital
necessary and desire to create a "model" town, its
principals probably would not have been exposed to the
ideas of these movements.

Conversely, the decades of the

1870s and 1880s were extremely important in the
dissemination of reform ideals, through the work of
Frederick Law Olmstead and others. 44

This would have meant

that the land companies which developed towns in the Upper
Tennessee River Valley in 1890 would most likely have been
exposed to these ideals, and had the opportunity to
incorporate them into their plans.

Scheme

This study is divided into several chapters.

Chapter

I explores the development of the pre-industrial Tennessee
Valley, i.e. the region's settlement landscape up until the
close of the Civil War during the era of mercantile
44 Peterson, "The Impact of the Sanitary Reform Movement upon American
Urban Planning."
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capital.

Chapter II details the regional situation during

the Reconstruction period, and provides information
regarding production techniques and business practices in
the iron and steel industry during this period.

It also

traces the first major round of capital investment in the
Upper Tennessee River Valley (beginning in the late 1860s),
which resulted in the Roane Iron Company production
facility and the town of Rockwood.

Chapter III

investigates the second major round of investment which
occurred in the region (during the late 1880s and early
1890s), which resulted in several manufacturing facilities
and the towns of Harriman, Cardiff, and Lenoir City.
Chapter IV focuses on the study region after the analysis
period, lending insight in to the development patterns that
exist presently.

Chapter Vis the summary and conclusion

section, and discusses the major findings of the study, and
their implications for our understanding of industrial
development and Upland South during the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries.

Chapter I
THE PRE-INDUSTRIAL UPPER TENNESSEE RIVER VALLEY

The pre-industrial Upper Tennessee River Valley was a
sparsely settled region for much of the eighteenth century.
The earliest European urban settlements were a product of
settler struggle against the Cherokee Indians for land.
The English, and later Americans, built forts for
protection from French and Indian attacks during the midto-late 1700s.

As native Indian groups were displaced by

Europeans over time, these forts became the focus of
economic activity.

During the late eighteenth and early

nineteenth centuries, roads began to be built through the
region and an agricultural economy began to develop.

River

transport became significant in the region, and spurred the
growth of towns such as Kingston, which became a break-ofbulk-point for commodities moved by road and river.

By the

1850s, railroads appeared in the Valley, and played a key
role in the development of the town of Loudon.

The

economic and settlement patterns created by mercantile
capitalism prevailed when industrial development of the
region was initiated in the post-Civil War era.

Before the Settlers
In the early eighteenth century, when Europeans first
moved into the Upper Tennessee River Valley, the area was
under the control of the Cherokee Indians, who had been
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living in the region since approximately 1000 A.D.

They

had developed a distinctive culture that included
complicated mound-building burial rites, pottery-making, a
major commitment to maize agriculture, and a settlement
pattern in which groups of permanent villages were
satellites of larger communities with clearly defined
ceremonial precincts. 1
The area controlled by the Cherokees in the early
1700s was approximately 40,000 square miles, extending from
the headwaters of the Tennessee River southward to
approximately the southern edge of the foothills of the
Appalachians, and east to west from piedmont region of the
Carolinas and Georgia to the north-flowing Tennessee River
in middle Tennessee. 2

The Cherokee population was

distributed in approximately 60 to 80 towns in the early
1700s, and was estimated to have numbered 16,000 to 17,000.
Cherokee settlements were found in three distinct
subregions.

These subregions have been described as the

Piedmont or Lower province of northern Georgia, eastern
Alabama, and northwestern South Carolina; the Blue Ridge or
Middle province of western North Carolina, northeastern
Tennessee, southwestern Virginia, and northwestern South
Carolina; and the Ridge and Valley or Overhill province of
northwestern Georgia, northeastern Alabama, and
1Roy S. Dickens, Jr., "The Origins and Development of the Cherokee
Culture," in D. King, Ed., The Cherokee Indian Nation: A Troubled
History (Knoxville, TN: University of Tennessee Press, 1979), 3-28.
2Gilbert E. Govan and James W. Livingwood, The Chattanooga Country
1540-1951: From Tomahawks to TVA (New York: E.P. Dutton & Company,
1952), 23-24.

37

southeastern Tennessee. 3

The Cherokee Overhill settlement

area encompassed the Upper Tennessee River Valley.
At the time of first contact with Europeans, the
Cherokee had cultivated sophisticated cultural and national
systems. The entire Cherokee nation was organized under a
principal chief. However, subregional settlement groups
functioned as the major units of political, religious, and
everyday life.

Each town and every settlement group had

its own civil, religious, and military organizations which
paralleled those of the national institutions.

Cherokee

towns varied in size from a dozen up to two hundred
dwellings, with the average being about one hundred.

In

any town, seven geneological clans were represented which
linked all of the town residents by blood or marriage.
This type of clan relationship prevailed throughout the
nation and linked all of the Cherokee by kinship bonds. 4
The towns _settled by the Cherokee were fairly
permanent, and were mostly located along streams and rivers
in valley areas.

Agriculture was integral to their way of

life. Corn was their main staple crop, but they also grew
beans, gourds, and sunflowers as food crops.

The Cherokee

also traveled over large areas in hunting parties in search
of meat to supplement their diets.

The Cherokee Indians

had only a vague conception of land ownership in the
3Thomas M.N. Lewis and Madeline Kneberg, Tribes That Slumber: Indians
of the Tennessee Region (Knoxville, TN: University of Tennessee
Press, 1960), 156-159; Dickens, Cherokee Culture, 9-13; and Govan and
Livingood, Chattanooga Country, 23-25.
4Lewis and Kneberg, Tribes That Slumber, 157-166.
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European sense.

They knew what territory they controlled

and could utilize for substinence, but individuals did not
claim land for themselves as property.

European settlement of the Tennessee Valley

The end of Cherokee control in the Tennessee Valley
began with the arrival of Europeans in the area in the
early eighteenth century.

East Tennessee was settled

rather late compared to the coastal plain and piedmont
areas of Georgia and North and South Carolina, with only
few incursions by individual trappers and traders.

Until

the beginning of the eighteenth century, the Appalachian
Mountains stood as a barrier to westward advancement from
English communities along the Atlantic coast.

The French

who had settled to the south and west were likewise
dissuaded from moving into the Tennessee Valley by the
impedement of the Muscle Shoals on the Tennessee River.
The first major contact and negotiation that the English
had with the Cherokees occurred in the South Carolina
colony in 1721, when the Indians ceded a tract of land in
that colony.
The Treaty of 1721 marked the beginning of the gradual
eviction of the Cherokee from their lands.

By 1730, the

English had won the confidence of the Cherokees, and
persuaded a party of their leaders to visit England as a
sign of good will.

The visit resulted in a treaty in which

the Cherokee granted the English exclusive rights to trade
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and build forts in their territory. 5

The Cherokee served

as an invaluable ally for the English against the French,
their principal competitors for land in North America.

The

French had cultivated relationships with other Indian
tribes, so that each country had Indian allies with which
to help control territory and sway the balance of power.
The hostilities between the French and English broke out in
the French and Indian War in 1754.

The English enlisted

the help of the Cherokee on expeditions against the French
in the Ohio Valley.

They also built the first English fort

in Cherokee country on the Little Tennessee River during
the war in 1756, called Fort Loudon.
At the close of the French and Indian War in 1763, the
English had defeated both the French and renegade Cherokee
war parties that had risen up against them during the war.
With the land west of the Appalachians thoroughly under
English control, and the danger from Indians minimized,
settlers began to pour into the valleys of East Tennessee
from southern coastal areas and down the Great Valley from
Pennsylvania and Virginia.

Over the next sixty years, the

Cherokee gradually lost their land in a cycle of settler
encroachment, conflict, and treaty agreement.

European

settlers were constantly settling in Cherokee territory in
search of the best homesteads.

The Cherokee reacted to

this by attacking settlers, and appealing first to the
English and later the American government to stop the
5 rbid., 166-167.
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encroachment. 6

Settlers were also appealing to government

authorities to put a stop to indian attacks.

Conflicts of

this type were most often mediated through treaties in
which the Cherokee sold land to the English or Americans
for a minimal price.

The result was a steady push of the

Cherokee to the south and west throughout the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.
The land of the Upper Tennessee River Valley was
acquired through several treaties between the Cherokee and
the United States government beginning in 1791.

The first

of these was the Treaty of Holston in which the Holston and
Nolichucky river valleys were acquired from the Cherokee
for a $1,000 payment.

The Holston treaty was signed at

White's Fort, later to become Knoxville, and was the
groundbreaking agreement in opening up the Tennessee Valley
for settlement.

In fairly quick succession further

treaties were si_gned.

Eight years ·1ater in 1798, the

Treaties of Tellico were signed in which lands in the
French Broad and Clinch river valleys were bought by the
United States for $6,000.

In the Third Treaty of Tellico

of 1805, a large tract of land on the Cumberland Plateau
which formed the western boundary of the Valley was
purchased by the federal government for $14,000.

The

southern area of the Tennessee Valley remained under
6The territory which comprised Tennessee came under the
administration of the new American government in 1782 after the
defeat of the English in the Revolutionary War. The Cherokee fought
on the side of the English during the war, and were persecuted for
this when the colonists were eventually victorious.
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Cherokee control until 1819, when the renegade Chickamaugas
finally gave in to federal government military
superiority. 7

The final chapter of the Cherokee presence

in East Tennessee was marked by the infamous Treaty of New
Echota, which resulted in the cession of all Cherokee land
east of the Mississippi River.

The Treaty of New Echota

was the basis for the forcible removal of the Cherokee to
Arkansas and Oklahoma in 1838 by the federal government,
along what became known as the "Trail of Tears."

European Settlement Landscape in the Tennessee Valley

Settler struggle again-st the Cherokee for land in the
Tennessee Valley produced an initial settlement landscape
that endured until the mid-nineteenth century.

Both the

English and Americans had built a network of forts for
protection from French and Indian attacks during the mid to
late 1700s.

These forts often became the focus of economic

activity during the mercantile capitalist phase, emerging
as the first towns in the Upper Tennessee River Valley
region.
Forts were most often located at strategic points
along river banks, where water transportation could be
utilized, and movements of the enemy monitored and
constrained.

In the Upper Tennessee River Valley, three

7Albert C. Holt, The Economic and Social Beginnings of Tennessee
(Nashville, TN: George Peabody College, 1923), 35-38; and Weston A.
Goodspeed, Ed., Goodspeed's General History of Tennessee (Nashville,
TN: Goodspeed Publishing Company, 1887), 93~103.
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major forts were founded during the Indian period: Fort
Loudon, Fort White, and Fort Southwest Point.

Fort Loudon

was the oldest of these forts, founded in 1756, and was the
first European settlement in the Tennessee Valley.

It was

built on the banks of the Little Tennessee River during the
French and Indian War as a defense for the English and
their Cherokee allies against French attacks from the south
and west. 8

The other two forts were built later in the

century generally as protection for settlers against the
Cherokee as larger scale settlement took place in the
Valley. 9

Fort White was constructed in 1786 near the

origin of the Tennessee River, on a well fortified bluff

°

site. 1

Fort Southwest Point was built in 1792 near the

confluence of the Clinch, Emory, and Tennessee Rivers.

It

became a very important strategic site militarily following
its construction by General John Sevier, as it served to
cut off water travel and communication between the Upper
and Lower Cherokee settlement groups. 11

8 John Haywood, The Civil and Political History of the State of
Tennessee from its Earliest Settlement up to the Year 1796 (Reprinted
from 1823 Edition, Knoxville, TN: Tenase Co., 1969), 41-45; P.M.

Hamer, Fort Loudoun on the Little Tennessee River (Raleigh, NC:
Edwards & Broughton Printing Co., 1925).
9Groups of Cherokee Indians by this time had become disenchanted with
settlers and the American government for constant encroachment on
their traditional lands.
10Mary U. Rothrock, Ed., The French Broad-Holston Country: A History
of Knox County, Tennessee (Knoxville, TN: East Tennessee Historical
Society, 1946), 26-27.
11 stanley J. Folmsbee, Robert E. Corlew, and Enoch L. Mitchell, Eds.,
History of Tennessee, Volume I (New York: Lewis Historical Publishing
Co., 1960), 194-202; Eugene M. Pickel, "A History of Roane County,
Tennessee to 1860, "(M.A. Thesis, Univ. of Tennessee, Knoxville,
1971), 25-27.
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The Development of a Regional Economy in the
~per Tennessee River Valley
During the pre-Civil War nineteenth century, the
initial layers of the Upper Tennessee River Valley
palimpsest were formed by mercantile capitalism, involving
agriculture, small-scale and unsophisticated industry, and
the development of successive transportation modes that
included roads, rivers, and railroads.

Settlements that

had initially been trading posts and ferry crossings became
markets for agricultural products,
mostly home-centered industry.

and locations for

Grist mills, tanneries,

boot and shoe producers, hatmakers, carriagemakers,
druggists, general store owners and others relied upon
resources and customers from the surrounding hinterland.
The modifications that occurred in this regional hinterland
relationship during this period were tied to changes in the
transportation landscape, which enabled both people and
commodities to move more quickly and easily over space.
Farming emerged as the dominant activity in the
region on the fertile lands of the Upper Tennessee River
Valley soon after settlement began there in the late
eighteenth century.

From its outset, agriculture in the

region was dominated by corn, wheat, and oats.

The limited

availability of flat, fertile valley land dictated that
these crops be grown on farms of small to medium size,
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generally between twenty and five hundred acres. 12

The

region's farmers were not specialists; besides their staple
crops they also grew small amounts of many crops for their
own consumption.

This pattern of agriculture did not

encourage the development of "cash crops" such as tobacco,
cotton, or peanuts in the Upper Tennessee region.
Consequently, the smaller-scale, mixed-use regional farms
never utilized large amounts of slave labor as did their
contemporaries in Middle and West Tennessee. 13
By 1860, the agricultural economy of the Upper
Tennessee River Valley had reached its apex.

Approximately

365,000 acres of land in the study area 14 , worth
$3,420,610, was in use for agriculture. 15

In the

preceding decade, significant advances had been made in
agricultural methods and organization, and a statewide
movement to support agrarianism was in full swing.

The

Roane County Agricultural Society was formed as a local
branch of the Tennessee State Agricultural Bureau.

The

Agricultural Society's mission was the improvement of
farming methods on the county level.

Part of this effort

was the organization of annual county-wide agricultural
fairs during the 1850s at which farming methods were
12 united States Eighth Census, Volume II Agriculture (Government
Printing Office, 1865), 215.
13Goodspeed, History of Tennessee, 229-232.
14 Roane County in 1860 encompassed the entire study area, and
therefore its census statistics are applicable to this analysis.
Loudon County, in which Loudon and eventually Lenoir City were
located, was formed out of parts of Roane, Monroe, and Blount
Counties in 1870.
15united States Eighth Census, Agriculture, 136.
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demonstrated, various competitions held, and issues
debated. 16

These fairs were a manifestation of the

importance and prestige of agriculture in the State and
County in the pre-Civil War era.
The need to market the agricultural produce of this
rural region stimulated the formation of the first urban
place in the Upper Tennessee Valley region.

The town of

Kingston, which became the regional focus of commercial and
political activity in the mercantile capitalist era, was
established by an act of the state legislature in late
1799.

Founded near the confluence of the Emory, Clinch,

and Tennessee Rivers, Kingston began as a trading post for
the federal government's military post at Fort Southwest
Point.

Its functions expanded with the Valley's growing

population, and as political boundaries began to be placed
on the landscape of East Tennessee.
nineteenth century,

By the turn of the

Kingston had become the marketing

center for produce from the surrounding valley farms,
mainly because of its access to river transportation.

The

town also was named the county seat of Roane County in
1801, bringing formal governmental apparatus in the
following years. 17

Court facilities, law offices,

mercantile establishments, and inns were established in

16pickel, "History of Roane County," 55-60.
17Jack Shelley, Helen Galloway, Arny Wolfe, and Madge Sneed, "Towns Old and New" in Jere Hall and Jack B. Shelley, Eds., Valley of
Challenge and Change: Roane County, Tennessee, 1860-1900 (Knoxville,
TN: East Tennessee Historical Society, 1986), 49-51.
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Kingston to serve its local political functions and to
cater to its rural hinterland.
Despite the steady flow of settlers into the Valley
during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries,
the growth of the area was hampered by inadequate
transportation.

The first settlers had floated down the

Tennessee River or

one of its tributaries on flatboats, or

followed poorly marked and hazardous game trails and Indian
paths into the region.

The region remained without any

improved routes of land travel until 1792, when the Treaty
of Holston was signed, providing for a road to be
constructed westward from Knoxville to the new settlements
of Middle Tennessee.

The route chosen for the new road was

from Knoxville to Kingston (Fort Southwest Point) where the
Clinch River was crossed by ferry, west across Indian
territory for one hundred miles to a ferry crossing of the
Cumberland River (which became the town of Carthage), and
on to Nashville via the settlement of Gallatin (Figure
1.1).

The road, which came to be known as Walton Road18 ,

was completed in 1795 and improved in 1801 through state
approprations and the incorporation of the Cumberland
Turnpike Company. 19

After 1800, the State of Tennessee

18 The road was named for William Walton, a member of the board of
commissioners of the Cumberland Turnpike Company.
19 Thornas P. Aberethy, Frontier to Plantation in Tennessee: A Study in
Frontier Democracy (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina
Press, 1932), 155-158; Stanley J. Folmsbee, Robert E. Corlew, and
Enoch L. Mitchell, Tennessee: A Short History (Knoxville, TN: The
University of Tennessee Press, 1969), 241-244; Albert C. Holt, The
Economic and Social Beginnings of Tennessee (Nashville, TN: George
Peabody College, 1923), 68-72.
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Early Roads and Settle ment s of Tenne ssee

Cumberland Settlemen t

increasingly encouraged the construction of roads into
settlement areas.
In the early nineteenth century, Walton Road became
the principal route of overland travel between East and
Middle Tennessee.

Kingston's location along

Walton Road,

and at the confluence of the Emory, Clinch, and Tennessee
Rivers cemented its primacy as the economic and commercial
center of the region.

Its access to water and land travel

routes made it a natural break-of-bulk point, and a
strategic site for the east-west transportation of both
people and commodities.

Many travelers on their way to

Middle Tennessee and points west stopped in Kingston for
rest and provisions.

Would-be settlers also waited at

Kingston for military escorts to accompany them on their
westward journey, as protection from Indian attacks which
occurred periodically in the territory between the Clinch
and Cumberland Rivers. 20
Until approximately 1830, road and unorganized river
transportation dictated the pattern of commodity flows and
movement of people through the Upper Tennessee River Valley
region.

As the region was settled, it became evident that

the upper limits of the Tennessee River contained natural
obstacles preventing the movement of larger boats between
Knoxville and important southern ports such as Memphis and
New Orleans.

The most troublesome of these was Muscle

Shoals in Alabama, a thirty-seven mile stretch of rapids
20 Holt, Economic and Social Beginnings, 70-71.
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created by a cumulative vertical drop of 134 feet in the
river. The shoals were located 260 miles from the
confluence of the Tennessee and Ohio Rivers.

They could be

traversed only during the high-water season and then only
by boats small in comparison to those used on the Ohio and
Mississippi Rivers.

Muscle Shoals cut East Tennessee off

from the larger southern economy.

By 1822, a regular

steamboat line was in operation between New Orleans and
southern boundary of the Muscle Shoals, but the Upper
Tennessee remained unserved.
In 1828, however, the steamboat era finally reached
East Tennessee.

During February and March of that year,

the steamboat Atlas traveled from New Orleans up the
Mississippi, Ohio, and Tennessee River to Knoxville.

The

Atlas had crossed Muscle Shoals during a high-water period,

and arrived in Knoxville with much fanfare. 21

The city

fathers of Knoxville had much anticipated the arrival of
steamboat transport, and in fact gave the captain of the
Atlas a $640 purse for successfully completing the journey.

It would be another three years, however, before regular
steamboat service began in the Tennessee Valley.

This was

a result of the successful plea of East Tennesseans to the
state legislature in 1830 for $60,000 to improve conditions
for water transport on the Tennessee River.

The money was

used to dredge a navigable channel between Knoxville and

21 Knoxville Daily Register, March 4, 1828.
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the Alabama state line. 22

The dredging made steamboat

travel possible between Knoxville and Decatur, Alabama at
the head of Muscle Shoals from November until June. 23
The advent of streamboat transportation brought
significant growth to the economy of the Upper Tennessee
River Valley.

During the late 1830s and 1840s, there was

substantial growth in commerce carried on regional rivers.
Agricultural products were brought down the Clinch and
Tennessee Rivers in large quantities, and were most often
transported on to Chattanooga or Decatur, Alabama. 24
Kingston remained the focus of the emerging mercantile
agricultural-steamboat-based economy, and its regional
importance increased accordingly.

Produce from the

agricultural hinterland was assembled in the town,

and its

value improved by reducing bulk and perishability.

Corn,

for example, was shelled and sacked, milled into cornmeal,
or made into whiskey.

A mill ground wheat into flour.

Kingston's wharf was kept busy with the shipment of
agricultural products and trade items.

To accommodate

22 Gilbert E. Govan and James W. Livingood, Chattanooga Country 15401951: From Tomahawks to TVA (New York: E.P. Dutton & Company, 1952),
121-122.

23 Edwin P. Patton, "Transportation Development" in Lucille Deadrick,
Ed., Heart of the Valley: A History of Knoxville, Tennessee
(Knoxville, TN: East Tennessee Historical Society, 1976), 179-181;
Mary U. Rothrock, Ed., The French Broad-Holston Country: A History of
Knox County, Tennessee (Knoxville, TN: East Tennessee Historical
Society, 1946), 96-100.
2 41n 1838, a state appropriation was made to improve navigation on
selected tributaries of the Tennessee River. As a result of this,
keelboat transport of produce on tributaries such as the Holston,
Clinch, and Emory Rivers increased, and these agricultural areas were
connected with steamboat travel on the Tennessee River.
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passengers arriving by boat and overland stage, new larger
hotels and businesses were built during this period.
Kingston remained the sole urban settlement of any
consequence in the region until the 1850s, when
transportation innovation brought advantages to another
site along the Tennessee River.

The village of Blair's

Ferry had been established by the Blair family, some of the
earliest settlers to the region, in 1817.

The family had

come to an agreement with the Cherokee Indians, in which
they obtained permission to operate a ferry across the
Tennessee River. 25

Blair's Ferry remained a small river

settlement for the next thirty years, growing only slightly
with steamboat travel on the river.

By the late 1840s, the

village consisted only of one general store, a steamboat
landing, and a few houses.

Blair's Ferry's future, was

changed, however, with the first railroad line to East
Tennessee.

The East Tennessee and Georgia Railroad ran

from Dalton, Georgia north to the Blair's Ferry site and
was completed in 1852. 26

Within two years, Blair's Ferry

became an important place in the region in association with
the railroad.
The East Tennessee and Georgia Railroad was a revival
of the Hiwassee Railroad, which had made an aborted effort
to build a railroad from Dalton, Georgia to Knoxville
before its financial collapse in 1842.

Following the

25Ted B. Clark, "The Changing Central Place Function of Loudon,
Tennessee," (M.A. Thesis, Univ. of Tennessee, 1968), 6-8.
26 Rothrock, French Broad-Holston Country, 104-107; Folrnsbee et. al.,
Tennessee - A Short History, 261-262.
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termination of a civil suit against the Hiwassee by the
State of Tennessee, the company was reorganized and
obtained its new charter in 1848.

Continuation of rail

line construction north from Dalton was made possible by a
loan of $350,000 in state bonds by the State of
Tennessee. 27

By August of 1852, construction of the rail

line had been completed from Dalton to Blair's Ferry, and
trains had begun operation.

Blair's Ferry became the

northern terminus of the East Tennessee and Georgia in 1852
mainly because funds were not available to build a railroad
bridge across the Tennessee River.
The fortuitous advantage conferred upon Blair's Ferry
by the local landscape served as the impetus of its rapid
growth in the ensuing years.

A larger town area was

planned and platted in 1852, and the planned community was
renamed Loudon, after the first English fort in the region.
In the aftermath of the completion of the railroad, a
"boom-town" atmosphere existed, as Loudon became the only
railroad-connected, break-of-bulk point 28 in the Valley.
Produce in large quantities was brought from various
locations on the river, and transferred to the railroad
where it was shipped to points south.

Traffic was so heavy

during the harvest season that steamboats had to lay over
several days to discharge cargo.

Merchants began selling

2 7 Rothrock, French Broad-Holston Country, 105.

28 A break-of-bulk point is a location at which there is a transfer of
commodities from one mode of transportation to another. In the case
of Loudon, the town became an important break-of-bulk point between
water and rail transport when the East Tennessee & Georgia Railroad
was completed in 1852.
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produce and dried goods in new stores, a flouring mill was
built to refine corn and wheat,

and a saw mill and foundry

were established at the new transportation crossroads. 29
The population of Blair's Ferry/Loudon grew rapidly in the
early rail period, propelling it from a frontier settlement
to an important regional town.
Loudon's boom town era did not last long, however;
railroad expansion took away the town's locational
advantage as quickly as it conferred it.

The East

Tennessee and Georgia Railroad's problem with lack of
construction funds was solved when the Tennessee State
Legislature announced in 1854 that it would provide a loan
for the extension of the line northward.

The State

provided $8,000 per mile of rail line, on the condition
that the rail line be completed to Knoxville. 30

By June of

1855, the extension to Knoxville was completed, making it
the northern terminus of the East Tennessee and Georgia.
Less than three years later, Knoxville became the
connection point of the the East Tennessee and Georgia and
East Tennessee and Virginia Railroads, making it a
strategic location on a rail network that stretched from
Richmond, Virginia to Atlanta, Georgia. 31

Although

29 Goodspeed's History of Tennessee: Containing Historical and
Biographical Sketches of Thirty East Tennessee Counties (Nashville,

TN: reprinted from Goodspeed's History of Tennessee 1887 by Elder
Booksellers, 1972), 826-827.
30 1t is generally accepted that Knoxville lobbied to become the
northern terminus of the East Tennessee and Georgia Railroad from its
inception It is probable that Knoxvillians used whatever influence
they could muster to encourage the State to fund the extension of the
East Tennessee and Georgia to Knoxville.
31 Patton, "Transportation Development", 193-195.
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Loudon's boom town phase was over after 1855, it remained a
locally important marketing center because of its waterrail connection.

The civil war in the upper Tennessee River Valley
The debate over states rights and slavery came to
Tennessee as it did other southern states in 1860 and 1861.
A political chasm on the issue of slavery developed between
the counties of East Tennessee and the rest of the state.
While East Tennesseeans varied in their attitudes toward
slavery, they did not identify with the large plantation
owners of the deeper South who were benefitting to a much
larger degree frorr the institution.

East Tennessee was

also the last stronghold of the Whig party, whose
conservative tenets tended to ally it with the Unionist
cause.
By February of 1861, the states' rights debate and
slavery controversy in Tennessee had reached such critical
proportions that Governor Isham Harris called for a special
session of the state legislature to decide whether or not
the State should seceed from the Union.

Harris enumerated

twenty-three grounds of complaint against the Northern
states,

which he believed necessitated and justified the

removal of Tennessee and other Southern states from the
Union. 32

The convening of the seccession convention was

32 oliver P. Temple, East Tennessee and the Civil War (Cincinnati, OH:
The Robert Clarke Co., 1899), 167-172; Governor Harris was a stauch
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defeated statewide by a margin of 66,000 votes, and in the
counties of East Tennessee alone the convening of the
convention lost by over 25,000 votes.

This resolution of

the seccession issue in Tennessee lasted only a few months,
as Confederate troops opened fire on the federal garrison
of Fort Sumter in April of 1861.

Shortly thereafter,

~resident Lincoln called for 75,000 volunteers to put down
the rebellious Southern states.

The decision by the

federal government to stop state succession by force
created a new opportunity for seccessionists in Tennessee.
They were able to capitalize on President Lincoln's
decision by stoking fears of northern aggression against
the South, and once again called for the removal of the
State from the Union.
A second seccession referendum vote was called for
June of 1861 by Governor Harris.

The Tennessee State

Legislature had already adopted a resolution of military
alliance between the State and the Confederate government
in the preceding months, and was seeking popular support
for the decision.

As the time for the referendum

approached, most prominent leaders of church, press, and
state in Middle and West Tennessee were urging ratification
of the declaration of independence, while those in East
Tennessee were arguing against it.

The result of this

second vote was a substantial 50,000 vote majority in favor
Democrat, and was sympathetic to the cause of the southern planter
and slave owner. It is widely held that his personal views dictated
this first attempt to remove the State of Tennessee from the Union
before the attack on Fort Sumter.
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of secession from the Union statewide. 33

There was

considerable regional variation in the secession vote.

The

traditional Whig districts of East Tennessee, with
Knoxville as the regional focus, strongly opposed
separation from the Union.

The established Democratic area

to the northeast followed native son, former governor, and
United States senator Andrew Johnson in opposing secession
as well (with the exception of Sullivan County).

Middle

and West Tennessee voted almost solidly for secession.
The Unionist counties of East Tennessee made a last
ditch effort to avoid separation from the federal
government.

Meetings of prominent Unionists were held in

Knoxville, Greeneville, and other towns shortly after the
vote in order to develop a plan of action.

The final

result was a convention at Greeneville, Tennessee at which
a plan was proposed for the independence of the East
Tennessee region as a separate state.

The proposal was

presented to the state legislature, which took no action on
it, but noted the security problems that Unionist
sentiments in East Tennessee presented to the Confederacy.
The eastern part of the state was strategically valuable as
a principal avenue of travel between the upper and lower
South, especially because of the East Tennessee and
Georgia, and East Tennessee and Virginia Railroads which
stretched from Atlanta, Georgia to the Confederate capital
33James W. Patton, Unionism and Reconstruction in Tennessee (Chapel
Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1934), 14-24;
Abernethy, Frontier to Plantation in Tennessee, 338-343; Temple, East
Tennessee and the Civil War, 196-204.
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of Richmond, Virginia.

In less than a month, six

Confederate regiments were sent to East Tennesssee to
secure the region, commanded by former Knoxvillian General
Felix Zellicoffer. 3 4
The Upper Tennessee River Valley was a microcosm of
events that were taking place throughout East Tennessee
during the Civil War.

The citizens of the region were

split fairly evenly between support of the Confederacy and
the Union.

Union supporters, however, were being

increasingly persecuted by local Confederate sympathizers
and soldiers that had moved into the region.

Many Union

sympathizers left the region and fled to Kentucky or other
northern states where volunteer units were being organized
in the latter months of 1861.

Some stayed in Tennessee and

resisted Confederate occupation through guerilla
activity. 35

Many remaining residents also joined

Confederate units that were being raised in Knoxville and
other nearby towns.
The Upper Tennessee River Valley was controlled by
occupying Confederate forces until the summer of 1863, when
Federal forces brcught the shooting war to East Tennessee.
Since the beginning of hostilities President Lincoln had
wanted to aid those loyal to the federal government in
34 James w. Fertig, The Secession and Reconstruction of Tennessee
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1898), 28-32; Folmsbee,
Corlew, and Mitchell, Tennessee: A Short History, 324-325.
35The most infamous of these guerilla activities was the coordinated
burning of five railroad bridges between Stevenson, Alabama and
Bristol, Tennessee, which rendered 265 miles of railway useless and
impeded the transportation of Confederate troops and supplies to the
battlefields of Northern Virginia.
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Tennessee.

In August of 1863, General Ambrose Burnside

directed his Federal Army of the Ohio to begin movement to
the south from Camp Nelson, Kentucky into East Tennessee.
Receiving advance notice of the movement of Federal forces,
Confederate General Simon Buckner elected to abandon the
Tennessee River Valley in the face of superior numbers.

By

September the region was under Union control.
Unfortunately, the fighting in the county would not end for
over a year after this.

The defeat of federal forces under

General William Rosecrans at Chickamauga to the south
allowed Confederate calvary to roam freely throughout East
Tennessee.

General Nathan Bedford Forrest in particular

led raids into the region, inflicting heavy losses in terms
of men and materials.

From the fall of 1863 until the end

of the war, the Valley endured skirmishes between the
armies several times.
The economic, social, and intellectual life of the
Tennessee River Valley suffered greatly during the Civil
War.

As the result of constant troop movements through the

Valley, the land was stripped of most of its foodstuffs.
What armies did not forage from the farmsteads, marauders
stole from the defenseless families that remained.
Businesses in towns such as Kingston and Loudon were not
able to replentish their stocks because of the fighting,
and many were forced out of business.

Gold and silver had

passed completely out of circulation so that any type of
business had to be done using paper money of questionable
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value.

Many schools and churches had also been damaged and

destroyed.

Farms and property lay idle.

Many of the

Unionists that did return to the region after the war
wanted retribution, and sought reparations from the estates
of Confederate officers who had damaged their properties.
This created an atmosphere of hostility between former
local Confederates and Unionists in the months and years
following the close of the war. 3 6
One important result of the war which would have
future ramifications for the region was the exposure of
outside Union soldiers to the area.

Their travels though

the Tennessee Valley during wartime exposed them for the
first time to the natural resource base of the region.
Union officers such as General John T. Wilder and Captain
Hiram S. Chamberlain took notice of the large deposits of
iron ore and coal along the Cumberland Escarpment which
formed the western boundary of the valley.

Although large-

scale investment in the region would be delayed for a few
years during the post-war recovery period, the interest of
these entrepreneurs had been piqued, and it would play a
large role in the region in the years to come.
In summary, at the close of the Civil War, the Upper
Tennessee River Valley continued to be an agriculturedominated region.

The Civil War had taken its toll on the

36 Jack Mcinnis and William Jarnborsky, "A County in Time of Turmoil",
in Jere Hall and Jack B. Shelley, Eds., Valley of Challenge and
Change: Roane County, Tennessee, 1860-1900, (Knoxville, TN: East
Tennessee Historical Society, 1986), 8-12; Fertig, Unionism and
Reconstruction in Tennessee, 68-72.
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area, but the economic balance of agriculture and marketing
remained, if on a slightly smaller scale.

The towns of

Kingston and Loudon were the marketing centers of the
mercantile economy, and they provided services for
residents of the rural hinterland.

The Upper Tennessee

Valley remained a relatively isolated backwater region,
however, with its only railroad connection being the East
Tennessee and Georgia which ran through the extreme eastern
section.

The ensuing years would change the region's

fortunes and its character, bringing it into the larger
industrial economy.

Chapter II
RECONSTRUCTION AND INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT: THE SECOND ROUND
OF CAPITAL INVESTMENT

Reconstruction in Tennessee
In the aftermath of the Civil War, Tennessee was a
state torn asunder by the atrocities of wartime and the
rivalries of soldiers returned home.

The sufferings of

Tennesseans, so pronounced during the hostilities, were
continued into the post-war period with the return of Union
and Confederate soldiers.

Many men returned to land

damaged and made barren by war, and fought with those they
held responsible.

Added to this were the social and

economic issues posed by recently freed African- Americans,
who were adjusting to their new status.
The State of Tennessee had technically been under
federal military rule since March of 1862, when federal
troops forced the evacuation of Confederate forces from
Nashville and Middle Tennessee.

Andrew Johnson, a native

Tennessean and United States senator, was appointed
military governor of Tennessee by President Lincoln at this
time.

Johnson's tenure as governor lasted until early

1865, when his duties as Vice President of the United
States required his presence in Washington, D.C.

His last

official act as governor of Tennessee was the authorization
of elections to select officials for a civil state
government.

At the election, held on March 4, 1865,
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William G. Brownlow was elected governor by a large
majority. 1
Brownlow's Republican administration immediately
undertook a program of harsh retribution against former
Confederates.

Governor Brownlow recommended that the state

criminal code be strengthened to combat guerilla activity;
that suffrage be limited to loyal Union men; that freedmen
be protected from the harrassment of former Confederates;
and that Confederate officers and bank directors be held
personally responsible for bank and railroad losses.

He

also announced a reward of $5000 for the arrest of former
state governor Isham G. Harris, declaring him "responsible
to a great extent for the war ... 112
Part of the Brownlow administration's wholesale
rejection of the Confederate creed was a marked
reorientation of the government's approach to economic
development within the state.

Prior to the Civil War,

Tennesseans in general and the state government in
particular, held firmly to the doctrine of the superiority
of agriculture to other economic activities.

For example,

in 1854 the Tennessee general assembly, in the preamble of.
an act establishing a state agricuitural bureau, explicitly
stated that agriculture was the source and foundation of
all industry and that the state must continue to rely upon
1Fertig, Unionism and Reconstruction in Tennessee, 34-59.
Only men
who took an oath of loyalty to the Union were allowed to vote for
civil state government positions. This was in large part the reason
for Brownlow's easy victory.
2Folmsbee, Corlew, and Mitchell, Tennessee: A Short History, 353-354.
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it for its future prosperity. 3

Brownlow and his fellow

Radical Republicans that took over post-war state
leadership saw the war as a clash of economic systems as
well as armies, and interpreted Confederate defeat as
evidence that the antebellum South had failed to cultivate
a strong economic base.

Governor Brownlow's new direction

was evident from his inaugural speech, in which he
proclaimed " ... that the natural resources of the Southern
States are being expatiated upon, in order that
enterprising emigrants may be led to come among us and add
to our capital and enterprise.

Tennessee holds out

inducements to wealthy and industrious emigrants that no
other border state affords." 4

The new administration set

about implementing a program of industrialization that
would put the state in step with the industial economy that
was emerging north of the Mason-Dixon line.
The staple argument of the pro-industrial
reconstruction government was based upon the doctrine of
state self-sufficiency.

In 1868, a legislative committee

reported that Tennesseeans were spending more than
$77,000,000 for imported manufactured goods.

To remedy

this situation, the state government established a State
Board of Immigration in late 1867, charged with the
encouragement of immigration from the Northern states and
3constantine G. Belissary, "The Rise of Industry and the Industrial
Spirit in Tennessee, 1865-1885," The Journal of Southern History XIX

(May, 1953), 193-215.
4Quoted from the Knoxville Whig and Rebel Ventilator, May 5, 1869 in
W.B. Hesseltine, "Tennessee's Invitation to Carpet-baggers," East
Tennessee Historical Society's Publications, 4 (1932) 104.
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Europe.

The board was funded by state appropriations, and

was authorized to publish pamphlets, newspaper articles,
and advertisements, as well as send agents to northern and
eastern states to tout Tennessee and its resources. 5

The

theory behind this strategy was that changing from a
predominantly agrarian to a diversified economy required
the help of immigrants, skilled in machine labor and
attuned to the factory system.

This is evident in the

preface of an immigration handbook published by the Board
of Immigration.

In it, author Hermann Bokum described the

administration's desire to diversify Tennessee's economy:
"Instead of an almost exclusive attention to agriculture,
which has prevailed in the South for so many years, there
is now a general desire that there should be a harmonious
development of its resources.

In consequence of it,

immigration which was regarded with indifference or
dislike, is now greatly desired. 116

During the late 1860s,

various bills were also introduced into the

legislature,

explicitly inviting outside capital and industry to the
state and establishing an association to encourage
industry.
The popular sentiment of Tennesseeans towards industry
during the post-war period was also improved by the sharp
regression in prices of agricultural goods beginning in the
late 1860s.

The price of cotton dropped from 23 cents a

5Hesseltine, "Tennessee's Invitation to Carpet-baggers," 108-109;
Belissary, "The Rise of the Industrial Spirit in Tennessee," 207-208.
6Hermann Bokum, The Tennessee Handbook and Immigrant's Guide
(Philadelphia, PA, 1868), 3.
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pound in 1868 to 15 cents in 1870 and 9 cents in 1878. 7
Wheat followed a similar downward spiral, dropping from
$2.18 a bushel in 1868 to $1.00 in 1870, and bottoming out
at 77 cents in 1878. 8

As a result of these price

decreases, many Tennesseeans were forced to activities
other than farming to make a living and feed their
families.

Another consequence was the erosion of faith in

agrarianism as the path to post-war social and economic
regeneration.

Industry was becoming more widely viewed not

only as a feasible alternative for economic development by
investors and policy makers, but also as a potential
generator of income and livelihood by the populace.
Radical Republican rule in Tennessee ended in 1869
when William Brownlow was elected to the United States
Senate, and resigned the governor's seat.

The ensuing

election resulted in the victory of the Radical-turnedConservative DeWitt C. Senter in the governor's race, and
Conservative majorities in both houses of the legislature. 9
Although the conservatives made changes on many fronts
during the "redemption" period following reconstruction,
7James E. Boyle, Cotton and the New Orleans Cotton Exchange: A
Century of Commercial Evolution (Garden City, NY, 1934), 180-181.
8James E. Boyle, Chicago Wheat Prices for Eighty-One Years: Daily,
Monthly, and Yearly Fluctuations and Their Causes (Ithaca, NY, 1922),
15.
9The distinction between Radicals and Conservatives began in the
immediate post-war reconstruction period. Radicals were identified
as those who wanted to follow a harsh reconstruction program for the
South that included the exclusion of former Confederates from such
citizenship rights as voting and holding office. Conservatives in
general followed the leadership of president Andrew Johnson and
Washington Conservatives who wished to put into effect the LiincolnJohnson plan of leniency in reconstruction. Thus, with the
Conservatives in power after 1869, former Confederates began to
return to positions of power within the state.
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they continued the radical policy of encouraging industrial
development. 10

Woodward, in fact, has suggested that

"Redemption was not a return of an old system nor the
restoration of an old ruling class.

It was rather a phase

of the revolutionary process begun· in 1865. 1111

The

dominant element among the conservatives that came to power
on the heels of reconstruction in the South were middleclass, with a decidedly

industrial, capitalistic outlook.

They had little connection with the old planter regime, and
did not share its reproach for outside capital and
industry.
An examination of two of Tennessee's early

Conservative governors confirms Woodward's contentions.
Former Confederate general John C. Brown took over the
governorship of the state in 1870 from DeWitt Senter.
Brown was an active industrialist, who took prominent part
in the ambitious schemes of Thomas A. Scott for a southern
transcontinental railway and served as vice president of
Scott's Texas and Pacific Company.

Later he became

president of the Bon Air Coal Company, and at the time of
his death he was serving as president of the expanding
Tennessee Coal, Iron, and Railroad Company.

His successor,

James D. Porter, was also a Confederate veteran and
10 Redemption was a term applied to the restoration of Conservative
rule by native southerners in southern states. Many southerners felt
that they had been unjustly governed by Radical Republican outsiders
during reconstruction, and hailed the return of Conservative state
administrations.
11 c. Vann Woodward, Origins of the New South, 1877-1913 (Baton Rouge,
LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1951), 21-22.
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industrialist.

Porter served two full terms in office,

after which he was elected president of the Nashville,
Chattanooga and St. Louis Railroad.

He also served on the

board of directors of the Tennessee Coal, Iron, and
Railroad Company, as well as several other financial
enterprises in Nashville. 12

Brown and Porter were typical

of the New South Conservatives that dominated Tennessee
politics during the two decades following reconstruction,
mixing the mores of the Old South with a recognition that
industrial capitalism was the wave of the future.
The pro-industrial policies of the reconstruction
Radicals and the redemption Conservatives contributed to
industrial growth in the state.

By 1870, despite war

damages and political turmoil, industry in Tennessee had
surpassed its pre-war proportions.

The number of plants

had more than doubled since 1860, from 2,500 to 5,300; the
number of industrial workers had increased from 12,500 to
19,400; the value added in manufacturing had increased by
$7,000,000 to $15,000,000 in 1870; and the value of
industrial goods produced had almost doubled during the
decade. 13

Leading the industrial emergence was the iron

industry, upon which most often was placed the hopes of
Tennessee manufacturing promoters.

Iron production in

Tennessee steadily increased between 1865 and 1870, and
fueled speculation that the iron ore and coal deposits of

12 Ibid, 3.
13 Tenth Census, 1880: Manufactures (Washington, D.C., 1883), xiv.
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the eastern part of the state would be the basis of
industrial development

within the state.

The Iron Industry in the Mid-Nineteenth century
Between the late-eighteenth century and the 1870s,
iron production in the United States was carried out in
small-scale facilities.

Iron was the dominant metal

building material used during this period, as steelmaking
was only in its infancy by 1870.

Compared to the later

steel industry, iron production was a disconnected process
performed by separate companies.
The primary stage of ironmaking involved the smelting
of iron ore in a blast furnace to remove impurities from
the ore.

The resulting product, pig iron, was often not

refined enough to be worked into shapes without breaking;
the metal requir~d further purification.

Skilled iron

workers called puddlers performed this process, melting,
stirring, and kneading pig iron ingots inside puddling
furnaces until slag could be drained and the ingots fused
to become a 200 pound ball of wrought iron.

This ball was

then sent to a squeezer and muck rolls where remaining
impurities were removed.

The iron was usually put through

a secondary production stage in which it was reduced into
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blooms and then processed into finished products such as
bars, rails, plates or sheets. 14
Prior to the Civil War, almost all rolling mills were
of the "two-high" type, in which iron was processed using
two iron rolls or cylinders.

After an initial pass, the

hot wrought iron was lifted and carried manually over the
top roll to be reinserted for another pass.

With each

successive pass, the pressure and width of the rolls were
adjusted by workers called rollers.

Through this process

dependent upon manual labor and numerous reheatings, the
iron was manipulated into rails, rods, bars, plates, and
sheets.
Each of these stages of iron production required a
specific set of locational attributes.

Furnace operators,

dependent upon a supply of bulky natural resources, located
their furnaces in rural areas near hardwood forests and
deposits of iron ore and limestone.

Puddling furnaces were

sometimes found in conjunction with blast furnaces, but
more often they were associated with rolling mill
operations.

Because of their greater labor requirements,

their need for access to transportation facilities, and
their large and constant demand for pig iron ingots,
rolling mill owners most often located their production
facilities at the most accessible transportation nodes -reasonably large towns and cities.
14 Peter Temin, Iron and Steel in Nineteenth-Century America: An
Economic Inquiry (Cambridge, MA: The Massachusetts Institute of
Technology Press, 1964), 102-105.
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Thus, prior to the 1870s, smelting, puddling and
rolling operations in the United States were carried out at
dispersed locations.

Few, if any, companies had access to

the large amount of investment capital required to operate
a furnace, puddling department and rolling mill.

Because

iron smelting was notoriously unpredictable -- plagued by
problems with furnaces, temporary labor shortages, and
variable ore supplies -- pig iron production rates were
uncertain.
fluctuated.

Moreover, market demand for pig iron also
Rolling mills could also break down, rolled

iron buyers sometimes cancelled their orders, and for both
furnace and rolling mill there was always the possibility
of work stoppages because of labor problems.

Porter and

Livesay argue that these fluctuations in supply and demand
created a difficult situation for iron producers, and a
need for an intermediary to match suppliers and buyers.
With respect to this situation, they state "What was needed
was an intermediate agency which could rationalize the flow
of material by collecting large supplies from the sporadic
output of many furnaces and matching them to the demands of
a multitude of widely scattered foundries, bloomeries, and
rolling mills.

Only one man, the city merchant, was

capable of performing this function, and iron smelters
invariably turned to him.

11

15

15 Glenn Porter and Harold C. Livesay, Merchants and Manufacturers:
Studies in the Changing Structure of Nineteenth Century Marketing
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971), 42.
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Housing Industrial workers; varying Solutions
As they became part of the industrializing labor
force, workers were confronted with the basic need for
shelter in production areas.

Laborers in some cases could

provide their own shelter, but in many cases they did not
have the financial resources to build housing and obtain
the various goods which were needed for everyday life.
Often, during the early years of factory production,
independent landowners and/or developers would be the ones
to respond to this demand for worker housing.
Large and small landowners hired contractors to build
up tracts of land into speculative housing ventures. 16
These developments varied in size from a few houses to
acres lined with structures.

Some developers offered

rental housing to workers, seeking long-term financial
returns through monthly payments.

Others sought immediate

returns on their speculative investment by selling houses
to individuals.

Workers in residential areas around the

factories were thus usually divided into renters and
owners.
Low wages limited most workers to inadequate and
crowded housing close to the workplace.

These conditions

were worsened when the demand for low-skill, low-wage labor
increased in production facilities.

If independent

developers could not or would not respond rapidly to the
16 sam Bass Warner, Jr., Streetcar Suburbs: The Process of Growth in
Boston, 1870-1900 (Cambridge: Harvard and MIT Press, 1962).
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increased need for new housing, existing dwellings were
made to accomodate more people.

In many American cities

and towns, large boarding houses and tenements were
constructed by landowners and in some cases laborers
themselves to supply the demand. 17

This process created

severe overcrowding, and overwhelmed the capacity of urban
infrastructure, resulting in unsanitary and unhealthy
living conditions.

The Reaction of Industrialists and Social Reformers

Sanitary reformers were horrified by these conditions
and advocated measures that would alleviate crowding and
prevent the further development of these types of
residential areas.

Throughout the nineteenth century, a

series of reform movements attempted to alter the physical
condition of American cities with the goal of making urban
residents healthier and happier.

The dominant philosophy

of reformers was that of a causal relationship between the
quality of environmental conditions and the level of human
physical and mental health. 18

They addressed important

urban issues of the era, such as sanitation and the need to
17 sam Bass Warner, Jr., The Urban Wilderness: A History of the
American City (New York: Harper and Row, 1972); Robert Ernst,
"Immigrants and Tenements in New York City, 1825-1863," in R.A. Mohl
and N. Betten, eds., Urban America in Historical Perspective (New
York: Weybight and Talley, 1970), 113-126.
18 Thomas Bender, Toward an Urban Vision: Ideas and Institutions in
Nineteenth-Century America (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press,
1975); Paul Boyer, Urban Masses and Moral Order in America, 1820-1920
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978).
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expose urban dwellers to uplifting elements of rural
settings and nature.

The ideas of social reformers

gradually filtered into the public consciousness during the
nineteenth century, and resulted in organized sanitary
reform and urban parks movements. 19
Urban reform movements generally resulted in the
commitment of governmental resources to the construction of
infrastructural facilities.

Professional civil engineers

and architects were retained to design sewer and water
systems, as well public parks for major American
metropolitan areas such as New York City, Boston,
Philadelphia, and Chicago. 20

Later, in the 1880s and

1890s, urban reformers began to recognize the
interconnected nature of urban problems and that
infrastructure must also be approached as a group of
interconnected systems.

The comprehensive planning

movement began to address a wide range of urban issues
through the planning, construction, and maintenence of many
infrastructural facilities. 21

19 Jon A. Peterson, "The Impact of Sanitary Reform Upon American Urban
Planning, 1840-1890," in Donald A. Krueckeberg, ed., Introduction to
Planning History in the United States (New Brunswick, NJ: The Center
for Urban Policy Research, 1987), 13-39.
20 Joel A. Tarr, "The Evolution of Urban Infrastructure in the
Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries," in Royce Hanson, ed.,
Perspectives on Urban Infrastructure (Washington, D.C.: National
Academy Press, 1984), 5-66; Ellis Armstrong et. al., History of
Public Works in the United States, 1776-1976 (Chicago: American
Public Works Association, 1976).
21 Robert L. Wrigley, Jr., "The Plan of Chicago," in Donald A.
Krueckeberg, ed., Introduction to Planning History in the United
States (New Brunswick, NJ: The Center for Urban Policy Research,
1987), 58-72.
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The social reformers' efforts to improve living
conditions and the quality of life in American urban areas
during the late nineteenth century placed heavy emphasis
upon infrastructural solutions.

As the views of the

reformers began to be accepted by American society,

they

also influenced the attitudes of industrialists.
Originally, manufacturers were concerned with the impact
that the living conditions of their workers had on
productivity at the plant.

They quickly realized that it

was in their best interest to work to preserve a pool of
healthy and loyal workers who knew their jobs and were
reliable in work attendance.

In many cases, manufacturers

felt that independent developers failed to provide adequate
housing, which ultimately impacted the operation of
production facilities.

As a result, some manufacturers

became involved with the provision of housing in urban
settings and at rural production sites.

The Development of Company Towns and Model Company Towns

In established urban places, factory owners responded
to worker need for housing by providing shelter that would
provide the right mix of skill types for production.

In

and around nineteenth century American cities, mill owners
built a variety of housing types to be used by workers.

In

a typical urban situation, for instance, rows of small
uniform structures were built on land adjacent to the
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mills.

Larger houses were constructed for foremen at

advantageous positions, from which the home activities of
mill workers could be monitored and bosses could easily
keep track of work attendance.

Moving down the rows,

houses became smaller and rents
and unskilled laborers.

cheaper for semi-skilled

The result was the creation of

distinct districts of company housing, which were added to
preexisting urban patterns.
The involvement of factory owners in providing housing
was not limited to large urban areas.

Throughout the

nineteenth century, manufacturers located their production
facilities at rural sites near raw materials and power
sources.

In these cases, pools of labor and housing stock

were limited or nonexistant.

Workers and independent

developers might eventually produce sufficient housing, but
in many instances industrialists took matters into their
own hands, recruiting labor and providing housing for them
in isolated and often self-contained company towns.
Most nineteenth century company towns adhered to a
basic policy of company ownership of housing, although
there were variations in the willingness of facility owners
to go beyond the provision and maintenance of shelter.

The

creators of company towns were confronted with decisions
regarding the extent to which they would provide needed
services such as water, sewer, hospitals, libraries and
other infrastructural facilities.

Some maintained control

of these service systems and assumed total responsibility
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for the provision of foodstuffs and other consumer goods by
building and operating company stores.
The extent of company involvement usually was a direct
reflection of the goals that manufacturers hoped to achieve
by providing housing, services, and commercial functions.
One possible set of anticipated returns on investment was
economic profit from housing.

If a company wished to

receive immediate returns on housing investment, rents were
high and were automatically deducted from paychecks.

These

types of rent practices ensured a direct return of wages to
the company and quickly paid for the initial outlay in
housing construction.

Once the initial investment was

recovered, a large percentage of the proceeds from rent
were profit, and company housing became a money-making
scheme.
Rental housing was also a method of tying the
financial fortunes of workers to the company.

It imposed

limitations on the worker's abilities to seek alternative
housing opportunities, especially home ownership.

When

high rents were deducted directly from wages, little money
remained for families to provide for other basic needs.
In this situation, saving for the down payment on a house
was almost impossible. 22

In many isolated company towns,

an open housing market did not exist, further limiting
worker residential choice.

22Margaret F. Byington, Homestead: The Households of a Mill Town (New
York: Russell Sage, 1910).
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Differences in companies' willingness to commit
resources to company towns resulted in differences in
company town environments.

When cost minimization was the

was the major concern in the production of housing, the
results were often small, unsanitary, poorly constructed
houses.

These types of housing conditions were usually

accompanied by unpaved streets and a lack of basic
services.

Rents were many times high, housing policies

were strict, and the range of goods and services were
limited to what the company would provide and to what
company scrip could buy.

The starkest examples of "cost

minimization" company towns in the United States were
"patches" created by coal operators to house miners.

Life

for workers in these places was little, if any, better than
the boarding house and tenement environments provided by
independent developers.2 3
Some industrialists chose not to go the cost
minimalization route, and instead created model company
towns.

Larger investments were made to create a pleasant

environment for workers through the provision of running
water, appropriate drainage, and adequate light and
ventilation.

Worker housing was part of an ordered and

usually professionally designed company-owned settlement.
For all of their differences, model company towns still
23 crandall A. Shifflett, Coal Towns: Life, Work, and Culture in
Company Towns of Southern Appalachia, 1880-1960 (Knoxville, TN: The
University of Tennessee Press, 1991), 48-49; Richard V. Francaviglia,
Hard Places: Reading the Landscape of America's Historic Mining
Districts (Iowa City, IA: The University of Iowa Press, 1991), 80-81. 78

included the basic staples of all company towns: production
areas, infrastructural facilities, and commercial
functions. 24
The major philosopical similarity between model and
other company towns was that both were created by
industrialists to ensure the continuity and stability of
the labor force.

The methods used to achieve this end were

different in model company towns, however.

The reign of

manufacturers over minimal cost, poorly built houses and
service facilities was replaced by a more benevelent
attitude toward labor.

Many model company town builders

viewed labor as more than just another production input
that needed to be controlled, thus they adopted a more
humanistic approach towards workers.
The realization that labor pools were made up of
people, and that people had lives away from the workplace
led some industrialists to believe that it was their
Christian duty to improve the living environment of workers
by making it ordered and cleanly.

As a result, model

company town builders developed paternalistic attitudes
towards labor.

Paternalistic industrialists believed that

good housing in concert with educational, cultural, and
civic awareness would make workers into better individuals,
citizens, and Christians.

Housing was seen by factory

owners and urban reformers as an opportunity for workers
and their families to experience a morally uplifting
24 walter L. Creese, The Search for Environment, The Garden City:
Before and After (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966).
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lifestyle that included religious observance and
educational attainment.
Model company town builders had begun to believe in
their own modified version of environmentalism: that a good
living environment made better people and better people
made better workers. 25

Paternalism was not only a way to

uplift workers, but a way to make them more efficient.
Industrialists incorporated environmentalism into the model
company towns that they developed because they believed
that their manufacturing operations would be made more
secure and profitable by doing so.

Having been influenced

by their pleasant surroundings, model company town
residents would be more reliable workers because they could
cope better with the strenuous nature of industrial life
than their city or non-model company town contemporaries.
They would also appreciate the benevolence of industrial
employers who made it possible for them to live high
quality surroundings at low cost.

Thus factory owners

aimed to achieve two goals that expanded far beyond the
mere maintenance of a work force and providing shelter for
it.

They sought to foster a moral code of conduct and

company loyalty within their workers.
Model company towns were idealized blueprints that
allowed capitalists and industrialists to create places
with better basic urban conditions and to attempt to
25 stanley Buder, Pullman: An Experiment in Industrial Order and
Community Planning, 1880-1930 (New York: Oxford University Press,
1967).
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influence the population that lived in those places.

With

their emphasis on workplace efficiency and company loyalty,
they were meant to be orderly and clean alternantives to
the clutter, corruption, and unsanitary conditions that
existed in nineteenth century industrial cities.

Model

company towns were model in a scale sense, in almost all
cases t~ey were planned for only a few thousand inhabitants
and several hundred houses.

This was in part so they could

be managed more easily as compared to larger urban areas.
Finding a scale at which it was practical to build was
important if industrialists wished to take responsibility
for, and influence the actions of, their labor force away
from home.

Company Towns and Model Company Towns as Places

During the nineteenth century, the concept of the
model company town was adapted and altered in a variety of
cultural and environmental contexts.

Model company towns

in the United States mixed company housing, company-owned
service facilities, and professional architectural and
urban design.

The earliest of these places, such as

Lowell, Massachusetts (1823), were created to provide
worker housing near factories that had been built on
greenfield sites. Gradually these basic goals were expanded
to include environmentalism.

Later towns such as Pullman,

Illinois (1880) were, in the main, attempts to provide
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workers with living environments that would promote
efficiency in production.

They were also intended to

demonstrate to industrialists, politicians, and the publicat-large how to do away with the negative impacts of
housing shortages, unfavorable urban conditions, and labor
unrest on the production process.
The business considerations underlying American
company towns were generally played down by industrialists
and social reformers in lieu of the benevolent aspects of
environmentalism.

The early development of Lowell,

Massachusetts, one of the first industrial company towns in
the United States, reflected the importance of the town as
a business venture.

Founded on a rural greenfield site

during the early 1820s, the town was successful in large
part because the factory owners, the Merrimack
Manufacturing Company, were able to attract a work force
that met their labor requirements.

Doing so depended upon

the company's ability to convince farmers in the New
England region that their daughters would be living and
working in a decent environment if they came to Lowell to
work in the mills.

Thus, the provision of a clean, safe

and pleasant living environment was for the most part a
response by the company to existing societal attitudes and
a strategy to attain a specific required labor force. 26
Later, the Lowell mills were expanded and other
industries were established in the town.

The Merrimack

26 Bender, Toward an Urban Vision, 33-38; Boyer, Urban Masses and
Moral Order in America, 78-84.

82

Company continued to provide housing, although their work
force eventually expanded beyond young female operatives to
include a significant number of male machinists,
operatives, and laborers.

Consequently, quality housing

became less of a strategy for attracting labor for
production.

As Lowell grew and agglomeration economies

attracted other textile manufacturers and large numbers of
new employees to the community, the Merrimack Company's
control began to weaken.

Many of the new workers were

unable to obtain housing from the company or other
landlords, and were forced to build their own shelter on
unoccupied tracts of land. 27 Thus, by 1845, living
conditions in Lowell mirrored those that were developing in
the larger industrial cities of the United States.
Another example of an early industrial company town
was Hopedale, Massachusetts, created by the Draper Company
for the producti9n of textiles and the housing of workers.
The town was founded as a business proposition, and was
intended mainly to ensure the presence of a reliable
workforce.

During later periods of growth, however,

professional architects and planners were retained to
create "model neighborhoods" within the community.
Eventually, the town was commended as a model in urban
social reform; receiving a gold medal for its housing
exhibit at the Louisiana Purchase Exhibition, a silver
medal at the Paris Exposition of 1900, and other gold
27 Ibid.
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medals at expositions in Liege in 1905 and Milan in 1906. 28
The Draper Company took advantage of these accolades by
incorporating the model image of Hopedale into its
advertisements.

By publicizing their model town and their

perceived progressive attitude towards labor, the Draper
Company hoped to improve its public image.
Later in the nineteenth century, the town of Pullman,
Illinois was founded by the Pullman Palace Car Company of
Chicago.

In providing housing, meeting halls, a library,

and a shopping precinct near his sleeper car works, the
company's owner George Pullman hoped to
"attract and retain a superior type of workingman, who
would in turn be "elevated and refined" by the
physical setting. This would mean contented employees
and a consequent reduction in absenteeism, drinking,
and shirking on the job. Furthermore, such workers
were expected to be less susceptible to the
exhortations of "agitators" than the demoralized
laborers of the city slums. 1129
Mr. Pullman also believed that in addition to retaining a
high-quality, controllable work force, that he (and his
company) could receive a direct return on the housing
investment made in the community.

He attempted to achieve

these goals through an expert urban design that would
provide an ordered physical setting for the daily work
routine.
When the construction of Pullman was completed in
1884, the total cost was eight million dollars, an
28 John S. Garner, The Model Company Town: Urban Design Through
Private Enterprise in Nineteenth Century New England (Amherst, MA:
The University of Massachusetts Press, 1984), 205-210.
29 Buder, Pullman: An Experiment in Industrial Order and Community
Planning, 44.
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astronomical sum for the period.

The large capital

investment was used to build housing furnished with gas,
running water, and indoor toilet facilities, macademized
streets, two large public parks, a municipal sewage system,
and a large Arcade building which housed a restaurant, post
office, shopping area, public library, and theater.

Much

consideration was given to landscape and architectural
design, with manicured flower beds and public buildings in
the "secular Gothic" and "Queen Anne" styles.

The Pullman

Palace Car Company had begun the production and repair of
railroad sleeper cars in early 1881, and maintained control
over the entire physical fabric of the community.

Thus,

the company's reign extended over not only wages, but also
housing supply, public space, and rent levels. 30
Most social commentators during the early years of
Pullman's history sang its praises, not perceiving the
undercurrent of worker dissatisfaction that had emerged in
the town over a period of years.

By the early 1890s, this

undercurrent was brought to the surface by the continuation
of some of the Pullman Company's policies and perturbations
in the national economy.

Because George Pullman and his

investors had sought a six percent return on housing, rents
were set at fixed levels.

At the same time, the company

maintained a sliding wage scale in the rail car works based
on output and current market prices.

In tough financial

30 auder, Pullman; Almont Lidsey, The Pullman Strike: The Story of a
Unique Experiment and of a Great Labor Upheaval (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1942).
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times, such as those following the economic downturn of
1893,

it became very difficult and in some cases

impossible under these policies for workers to afford
housing in the Pullman community.

The company, however,

refused to lower rent levels or to fix a minimum wage for
employees.

This left workers with two options, moving to

another area for housing or rebelling against the policies
of the company.

Worker sentiment was expressed in the

Pullman Strike of 1894, which resulted directly in a
prolonged shutdown of the Pullman Palace Car Company's
works and indirectly in the paralysis of the national rail
system from Ohio to California with the sympathy walkout of
the American Railway Union. 31
The successes and failures of these places created by
industry had an effect on the development of other places.
For example, the positive publicity given to the
communities of L9well, Hopedale, and Pullman at various
times more than likely encouraged similar "experiments" at
other production sites in the United States.

The labor

unrest and violence that later resulted from company
strategy at Pullman no doubt also impacted perspectives
toward paternalism and the development of model company
towns.

The continuum of this impact is evident when

analyzing the development of industrial communities during
this period.

31 Ibid.
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The rise of corporate capitalism and the advent of
company communities signified new strategies in the
historical and spatial sequence of capital accumulation and
industrial production.

Not only were these strategies

distinguished by the increasing importance of the corporate
form, technological innovation, and new social relations,
but also by the spatial restructuring of economic activity.
Thus, the geographic significance of how these strategies
played out on the landscapes of specific regions.

Industrial capital in the Upper Tennessee River Valley;
The Establishment of the Roane Iron company

In the late 1860s and early 1870s, a positive
environment existed for the establishment of industrial
enterprises in Tennessee.

Governmental leaders were

touting industry as the state's hope for economic
development and recovery, and were instituting policies
that encouraged industrial location within its borders.
Union soldiers had been exposed to Tennessee during the
Civil War, and had seen industrial possibilities in its
regions (East Tennessee in particular) and resources.

It

was in this context that the first large-scale industrial
activity came to the Upper Tennessee River Valley.
The Roane Iron Company was organized and incorporated
in 1867, the brainchild of Union General John T. Wilder,
one of the principal "economic carpetbaggers" of the
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recontruction era.

During the Civil War, as Wilder

traveled through the region during military operations, he
took notice of the deposits of coal and iron ore that were
present along the slopes of Walden's Ridge, and became
intrigued with the possibility of a business enterprise in
Tennessee.
At the close of the Civil War, Wilder and another
Union officer stationed in East Tennessee, Captain Hiram S.
Chamberlain, set about establishing an iron production
facility in the Tennessee Valley.
experience in the iron industry.

Both men had previous
Wilder had served an

apprenticeship at an iron foundry in Columbus, Ohio during
his formative years, and moved west to Greensburg, Indiana
in 1857 where he established his own foundry before the
war. 32

Chamberlain had been the Union chief quartermaster

of East Tennessee, and while stationed in Knoxville had
operated a foundry that produced iron products for use by
Federal forces.33

Their initial step was the purchase of

928 acres of Roane County land from local land owners in

September of 1865. 34

It wasn't until almost two years

later in June of 1867 that the Roane Iron Company was
officially organized as a branch company of the East
Tennessee Union Petroleum, Coal, Iron

&

Salt Company

32 samuel C. Williams, General John T. Wilder: Commander, The
Lightening Brigade (Bloomington, IN, 1936), 2.
33Michael J. McDonald and William B. Wheeler, Knoxville, Tennessee:
Continuity and Change in an Appalachian City (Knoxville, TN:
University of Tennessee Press, 1983), 21.
34 office of the Register of Deeds, Roane County, TN, Deed Book o,
354-359. Office of the Register of Deeds will hereafter be cited as
ORD.
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(ETUPCI&S).

The ETUPCI&S, controlled by important

Knoxville business figures, had procured the land that
Wilder and Chamberlain had purchased in 1865, and the newly
formed Roane Iron Company with Wilder and Chamberlain as
directors, immediately reacquired it. 35
Wilder and Chamberlain were initially joined by five
Midwestern capitalists in the venture: W.O. Rockwood,
Antrim R. Forsythe, David E. Rees, John M. Lord, and Henry
C. Lord.

These men were apparently associated with Wilder

and Chamberlain either through wartime contacts or through
business connections in Indiana or Ohio, and were well
equipped to aid in the acquisition of startup capital for
the company.

W.O. Rockwood was an Indiana native who had

been a major in the Union army and served under General
Wilder in East Tennessee.

Forsyth was an Indiana railroad

promoter and banker; Rees was a banker in both Indianapolis
and Chattanooga; John Lord was a wealthy Mexican War
veteran from Indianapolis; and Henry Lord was a railroad
promoter from Ohio. 36

In December of 1867, the Roane Iron

35 Roane Iron Company, Board of Directors Minutes, June 8, 1867.
Roane Iron Company will hereafter be cited as RIC. In previous
studies of the Roane Iron Company, it was suggested that no records
of the Company were still in existence. However, I discovered
through local citizens that a man named Tom Ward had salvaged the
board of directors minutes when the rest of the records had been
hauled off for scrap in the 1950s. Mr. Ward informed me that he had
donated these records to the University of Tennessee in the early
1980s, and upon investigating this I found that the Special
Collections Library at the University indeed had a microfilm copy of
them.
36 Judge John Allison, Ed. Notable Men of Tennessee, Volume II.
(Atlanta, GA: Southern Historical Association, 1905), 303-304; Snyder
Roberts, "Roane County's Industrial Belt, 1868-1932," 11. This is a
collection of historical essays written by Mr. Roberts and published
by the Roane County News from December 30, 1981 to September 15,
1982.
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Company was officially incorporated by the state of
Tennessee, with a stock capitalization of $100,000. 37

All

of the stock declared at this time was owned by the
original seven principals.

Thus, although legally

incorporated, the company was closely held and managed
along proprietary lines.
Wilder and Chamberlain had chosen a site for Roane
Iron that was close to the iron and coal deposits of
Walden's Ridge, and within five miles of the navigable
Tennessee River.

The Company began activity in the region

almost immediately in 1867.

An additional 1,000 acres of

land was purchased in December of that year, and a contract
was drawn up for the construction of a blast furnace to be
completed by September 1st of 1868.

John Lord and W.O.

Rockwood were to undertake the building of the furnace, and
they agreed to build the furnace to specifications: a
furnace to be powered by bituminous coal or coke, with a
capacity of at least 15 tons of pig iron per day. 38

These

specifications are significant because charcoal was the
dominant fuel nationally for iron production, and there
were no pig iron facilities utilizing mineral fuel in the
South at this time.

They indicate that the management of

Roane Iron was intent on creating a state-of-the art
production facility, one on par with leading plants in the
North.
31 Acts of Tennessee, 1867-1868, Chapter 27, 34-36.
38 oRD, Roane County, TN, Deed Book P, 566-567; RIC, Board of
Directors Minutes, September 9, 1867.
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Over the ensuing year and a half, the Roane Iron
Company laid the groundwork for the efficient production
and distribution of pig iron.

Rights-of-way were secured

for a rail line to the Tennessee River, and for a road into
coal extraction areas.

The company continued its policy of

obtaining local land for mineral extraction, either through
outright purchase or mineral lease agreements.

Also, a

thirteen acre tract was purchased on the Tennessee River to
serve as a company landing. 39

In December of 1868, the

Roane Iron Company's first blast furnace was "blown in,"
initiating the production of pig iron.
Laborers at the rural Roane Iron production site
required housing, and in response to this need, the company
founded a settlement adjacent to the production facility.
The community was named Rockwood, in deference to W.O.
Rockwood, the first president of the company, and the
reality that former Confederates in the area might not look
favorably on the new project if it had been named for the
more celebrated General Wilder. 40

The fact that the

establishment of a town was not mentioned at early board of
directors meetings suggests that the settlement was a
spontaneous product of needs generated by the production
facility.

The first mention of housing or lot subdivision

at a meeting was in June of 1869, seven months after the
startup of production.

In this instance, the plant

superintendent (John Wilder) was authorized by the board of
39 RIC, Board of Directors Minutes, December 18, 1868, June 2, 1869.
40 shelley, Galloway, Wolfe, and Sneed, "Towns - Old and New," 60.
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directors to subdivide company land in certain areas, and
lease it with restrictions. 41

This would suggest that

company land around the facility had not been subdivided
previously, and was being divided and leased on a need
basis.

Expansion and Integration; The Early Years of Roane Iron
The Roane Iron Company's early years of operation in
the Tennessee Valley were both innovative and tenuous.

The

use of mineral fuel at the production facility's Upland
South location was the company's most significant
technological breakthrough.

The coal found in this part of

the Tennessee Valley was bituminous, typified by softness
and high gas content.

To be used effectively for iron

production, bituminous coal had to be put through a process
which would expel its gases, leaving a denser product which
more nearly approximated pure carbon -- coke.

The coking

process involved burning the coal in ovens in the absence
of air to expel the gases and leave the carbon.

Coke ovens

were required to protect the process from outside elements,
and to retain maximum heat for the operation. Coke had not
been used as furnace fuel in the South prior to the Civil
War because of the high sulfur content of coal found there,
which contaminated iron made from it. 42

The Roane Iron

Company was able to produce coke of high enough quality by
41 RIC, Board of Directors Minutes, June 2, 1869.
42 Temin, Iron and Steel in Nineteenth Century America, 89, 201.
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1868 to make acceptable pig iron, the first instance of
this innovation in the former Confederacy.

This enabled

the Company's facility at Rockwood to turn out from twelve
to fifteen tons of pig iron per day, three times as much as
charcoal furnaces could produce. 43
Upon solving the coke fuel problem, Roane Iron built
rows of coke ovens between its coal mines on Walden's Ridge
and the iron furnaces to the east.

Coal was brought on

narrow gauge tracks from the mines to the ovens, and then
in its coke form was taken to the furnaces for use as fuel.
Iron ore was transported in the same manner from more
dispersed areas of the company's holdings to the furnace.
The pig iron produced was hauled on tracks five miles to
the Tennessee River, initially by mules and later, after
1870, by a company-owned locomotive.
In the Roane Iron Company's early years of operation,
the Tennessee River provided the only feasible means of
transporting pig iron to demand points.

Because in general

the production of blast furnaces exceeded the demand of
single refiners, Roane Iron required more than one steady
consumer of pig iron. 44 Early on, its principal consumers
were rolling mills found upriver in Knoxville, Tennessee
(the Knoxville Iron Company) and downriver in Chattanooga,
Tennessee (the Southwestern Iron Company).

The company

struggled during this early period with production
43Morrow Chamberlain, A Brief History of the Pig Iron Industry in
East Tennessee (Chattanooga, TN, 1942), 6.
44 Porter and Livesay, Merchants and Manufacturers, 41-43.
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processes and unpredictable markets.

Because the coke fuel

method was new in the region, the company had to experiment
with the intricacies of the process using Tennessee coal,
causing irregularities in production.

Also, the economy of

the region was still recovering from the war, making demand
for pig iron variable at best.
The Roane Iron Company survived this early period, and
by 1870, began expanding its operations. From its
inception, Roane Iron had been backwardly integrated,
controlling most of its coal, iron, and limestone supplies
through large land holdings in the Upper Tennessee River
Valley.

In 1870, the company made a move toward forward

integration by purchasing the Chattanooga Rolling Mills,
the property of its former customer the Southwestern Iron
Company.

The purchase price was $225,000 in Roane Iron

stock. In effect, the transaction served as a merger,
making the principals in Southwestern Iron significant
stockholders in the company. 45
The Chattanooga Rolling Mills facility had been
constructed by the Construction Corp of the United States
Military Railroads during the Civil War, after Federal
forces had captured Chattanooga.

The mission of the mill

was to reroll tons of iron rails that had been damaged by
retreating Confederate armies, so that they could be used
for repairs on captured Southern rail lines.

In 1866,

45 RIC, Board of Directors Minutes, April 22, 1870, May 12, 1870. The
capital stock of the company was increased at this time to $600,000,
presumably to reflect the new acquisition.
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shortly after the close of the war, the Southwestern Iron
Company acquired ownership of the facility, to use it as a
rerolling operation for used iron rails.

During the next

three years, Southwestern Iron struggled to make the
Chattanooga mill profitable in the post-war South.
Southern railroads needed rails repaired and rerolled, but
did not have enough capital to pay for the service.
Because of this the supply of used iron rails was not
steady, and the mill frequently had to operate at less than
capacity level.

In 1869, Southwestern Iron remedied this

problem by installing puddling furnaces at the Chattanooga
facility, which allowed the production of rails from both
old rails and pig iron. 46

This made the rolling mills much

more versatile, and attractive to a company such as Roane
Iron looking to expand its operations.
With the acquisition of the Chattanooga Rolling Mills
by the Roane Iron Company, the original blast furnace
operation at Rockwood became part of an integrated iron
production system.

Pig iron produced at Rockwood was

shipped very cheaply down the Tennessee River by boat to
Chattanooga, where it increasingly became the dominant
component in the manufacture of rails.

During the 1870s,

Roane Iron supplied iron rails to railroads that were
beginning to expand lines into the South.

The Louisville

and Nashville Railroad was constructing significant mileage
46 James F. Doster, "The Chattanooga Rolling Mill: An Industrial ByProduct of the Civil War," East Tennessee Historical Society's
Publications, 36 (1964), 45-51.
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of rail lines during the early to mid 1870s, as was the
Cincinnati Southern Railway. 47

The company was able to

compete successfully for iron rail contracts with northern
producers because of its efficient integrated production
system and its proximity to Southern construction areas.
The creation of an integrated iron production system
with its relatively steady demand for pig iron necessitated
further investment at the Rockwood furnace site.

In late

1871, the stock capitalization of the company was increased
to $1,000,000, with proceeds from the issue dedicated for
the construction of a second blast furnace at Rockwood. 48
The company apparently felt that larger supplies of pig
iron would be needed at Chattanooga in the future with the
favorable market for iron rails.

In addition, negotiations

were being carried on with the Cincinnati Southern Railroad
by 1872 for a right-of-way through Roane Iron land holdings
in Roane County.

The company wanted the Cincinnati

Southern's Cincinnati to Chattanooga route to go through
Rockwood, providing another transportation outlet for pig
iron in addition to the Tennessee River.

The result of

these negotiations was Roane Iron's donation of land and
timber and stone for construction through Roane County,
land in Rockwood for depot and shop grounds, as well as
right-of-way over company land in Chattanooga. 49
47 Ibid, 53; R.O. Biggs, "The Cincinnati Southern Railway: A Municipal
Enterprise," East Tennessee Historical Society's Publications, 7
(1935), 81-102; RIC, Board of Directors Minutes, January 22, 1875.
48 RIC, Board of Directors Minutes, December 15, 1871.
49 Ibid, July 10, 1872.
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By 1876, the Roane Iron Company was operating
successfully in the Southern iron rail market.

It was

employing approximately 500 workers at the Chattanooga mill
and 300 in the two blast furnaces at Rockwood.

These

facilities had output capacities of 28,000 tons of rails
per year and 24,000 tons of pig iron per year respectively
at this time. 50

Unfortunately, just as Roane Iron had

begun to operate profitably in the Southern iron market,
technological innovation altered preferences of rail
consumers.

Bessemer and open hearth steel making had been

gradually perfected in the United States during the late
1860s and early 1870s.

In fact, as early as 1865, the

first Bessemer steel rails were rolled in Chicago.

This

was followed by the founding of large Bessemer plants at
Bethlehem, Pennsylvania in 1868 (Bethlehem Iron Company),
Johnstown, Pennsylvania in 1871 (Cambria Iron), and
Braddock, Pennsy~vania in 1872 (Edgar Thompson Steel
Works).

The Trenton Iron Company at Trenton, New Jersey

was using the open hearth method to make steel rails by
1868, and was supplying railroads in the Northeastern
United States by 1870. 51
Steel rails were stronger and more durable than iron
ones.

Since the late seventeenth century, iron makers had

known that blister steel, a material stronger than iron,
50 The company struggled somewhat during the recession years of 1873
and 1874, but continued to operate throughout the period.
51 Joseph G. Butler, Jr., Fifty Years of Iron and Steel (Cleveland,
OH: The Penton Press Co., 1923), 56-60; Allan Nevins, Abram S.
Hewitt, with Some Account of Peter Cooper (New York: Harper &
Brothers, 1935), 246-250.
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could be made by heating wrought iron sheets until the
impurities were burned away.

But blister steel was of

uneven quality, and could only be produced in small
amounts.

Bessemer and Open Hearth innovations solved these

problems, and made steel available in large amounts.
Railroad managers realized that steel rails would allow the
use of heavier and more powerful locomotives, larger
freight trains, and permit more efficient overall
operation.

By the mid to late 1870s, the purchase of steel

rails as replacements for iron by railroads was only
limited by capital availability and rail supply.

This left

the Roane Iron Company in a undesirable position, as the
railroads it used to supply switched to steel rails for new
construction and replacement.

In order to stay in the rail

supply business, the company had to adapt.

Iron to steel; Roane Iron Enters the steel Rail Market
The Roane Iron Company endeavored to become the first
enterprise to make steel in the South.

The possibility of

manufacturing steel rails was first discussed at a board of
directors meeting in April of 1877, and the idea was
accepted as a sound one.

By July of 1877, Captain

Chamberlain had traveled to steel works in Cleveland, Ohio,
and Harrisburg, Pennsylvania investigating steel production
methods.

He had also met with Alexander Holley, a partner

in the firm of Winslow, Griswold and Holley, which held Sir
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Henry Bessemer's American steel-making patent and had built
the first commercial bessemer steel plant in the United
States at Troy, New York. 52

Chamberlain apparently

preferred the Siemans-Martin (open hearth) over the
Bessemer process for steel production at Chattanooga, for
by April 1878 construction of a Siemans-Martin works was
under way. 53
The Siemans-Martin production process was a variation
of the open hearth principle originally devised by Josiah
Marshall Heath in 1845.

It involved a regenerative

furnace, which used the heat of combustion normally lost in
hot chimney gases, in combination with the practice of
charging scrap iron to dilute pig iron impurities. 54

The

choice of the Siemans-Martin process was a logical one for
the Roane Iron Company at this time. It did not require
high quality pig iron as did the Bessemer process.

High

quality pig iron would have been prohibitively expensive
given the company's existing iron ore supplies. The quality
of output could also be more effectively controlled with
the Siemans-Martins process, in contrast to the uncertain
52 RIC, Board of Directors Minutes, July, 10, 1877. Alexander Holley
was instumental in the adoption of the Bessemer steel-making process
in the United States. He helped to develop the first successful
Bessemer converter in the United States at Wyandotte, Michigan in
1865, and was also involved in the construction of the Cambria Iron
Company's Bessemer works at Johnstown, Pennsylvania in 1867.
53Ibid, April 17, 1878.
54 Leo F. Reinartz, "The Open Hearth Furnace - Part I" in History of
Iron and Steelmaking in the United States (New York: American
Institute of Mining, Metallurgical, and Petroleum Engineers, 1961),
75. The use of the regenerative furnace was patented by Sir William
Siemans, a German-born English citizen in the early 1860s. The
method of using scrap iron to dilute pig iron impurities was patented
by the Martin Brothers of France shortly thereafter. Hence the name
Siemans-Martin process.
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quality of each Bessemer "cast. 1155

One of the factors that

was probably most important to Roane Iron was cost, and
this also favored Siemans-Martin.

The company probably

wanted to build a fairly small facility, and the minimum
size of an efficient open hearth plant was far smaller than
that of a Bessemer plant. 56
By early 1879, two Siemans ten-ton acid open hearth
furnaces and associated equipment were installed at
Chattanooga, and steel was being produced for the first
time in the South (Figure 2.1).

The inputs were pig iron

from Rockwood, scrap iron, and a mixture of raw iron ore
from Cranberry, North Carolina, Cartersville, Georgia, and
Maryville, Tennessee. 57

This combination did not make high

quality steel, however, and Roane Iron continued
experimenting with the production process. The major
problem was the high phosphorous content of the Rockwood
pig iron, which _contaminated the steel manufactured from
it.

The acid process which the company was using did not

remove phosphorous in the course of refining the iron; the
phosphorous would simply not combine with the acid lining
in the refining vessel. In the years to come,
experimentation revealed that the basic process, in which a
basic vessel lining was substituted for an acid one, solved
this problem by allowing phosphorus to combine with the
lining and be carried off in the slag. 58

Unfortunately for

55 Nevins, Abram S. Hewitt, 241-242.
56 Temin, Iron and Steel in Nineteenth Century America, 141.
57 chamberlain, A Brief History of the Pig Iron Industry, 138.
58 Temin, Iron and Steel in Nineteenth Century America, 141-142.
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Figure 2.1.

The Chattanooga Rolling Mills Siemans-Martin
Steel Facility

Source: Sanborn Map Company, Sanborn Fire Insurance Maps
Chattanooga, Tennessee, 1885.
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Roane Iron, this innovation did not come soon enough and
the phosphorous content problem continually plagued the
operation at Chattanooga, eventually causing its demise.
Although 50,000 tons of steel rails were produced and sold
over a four year period by Roane Iron, the constant
problems with steel quality in combination with increased
competition caused the company to close its Chattanooga
operation in January of 1883. 59
This was not the end of the Roane Iron Company's
attempt at profitable steel production, however.

The

company apparently felt that the there was still a profit
to be made in the steel rail market, and almost immediately
after the Chattanooga shutdown in 1883 began inquiring
about the Bessemer steel-making process. 60

By July of

1883, Roane Iron had obtained permission from the Bessemer
Steel Company to use the basic Bessemer process for a
royalty of one dollar per ton of finished steel. 61

The

switch to the Bessemer process, however, would require
several prerequisites which the company did not have in
1883.

The first of these was a supply of fairly pure iron

ore from which to make low-phosphorous pig iron.

It had

become apparent during the company's experiment with the
open hearth process that the phosphorous content of iron
ore found in Roane County was too high to make consistent
quality steel.

Ore quality was even more important in the

59ooster, "The Chattanooga Rolling Mill," 53-54; RIC, Board of
Directors Minutes, January 18, 1883.
60 RIC, Board of Directors Minutes, January 18, 1883.
61 Ibid, July 18, 1883.

103

Bessemer process, and a new source would have to be found.
The second was the availability of large-scale capital.
The purchase of a Bessemer converter was much more costly
than smaller-scale open hearth equipment, and would require
larger amounts of capital than the company had ever before
had to raise.
The decision to produce steel using the Bessemer
process forced the Roane Iron Company for the first time to
look outside of its closed capital structure for operating
funds.

The company realized that it could not obtain the

large amount of capital it would need through its
traditional means of offering new stock issues to its
limited group of existing stockholders.

Thus, it looked to

the national finance market for the capital needed to
retool the Chattanooga facility.

At this time, however,

the company did not have a nationally-known business figure
associated with it, and financial institutions did not
generally loan large amounts of long-term capital to
industrial enterprises.

The Roane Iron Company needed a

contact through which to gain access to finance capital.
Roane Iron found this contact in native East
Tennesseean Charles Mcclung McGhee.

Charles McGhee had

spent the majority of his adult life in Knoxville,
Tennessee and since the pre-Civil War period had been
involved in railroad development in the South.

The

company's initial connection to McGhee was through Hiram
Chamberlain.

The two men had met during the Union army's
104

occupation of Knoxville, when Chamberlain was chief
quartermaster and McGhee was one of the city's most
prominent businessmen.

They had business dealings during

this period, and apparently forged a profitable
relationship, for they retained their association after the
close of the war. 62

By the mid 1880s, McGhee was a vice

president of the East Tennessee, Virginia & Georgia
Railroad (ETV&G), and was shuttling back and forth between
Knoxville and New York City on business. 63

He was

developing relationships with finance bankers through his
railroad dealings that would prove valuable to Roane Iron.
McGhee became involved with Roane Iron in the spring
of 1882, when, for the first time, he became a stockholder
and member of the board of directors.

This was shortly

before the decision was made to produce Bessemer steel at
Chattanooga. 64

For almost four years after the 1883

shutdown, the Chattanooga mill remained idle while Roane
Iron made preparations and waited for the right time to reenter the steel rail market.

By 1886, market prices had

risen sufficiently to prompt the company to commit to
production at Chattanooga.

The board of directors voted in

62 william J. MacArthur, Jr., "Charles Mcclung McGhee, Southern
Financier," (PhD Dissertation, University of Tennessee, Knoxville),
199-200. MacArthur's dissertation provides a large volume of
information on McGhee's financial and investment activity over his
lifetime.
63 East Tennessee, Virginia & Georgia Railroad, Board of Directors
Minutes, Railroad Manuscript Collection, Newman Library, Virginia
Polytechnic University. East Tennessee, Virginia & Georgia Railroad
will hereafter be cited as ETVG. The Newman Library at the Virginia
Polytechnic University administers the records of all of the railroad
companies that were incorporated into the Southern Railway in 1895.
64 RIC, Board of Direstor's Minutes, April 19, 1882.
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October of 1886 to raise $125,000 for the construction of
the Bessemer works through the sale of bonds with the
Chattanooga property as collateral.

Chamberlain repeatedly

requested and received McGhee's help in finding a lender to
provide this capital. 65

The floating and sale of bonds was

handled through the Central Trust Company of New York, one
of the foremost financial institutions in the nation at
this time. 66

McGhee lent invaluable assistance in the

negotiations between Roane Iron and the Central Trust
Company, as he had dealt with the trust company as a
representative of the ETV&G Railroad. 67
In the ensuing year, Chamberlain and the Roane Iron
Company attempted to build an efficient steel production
facility at Chattanooga.

There were problems, however,

with the quality of iron ore to which the company had
access for steel manufacture.

Roane Iron was forced to buy

iron ore land in Carter County, Tennessee, and also to
import pig iron from England for use in the Bessemer
process.

As Chamberlain himself explained the situation:

I find it necessary to make a rail perfectly satisfactory [sic]
that it is much better to use some English pig ... I think it
better that we have some foreign iron very low in phospherous
in our mixture ... we are making rails for the Cincinnati
Southern and they are applying very serious drop tests to show
the breaking or non breaking quality of the rail. To stand
this test I think it better to use this English iron, or to use
a small percentage of it. 68
65 chamberlain to McGhee, McGhee Papers, Mcclung Historical
Collection, June 10, 1886, June 19, 1886, October 16, 1886, October
23, 1886. All letter references made in this chapter are to the
McGhee Papers.
66 RIC, Board of Directors Minutes, January 19, 1887.
6 7 ETVG, Board of Directors Minutes.
68 chamberlain to McGhee, October 25, 1887.
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McGhee did everything in his power to make Roane Iron's
steel venture at Chattanooga a success, including providing
business from the railroads with which he was involved.
The ETV&G ordered steel rails from Roane Iron at McGhee's
behest, as did the Memphis & Charleston Railroad, of which
McGhee was president. 69 Roane Iron supplied these Southern
railroads during 1887 and 1888, but repeatedly ran into
problems with the quality of rails made at the Chattanooga
mill.

In February of 1888, the ETV&G rejected a shipment

of steel rails from Roane Iron, because of imperfections.
The unreliable quality of rails produced at
Chattanooga caused the demise of Roane Iron's steel
operation.

The company was operating on such a thin margin

that any temporary work stoppage was enough to prevent the
payment of monthly bills.

When the ETV&G suspended rail

purchases, the company's major buyer was gone, and the mill
had to be shut down.

Although McGhee intervened for Roane

Iron with the ETV&G in this case, the incident is
indicative of the problems the company had with the quality
of its steel rails.
Eventually, Roane Iron's damaged reputation among the
railroads and lower steel rail market prices dictated an
end to steel production at Chattanooga.

The company was

operating at a loss during 1888 and 1889, and the board of
directors recognized that the Chattanooga mills was the
reason.

A decision was made to attempt to sell the

69 MacArthur, Jr., "Charles Mcclung McGhee," 201-204.
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Chattanooga plant, and in late 1889 a group of buyers
representating the Southern Iron Company became interested
in the property.

The sale of the mill was accomplished in

October of 1889, for a price of $250,000. 70

Thus, the

Roane Iron Company's attempt at finished steel production
in the South was at an end, and the company retreated to
the less risky production of pig iron at Rockwood.
The Roane Iron Company from 1867 to 1889 was an
innovative industrial enterprise, but with problems arising
related to capital availability.

Roane Iron's record as an

industrial innovator during this period was impressive: it
was the first iron manufacturer to use coke in the
production of pig iron in the South (1868); the first
company to produce steel of any type in the South at
Chattanooga (1878); and the earliest enterprise to
successfully manufacture Bessemer steel in the South
(1887).

The company, however, was in a constant struggle

to obtain the capital to continue development and achieve
its objectives.

In this respect, it was representative of

proprietary-competitive industrial enterprises that had
closed ownership structures, and, consequently, limited
access to capital.

Throughout this period in the company's

history, repeated attempts were made to obtain larger
amounts of money for various purposes, mostly through the
offering of new issues of stock to a small existing group
of stockholders.

For a while, this method worked and Roane

70 RIC, Board of Directors Minutes, October 16, 1889.
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Iron managed to operate and innovate on a razor-thin
margin.

When the company decided to undertake the Bessemer

venture, however, a new strategy had to be employed.
Existing stockholders did not have the resources to cover a
new stock issue of that amount, and they were not about to
relinquish control of the company.

This is when Roane Iron

enlisted the help of Charles McGhee, and initiated its
dealings with the Central Trust Company of New York.
Throughout Roane Iron's growth and experimentation, its
production facility and community at Rockwood remained
constants, and were influenced by the company's shortage of
capital.

Industrial Capital and Place Formation;
Rockwood as Roane Iron's Company Town

The Roane Iron Company's furnaces, and the settlement
of Rockwood, were initially developed in an isolated and
sparsely settled section of East Tennessee.

The towns of

Kingston and Loudon were more than 20 miles to the east,
and the terrain in the western part of Roane County was
rough and constraining.

The location was secluded as well,

as no railroads or even decent wagon roads passed through
the area.

Deposits of coal, iron ore, and limestone were

abundant at and around the site, however, and the logic of
transportation costs and industrial location guided Roane
Iron's industrial development scheme.
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The Roane Iron Company's actions with respect to the
early development of Rockwood provide insight into its
motives for community formation.

The company did not sell

any residential land in Rockwood, but rather rented housing
to workers that needed it. 71

In the beginning, worker

housing was built as close as possible to the furnaces, to
minimize the distance employees would have to travel to
work.

Some of the earliest housing built by Roane Iron was

a group of one room huts, known as "Welsh Row" located
adjacent to the furnaces. 72

During this early period the

Roane Iron Company spent a significant amount of capital on
the construction of housing, as indicated by an 1870
company inventory (Table 2.1) . 73

The company's housing

policy suggests that it wanted to provide housing for its
workers while maintaining control of land ownership.

The

return that the company expected on the housing was
reliable labor in the mines and at the iron production
facility, and rent payments which could be drawn directly
from employee wages.
Rental agreements included clauses forbidding the sale
of dry goods.

This tied in with another of the company's

profit strategies, monopoly control of the sale of consumer
71 united States Congress, Senate, Committee on Education and Labor,
Report upon the Relations Between Labor and Capital, 48th Congress,
1st Session, November 11-28, 1883, 5 Volumes, Volume IV, 129. Report
upon the Relations Between Labor and Capital will hereafter be cited
as Report upon Labor and Capital. Hiram S. Chamberlain, president of
the Roane Iron Company in 1883, testified ands was cited in this
report.
72 Rockwood Times, December 18, 1924.
73 RIC, Board of Directors Minutes, June, 2, 1869, May 20, 1870.
110

Table 2 .1.
Inventory of the Roane Iron Company, May 20, 1870
Item

Capital Expended

Real Estate

$74,874.75

Houses

$52,198.50

Engines

&

Cars

$37,375.00

Mines

$13,670.00

Furnace

$61,845.00

Machine Shop
Blacksmith Shop
Foundry

&

Patterns

Furnace Shop
Sundries

$2,289.41
$834.44
$1,541.05
$225.60
$113,118.19

Do Supplies

$29,719.70

Accounts

$32,835.23

Total Assets

$428,702.86

Source: Roane Iron Company, Board of Directors Minutes, May
20, 1870.
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goods at the company store.

One of the earliest actions of

the company was the founding of the company store in 1868,
and the authorization of funds to stock it with goods. 74
No other stores existed in the settlement during the
company's first decade of operation.

Thus, during the

town's early years, the company effectively controlled
employee trade through its

restrictive covenants and the

establishment of the company store.
The Roane Iron Company did not develop a plan for
Rockwood during its early period of operation.

The company

built housing based on immediate worker needs.

When the

iron operation increased its production, more employee
housing was needed, and the company constructed more homes
to be rented.

Eventually, as construction continued this

resulted in a block morphology around the furnace area,
(Figure 2. 2) .
The production facility at Rockwood was typical of
coke-burning blast furnace operations of the era (Figure
2.3).

The facility site was located as far north as

possible, abutting formidable Walden's Ridge.

Tipples 75

were located adjacent to Walden's Ridge at mine openings,
in which coal was sorted and loaded into railroad cars.
The coal was transported in the cars the short distance
down the tracks to rows of beehive coke ovens where the
Bituminous coal was made into coke (Figure 2.4).

The coke

74 rbid, December 18, 1868.
75 structures at which coal was sorted and loaded into horse-drawn or
railroad cars. Coal was sorted according to size in some instances,
and excess rock was separated to be dumped in waste (culm) piles.
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Figure 2.2.
Block Settlement Pattern in Rockwood, Tennessee
Circa 1890

Source: The Roane Iron Company, Rockwood: The Pioneer IronMaking Town in the South (Cincinnati: McDonald & Eick
Printers, 1890).
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Figure 2.3.
1893 Map of the Roane Iron Facility,
Rockwood, Tennessee

Source: Sanborn Map Company, Sanborn Fire Insurance Maps
Rockwood, Tennessee, 1893.

Figure 2.4.
Beehive Coke Ovens at Rockwood, Tennessee
Circa 1890

Source: The Roane Iron Company, Rockwood: The Pioneer IronMaking Town in the South (Cincinnati: McDonald & Eick
Printers, 1890).
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was then used as fuel for the smelting of the iron ore,
also obtained from the company's mines, in 65 foot high
blast furnaces (Figure 2.5).

Lime, which was needed as a

flux to produce the desired chemical reaction, was also
extracted and transported by rail from the company's kilns
to the furnaces.

The resulting product was pig iron, which

was cast into ingots and stored in an adjacent yard until
it could be transported to a buyer who would use it for the
production of iron and steel implements.
This production system was geared toward a division of
labor, for which the Roane Iron Company attempted to
procure a corresponding workforce at the isolated Rockwood
production site.

In large part the labor needed for manual

work to be done around the coke ovens and blast furnaces
was unskilled.

Hiram Chamberlain expressed this during his

1883 testimony in front of the Senate Committee on
Education and Labor, in which he described in general terms
his assessment of the labor force required at Rockwood:
"The labor employed there is of a cheaper class than that
about rolling mills as a general thing, because there is
more common labor employed directly about the furnace." 76
There were some functions that could only be performed by
skilled labor at Rockwood, however, and Roane Iron had to
attract skilled workers to the isolated production site to
operate sucessfully in the early years.

Pools of skilled,

experienced iron-industry labor did not exist in the Upland
16 Report upon Labor and Capital, 129.
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Figure 2.5.
The Roane Iron Company Blast Furnaces

Source: Roane County Heritage Commission Photograph
Collection, Kingston, Tennessee

120

vi'
I)
u

tU

....C:
:::,

u..

-"'0
u

C:

...
0

.,
C:
tU

0

0:::

12 1

South in the late 1860s, thus Chamberlain explained that
" ... directly after the war all skilled labor in our line
was, of course, brought down from the North ... it is true in
this country, as in the North, that iron-workers as a
class, are foreigners -- are not Americans.

They are

Englishmen, Welshmen, Irishmen, and other foreigners. 1177
Federal Manuscript census data show Chamberlain's
descriptions of labor requirements at Rockwood to be
accurate.

Over 54 percent of workers residing in Rockwood

in 1870 were unskilled blue-collar workers, while slightly
less than 27 percent were skilled blue-collar workers. 78
Only a small percentage of residents were involved in
white-collar occupations, and most of those were related to
the company operations (Table 2.2).
The majority of employed persons in Rockwood in 1870
were born in the United States, but ethnic groups performed
different roles within the industrial division of labor
(Table 2.3).

The industrial occupations that required the

most skill and experience (and which were the highest
paying) were those in coal mining, and these jobs were
dominated by workers from the British Isles.

The coal

seams within Walden's Ridge were vertically tilted, and

77 Ibid, 133.

78 This data was compiled from the 1870 U.S. Federal manuscript census
data for Rockwood. The classification is based on a scheme developed
by Olivier Zunz for his study of late nineteenth and early twentieth
century Detroit. See Olivier Zunz, The Changing Face of Inequality:
Urbanization, Industrial Development, and Immigrants in Detroit,
1880-1920 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1982), 420-433
(Appendix 3).
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Table 2.2.
Occupational Breakdown of Rockwood, Tennessee, 1870, 1880
Occupational Class

1870

1880

Unskilled Blue-Collar

54.4%

69.0%

Skilled Blue-Collar

26.9%

22.5%

Low White-Collar

16.6%

7.9%

High White-Collar

2.0%

.6%

Total Number Employed

193

316

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census,
Ninth Census, 1870: Population Manuscripts; Tenth
Census, 1880: Population Manuscripts, Tennessee,
Roane County.

Table 2.3.
Ethnic Breakdown of Selected Industrial Occupations,
1870, 1880
Population
Group

Coal
Mining
1870

Ore
Mining

1880 1870

Iron
Furnace

1880

1870

Foreign-born

65.6

*

0.0

*

0.0

Native White

34.4

*

68.0

*

Native Black

0.0

*

31.8

Total Number
Employed

32

*

22

Coke
Ovens

1880 1870
0.0

1880

0.0

0.0

40.0 22.2

21.0

0.0

*

60.0 77.8

78.9 100.0

*

17

27

19

5

* Coal and iron mining could not be distinguished in the

1880 census manuscript for Rockwood.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census,
Ninth Census, 1870: Population Manuscripts; Tenth
Census, 1880: Population Manuscripts, Tennessee,
Roane County.

124

mining coal from them required a considerable level of
expertise.

In 1870, of 32 coal miners in Rockwood,

over 65 percent were English, Scottish, or Welsh.

The

remaining minority were white, United States citizens from
Tennessee, Kentucky, and Ohio.

Of the 25 British Isle

natives living in Rockwood with jobs in 1870, 21 (84
percent) were working as coal miners for the Roane Iron
Company.
This pattern also extended to other representative
industrial occupations.

Jobs at the coke ovens, which

involved long days of heavy labor working in high
temperatures, were dominated by African-Americans.

No

foreigners worked at the coke ovens, and only a small
minority of native whites were employed there (Table 2.3).
Iron ore mining, considered to require less skill than coal
mining because of the surface character of deposits, was
also limited to certain groups.

Native whites were the

predominant group found in the iron mines, with a
significantly smaller number of blacks involved in that
occupation. Again, no foreigners had were employed in iron
extraction.
Rockwood developed as a decidedly more ethnicallydiverse settlement than Roane County as a whole.

In 1870,

over 14 percent of Rockwood residents were foreign born, as
opposed to about one percent for the county as a whole
(Table 2.4).

In fact, 94 of the 148 foreign born residents
125

Table 2.4.
Ethnic Breakdown of Upper Tennessee River Valley Towns and
Roane County, 1870, 1880

Rcckllllccd

Kingston

Roane Cc.

LClldCn

Population
Group

1870

1880 1870

Foreign-born

14.4

3.2

4.0

*

trace

*

1.1

0.9

Native White

59.6 65.5

66.0

*

75.0

*

83.1

84.8

Native Black

26.0 31.3

30.0

*

25.0

*

15.8

14.3

1880

1870•

1880 1870

1880

* No data available
• Data for the Loudon Civil Division, of which the town of
Loudon was part.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census,
Ninth Census, 1870: Population Manuscripts; Tenth
Census, 1880: Population Manuscripts, Tennessee,
Roane County; Compendium of the Ninth Census, 1870,
337; Compendium of the Tenth Census, 1880, 371.

of the county lived in Rockwood at this time. 79

The Roane

Iron Company made a concerted effort to attract desired
foreign labor during its early period of operation; During
the late 1860s and early 1870s General Wilder made several
trips to England and Wales from which he brought back
skilled workers. 80

The town also had a significantly

larger proportion of black residents than other settlements
in the county in 1870 (Table 2.4).

This was also no

happenstance. The company apparently preferred, and
recruited, African-American workers for unskilled
positions.

Chamberlain explained Roane Iron's labor

practices:
As far as unskilled labor is concerned, we always employed
colored men. All the heavy work about the rolling mill was
done by colored labor, and the same is true of the heavy work
about the mines .... Around the furnaces, the great bulk of
labor is colored labor, and it is almost entirely so about the
blast furnaces. As far as our experience goes, we have found
it to be a good, reliable character of labor. I think it is by
far the best labor in the South -- I mean native to the
South. 81

By 1880, the settlement of Rockwood had existed for 12
years, and some significant changes had occurred both
regionally and locally.

Principal among these was the

completion of the Cincinnati Southern Railway in 1879.

The

Cincinnati Southern stretched from Cincinnati, Ohio to
Chattanooga, Tennessee and its route cut through Roane
County and directly past Rockwood.

The Roane Iron Company

79 u.s., Department of Congress, Bureau of the Census, Ninth Census,
1870: Population Manuscripts, Tennessee, Roane County; Compendium of
the Eleventh Census (Government Printing Office, 1893), 507.
80 Nashville Daily American, May 15, 1875 cited in William H. Moore,
"Rockwood: A Prototype of the New South," (Masters Thesis, University
of Tennessee, Knoxville), 30.
81 Report upon Labor and Capital, 133.
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had invested large amounts of time and capital in trying to
convince the Cincinnati Southern to construct this route,
negotiating with the railroad since the early 1870s. 82

The

successful completion of the rail line shattered the
isolation that had characterized Roane Iron's early
operations in the Upper Tennessee River Valley.

The

company no longer had to operate according to wet and dry
seasons and water levels on the Tennessee River.

Building

materials, supplies for the company store, and other items
could be shipped in as readily as pig iron could shipped
out. The connection of Rockwood to the north-south rail
line ended the community's initial pioneer phase, and
linked it to more numerous potential customers and outside
influences.
The work regime prevalent in the settlement changed
little during 1870s.

By 1880, the blast furnace operation

itself was larger, with the addition of a second furnace in
1872.

But the major differences evident over the decade

were the proportional paucity of foreigners present in
Rockwood, and the number of workers employed in skilled
blue-collar occupations compared to 1870.

By

1880, the

82 RIC, Board of Directors Minutes, July 10, 1872 and numerous others.
The Cincinnati Southern was a municipal railroad financed and
constructed by the City of Cincinnati. The major objective of the
City in building the road was to establish a direct rail connection
to southern markets, increasing its ability to compete with river
cities such as Louisville, Kentucky. There was heated competition
between the cities of Knoxville and Chattanooga to become the
southern terminus of the Cincinnati Southern Railroad, in which the
Roane Iron Company participated on behalf of the Chattanooga route.
For an in depth discussion about the Cincinnati Southern Railway and
route selection, see Biggs, The Cincinnati Southern Railway: A
Municipal Enterprise."
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proportion of foreigners had decreased to slightly over
three percent of Rockwood's population.

In skilled blue-

collar occupations, they had been replaced to a large
extent by native whites (Table 2.4).

This was, more than

likely, the result of the migration of the foreign-born to
other mining and manufacturing areas, and the substitution
of native whites that had acquired mining skills.

The

percentage of blacks living in Rockwood increased slightly
over the decade, and they increasingly were the dominant
labor source in the furnaces (Table 2.3, 2.4).

The other

employment pattern that was evident in 1880 Rockwood was
the entrenchment of natives of Northern and Midwestern
states such as Indiana, Ohio, and New York in the few
white-collar jobs available in the town. 83 These whitecollar workers were, more than likely, close associates or
relatives of principals in the Roane Iron Company, most of
whom came from these states.
The social landscape of Rockwood through 1880 seems to
have been characterized by micro-scale segregation.

White

and black residents were most often clustered in groups by
race. The dominant pattern was one in which blacks and
whites lived on different streets or different blocks on
the same streets.

There were, however, instances of black

and white men residing in the same boarding houses.

In

1870, some clustering was evident among the foreign-born,
but this pattern had diminished by 1880, with foreign
83 Tenth Census, 1880: Population Manuscripts, Tennessee, Roane
County.
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residences being almost totally intermixed with those of
native whites.

The 1880 census also shows the appearance

of boardinghouses that housed workers involved in sameclass or closely-related occupations. For example all
residents might be skilled blue-collar workers or coal
miners. 84
During the 1870s, the population of Rockwood grew with
industrial production, and by 1880 the settlement was the
largest in the Upper Tennessee River Valley (Table 2.5).
In twelve years, Rockwood had grown into a larger urban
place than Kingston or Loudon, settlements which had
existed for more than half a century.

The engine for this

fast growth was industrial production, and its concomitant
labor needs.

Throughout the late 1860s and 1870s, the

Roane Iron Company employed more than two-thirds of all
working residents of Rockwood at occupations within its
industrial complex.as
A plan for the growing town was not filed with Roane

County until 1887, 19 years after Roane Iron began
operation (Figure 2.6).

The plan shows the Roane Iron

84 Ninth Census, 1870: Population Manuscripts; Tenth Census, 1880:
Population Manuscripts.
Because the population manuscripts of
Rockwood for 1870 and 1880 do not include street names or house
numbers, it is impossible to accurately map the residential location
of persons listed. Therefore, the only accurate spatial inferences
that can be drawn from the manuscripts are relational ones.
85 This includes coal and iron miners, furnace workers, coke oven
workers, and other occupations that could be linked to company
operations. Unspecified laborers were also included, because there
is an overwhelming probability that they worked for the Roane Iron
Company in some capacity. Unspecified laborers were distinguished
from farm laborers in both the 1870 and 1880 Census manuscripts,
supporting this interpretation.
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Table 2.5.
Population of Upper Tennessee River Valley Towns, 1860,
1870, and 1880
Town

1860

Rockwood
Kingston
Loudon

1870

1880

649

1,011

307

739

858

*

*

832

* No data available
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census,
Ninth Census, 1870: Population Manuscripts; Tenth
Census, 1880: Population Manuscripts, Tennessee,
Roane County; Compendium of the Ninth Census, 1870,
337; Compendium of the Tenth Census, 1880, 295;
Compendium of the Eleventh Census, 1890, 380.

Figure 2.6.
The Roane Iron Company's Plan for the
Village of Rockwood, 1887

Source: Roane County Register of Deeds, Deed Book A-2, 233.

complex (including coal mines, coke ovens and furnaces) at
the far northwest corner of the settlement.

This was where

coal could be most easily and efficiently extracted from
Walden's Ridge. The company-built Rockwood and Tennessee
River Railroad snaked through the town in a southeasterly
direction from the production facility and connected the
furnaces to the Cincinnati Southern main line.

The plan

for the rest of the settlement, which stretched out onto a
flat valley site to the south and east of the furnaces,
incorporated the block pattern which had been incrementally
created during the construction of early company housing
(Figure 2.2). Hence, by waiting to formalize Rockwood's
community plan until 1887, the company did not impose a
predetermined morphology on the landscape, but developed
the community in fits and starts of housing construction
related to the production process.

The 1887 plan was

simply an articulation of the early nucleated pattern that
the Roane Iron Company had unintentionally created, at a
time later in the company's history when it was more
established and had become more interested in the
regularization of space under its control.
Throughout the mid to late nineteenth century, the
Roane Iron Company used paternalism as a means to attract
and retain a labor force at the Rockwood production
facility.

The company assumed the responsibility of

providing housing for a majority of the workforce,
especially in the early years.

Over the years it also
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supported institutions that it felt were positive
influences in the community, and that the labor force might
desire.

Roane Iron built a school house in Rockwood early

on, and provided $25 a month for the building's upkeep.
Later, when a new school building was constructed, the
company donated $750 towards the project.

A lot was also

donated for a school for blacks in Rockwood. 86

A church

was built with company funds soon after the furnaces
opened, and was made available for non-sectarian services.
On numerous occasions, Roane Iron donated lots in Rockwood
to religious groups, so that they could build churches in
the community.

Social clubs such as the Masonic Lodge and

the Independent Order of Odd Fellows were also supported by
the company. 87
The limits to Roane Iron's generosity were apparent in
some of its other policies, however.

Until the late 1880s,

the company prevented outside commercial establishments
from doing business in Rockwood, preserving the monopoly of
the company store.

Restrictive covenants against

commercial activities in lease agreements were the major
avenue through which this was accomplished.

When a

resident made a specific request to remove this restriction
from his deed agreement in 1883, the motion was voted down
handily by the board of directors, maintaining the

86 RIC, Board of Directors Minutes, October 22, 1874, January 22,
1885, January 15, 1886, January 17, 1889.
87 Ibid, April 19, 1877, January 26, 1880, March 12, 1890, January 14,
1874, October 16, 1889.
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monopoly.BB

Roane Iron also paid its employees in scripB 9

if they desired, a form of currency issued by the company
through the company store.

Once a worker's wages had been

paid in scrip, it could not be converted back into U.S.
currency, and had to be redeemed at the company store for
merchandise.

The scrip system was a way for the company to

siphon much of its payroll back into its coffers, while at
the same time making a profit on the merchandise sold.
Because the company store was the only commercial
enterprise in Rockwood, it was possible for workers to be
caught up in the scrip system, receiving little cash takehome pay.

The company also balked at paying for certain

amenities which it felt were unnecessary.

An example of

one of these instances was when the board of directors
voted against a motion by Hiram Chamberlain to build a
reading room for employees at the furnaces. 90

BBibid, July 18, 1883.
B9some industrial companies, including the Roane Iron Company,
offered scrip as an alternative to scheduled salary payments of U.S.
currency. Scrip could be drawn at any time by an employee, and was
subtracted from one's regular paycheck. Instances have been
documented in which scrip was the sole method of payment in company
towns, but this was not the case in Rockwood.
90 Ibid, January 15, 1886.
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&;!praisal

The activities of the Roane Iron Company in the Upper
Tennessee River Valley in the period between the close of
the Civil War and 1890 were representative of proprietarycompetitive industrial business methods.

Although the

company was incorporated from the outset, it was very
closely held, and principal investors were involved in the
management of production facilities.

Until the late 1880s,

the company depended on its small group of stockholders for
expansion capital, operating with a closed ownership
structure and limited capital availability.

Roane Iron did

make worthy attempts at technological innovation and
vertical integration, but these many of these efforts were
plagued by problems with production processes and raw
materials as well as capital availablility.

When the

company did finally look to an outside source for capital,
it did not change its ownership structure to any degree,
but gained access to large-scale loan capital through an
associate of Hiram Chamberlain.
Roane Iron's development of Rockwood as a company
community was influenced by its capital situation.

In its

early years, the company had barely enough money to get its
iron production facility up and running in isolated western
Roane County.

The company provision of worker housing at

this time was considered a necessity, and was built with
little thought to planning or amenities.

Over time, Roane
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Iron repeatedly allocated its small amount of disposable
capital to production processes and vertical integration,
as opposed to the development of Rockwood.

The company did

what it felt had to be done to maintain a labor force at
Rockwood, and not much more.

Thus, it did not become very

involved in trying to dictate the details of community
development at Rockwood.

This is reflected in the fact

that Roane Iron did not draft a plan for its community
until 19 years after its foundation.

Because Roane Iron

had neither the capital nor the inclination to rigidly plan
and control the morphology and residential landscape of
Rockwood from the outset, the patterns which emerged were
largely a reflection of societal norms and the harried pace
of industrial development.

The result was a settlement

segregated by class and race at the street and block
scales, but in which no more pronounced segregation was
planned by the company.

This "hands-off" approach to

company community formation would change in the Upper
Tennesee Valley in the near future, with the operation of
new types of companies and creation of urban places with
new, distinct settlement patterns.
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Chapter III
FINANCIAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL INNOVATION: LAND COMPANIES AND
THE THIRD ROUND OF CAPITAL INVESTMENT

The National capital Market situation in the Late

1ssos

The maturation of American capital markets had an
enormous impact on the business environment in the United
States in the 1880s.

Eastern capital markets had developed

as a result of American railroads' need for capital.

The

market for rail securities began during the railroad boom
of the 1840s, when rail companies for the first time needed
more capital for construction than could be obtained from
farmers and merchants living along their rail lines.

Those

seeking funds for new lines in the late 1840s increasingly
came to New York City, which had emerged as the national
financial center because of its low interest rates on
borrowed capital. 1

During the same period, Europeans also

began to look for investment opportunities in the United
States in lieu of those in politically unstable European
countries. To meet the needs of American railroads seeking
funds and Europeans seeking investment opportunities, a
number of importing and exporting firms in New York began
to specialize in handling railroad securities.

Some of

1chandler, The Visible Hand, 91. According to Chandler, Philadelphia
and Boston were the leading financial centers in the United States
prior to New York during the first four decades of the nineteenth
century. New York became the major national financial center after
the late 1840s mainly because of a general capital shortfall among
Boston lenders, which led to higher lending rates than were available
in New York.
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these firms eventually dealt almost entirely in railroad
securities, and became the nation's first specialized
investment banking firms.

As agents for a railroad, they

sold its securities for a fee or on commission, acted as a
transfer agent in New York, and advised on financial
matters.

At the same time, these firms also became agents

for larger European investors who were interested in
purchasing American railroad stocks and bonds. This supply
and demand cycle of railroad capital was the impetus for
the growth of the New York City capital market (as well as
secondary markets in Boston and Philadelphia) by the mid1850s.2
Responding to the needs of railroad financing, the New
York financial district had become one of the largest and
most sophisticated capital markets in the world by the
outset of the Civil War.

The volume of business brought to

the New York Stock Exchange by the buying and selling of
railroad securities brought about trading and speculation
in its modern form.

Where hundreds of shares had been

traded weekly in the 1830s, hundreds of thousands of shares
were traded in the 1850s.

The modern call loan market

began in the 1850s, as New York banks began to lend
speculators money on call in order to provide funds for the
interest they were beginning to pay on their deposit
accounts.

2 Ibid.

Skillful railroad securities speculators such as
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Jay Gould made their first fortunes in the market, and
became nationally-known figures.
The capital market spawned by railroad activity was
thus fully developed and institutionalized by the late
1880s.

The railroad industry had matured by this time,

however, and its heavy demand for capital relative to
investment funds available had begun to diminish.

Until

this time, the market had been used almost exclusively by
railroads and allied enterprises such as telegraph,
express, and sleeping car companies.

These had been the

only enterprises that operated at a large enough scale to
require large amounts of outside capital. The relative
paucity of railroad demand for capital beginning in the
late 1880s did, for the first time, open the capital market
to other potential users. 3

The Regional Economic and Transportation Situation
in the Late 1ssos
By the late 1880s, transportation in the Upper
Tennessee River Valley had improved markedly from the early
post-war period.

In 1887, Goodspeed's History of Tennessee

reported that Roane County had " ... transportation
facilities (that) are the best of any county in East
Tennessee." 4

This was mainly because rail lines had been

constructed in the region in the late 1870s and 1880s. The
3Navin and Sears, "The Rise of a Market for Industrial Securuties,"
107; Chandler, The Visible Hand, 92-93.
4Goodspeed's History of Tennessee, 821.
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Cincinnati Southern Railway had been completed through
western Roane County by 1880; and the East Tennessee,
Virginia & Georgia Railway (ETV&G) also expanded into the
region during the 1880s.

The ETV&G first acquired a

locally-owned, coal-extraction rail line (the Walden's
Ridge Railroad) in the Spring of 1887.

It then added

trackage to the line, connecting it to the Cincinnati
Southern Railway at Emory Gap and to the Knoxville & Ohio
Railroad (already part of the ETV&G system) at Clinton.
The major impetus of the ETV&G's rail development in the
region was potential service to coal extraction areas, as
its principals felt the Walden's Ridge line would have
" •.• excellent connections to the coal fields of the
Cumberland Mountains, and that the coal tonnage would
justify acquiring it, and that the entire region is rich in
iron ore, coal, limestone, and timber." 5

The resulting

network linked the Upper Tennessee River Valley to the
national rail system, as well as the two largest urban
markets in East Tennessee -- Chattanooga and Knoxville.
The 1880s were a period of economic expansion and
increasing industrialization in the South.

In part this

was related to the upturn of the national economy in 1879,
after the depression conditions of the 1870s.

The

subsidence of the depression once again brought about a
positive investment environment and served to free Northern

5ETVG, Board of Directors Minutes, March 29, 1887, May 23, 1887.
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and European capitalists seeking Southern outlets for
investment.

Woodward, in his seminal volume Origins of the

New South, also attributes industrialization in the South
during this period to an alteration of economic principles
by a majority of Southern society, stating: "Undoubtedly
the will, ambition, and even the cupidity of a class of
Southerners had much to do with the speeding-up of Southern
industrialization. 116
In any case, evidence of the South's increasing
reliance on the industrial sector was abundant in the
1880s.

Southern cities were at the forefront of the

industrial conversion.

Several cities held large

industrial expositions during the 1880s.

Atlanta, Georgia

held the International Cotton Exposition in 1881 and the
Piedmont Exposition in 1887; Louisville, Kentucky hosted
the Southern Exposition in 1885; and New Orleans, Louisiana
administered 30 acres of exhibits at its Cotton Centennial
Exposition of 1885.

Each of these events touted the

industrial development of the South, and was geared towards
attracting outside capital and immigration.

Production

statistics in important industrial sectors such as ironmaking also indicate Southern industrialization was on the
rise.

By the late 1880s, the South was producing more pig-

iron than the entire nation before the Civil War.

The

capital invested in blast furnaces was also increasing at a

6woodward, Origins of the New South, 113.
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faster rate in the South as a whole than in any Northern
state during this period. 7
The combination of an institutionalized national
capital market, a positive business environment in the
South as a whole, and a vastly improved regional
transportation system in the late 1880s created an
attractive situation in the Upper Tennessee River Valley
for potential investment.

The Roane Iron Company had

already proven that pig iron could be made successfully in
the region under primitive conditions.

Vast timber and

mineral resources were known to be present in the area, but
prior to the 1880s were relatively isolated from
transportation systems and urban markets.

By the late

1880s, the region was well connected into the national rail
system, and new capitalists began to see industrial promise
in its varied mineral deposits, rivers, and timber covered
ridges.

The Arrival of sophisticated capitalism;
Land companies in the Upper Tennessee River Valley
The capital that was funneled into the Upper Tennessee
River Valley during the late 1880s and early 1890s came
through the activities of land companies.

Specifically,

three land companies -- the East Tennessee Land Company,
the Cardiff Iron

&

Coal Company, and the Lenoir City

7rbid., 124-128; Victor S. Clark, The History of Manufactures in the
United States (New York, 1929), 211-220.
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Company -- coordinated the industrial development, mineral
extraction, and community building that took place in the
region during this period.

These companies were different

than the previous industrial entities that had operated in
the region with respect to organizational structure,
financial methods, and development strategy.

They were

among those business enterprises that took advantage of
available capital in the securities market of the late
1880s, using it to purchase land and advance industrial
development strategies in the Upper Tennessee River Valley.
Their operation methods resulted in urban places that
exhibited different morphologies than pre-existing
settlements.
Each of the aforementioned land companies began
operation in the Upper Tennessee River Valley in 1889 or
1890.

The East Tennessee Land Company was the first of

these, obtaining its charter from the State of Tennessee in
April of 1889.

The Cardiff Coal

&

Iron Company and the

Lenoir City Company followed soon after, incorporating with
the State in March and April of 1890, respectively. 8 In
general, these companies had similar methods of operation.

8corporation Records, State of Tennessee, April 21, 1889, March 18,
1890, April 12, 1890.
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The East Tennessee Land Company

The East Tennessee Land Company (ETLC) was formed by a
group of notable capitalists from outside the immediate
region.

Frederick Gates, a New York native who moved to

Chattanooga in the mid 1880s for health reasons was the
driving force behind the formation of the company.

Before

his move to Chattanooga, Gates managed a large Diamond
Match Company plant in Frankfort, New York.

He also

invested in real estate, and helped route the West Shore
Railroad connecting New York City and Buffalo through
Frankfort.

While in New York, Gates had been a member of

the Prohibition Party, and the party's candidate for New
York Secretary of State in 1883. 9

It was upon the tenets

of Prohibition that the East Tennessee Land Company was
founded.
While in Ch~ttanooga, Gates initiated a plan to
combine temperence and business in an industrial-urban
development scheme in the Upper Tennessee River Valley.
Gates sought out friends and associates to invest in the
venture, and with them created the East Tennessee Land
Company.

All of the eventual principals in the company

were staunch Prohibitionists, and most were prominent
politicians and/or businessmen.

Perhaps the best known of

these was General Clinton B. Fisk, former commissioner of
the Freedman's Bureau for Kentucky and Tennessee, the
9walter T. Pulliam, Harriman: The Town That Temperance Built
(Maryville, TN: Brazos Press, 1978), 19-23.

146

founder of Fisk University for freedmen in Nashville,
Tennessee, and

Prohibitionist candidate for President of

the United States in 1888. 1

°

Fisk, a native of New York,

was appointed president of the East Tennessee Land Company
because of his prominence in the Prohibition movement, and
was successful in attracting capital to the company.

Other

inaugural officers and directors of the company included:
Dr. I. K. Funk and Adam W. Wagnalls, president and vice
president, respectively, of the New York City publishing
firm Funk

&

Wagnalls Company; 11 Ferdinand Schumacher of

Akron, Ohio, a pioneer in the manufacture of oatmeal and
president of the F. Schumacher Milling Company (predecessor
of the American Cereal Company (1891) which later became
the Quaker Oats Company (1901)); 12 John Hopewell, Jr. and
Ernest M. Goodall, both members of prominent New England
textile families and principals in the Sanford (Maine)
Mills blanket manufacturing company; Walter C. Harriman,
Jr., former United States Congressman from New Hampshire;
William H. Russell, former attorney for the Louisville, New
Albany

&

Chicago Railway and senior member of the

Chattanooga law firm of Russell, Daniels and Garvin; 13 and
Alphonso A. Hopkins, former Prohibition Party candidate for
Governor of New York (1882), and well-known author and
lODictionary of American Biography, Vol. 6, (New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1931), 413-414.
11 Dictionary of American Biography, Vol. 7, 72-73; The National
Cyclopaedia of American Biography, Vol. 23 (New York: James T. White
and Company, 1925), 44.
12 Pulliam, Harriman, 54; Chandler, The Visible Hand, 294.
13 Pulliam, Harriman, 47-60.
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biographer of Clinton B. Fisk (1888) . 14

The influence that

this distinguished group of men had in political and
business circles was useful in facilitating the East
Tennessee Land Company's operations in the region.
The developmental strategy of the East Tennessee Land
Company encompassed a wide range of activities within the
region.

In a bound, illustrated prospectus targeted at

potential ·investors, the company explained:
The East Tennessee Land Company will not expend its energies and
its working capital in general mining or manufacture, nor in any
miscellaneous fashion distributed over such broad territory. It
is what its name indicates, primarily a Land Company, and having
acquired magnificent heritage in lands, its one purpose is to
turn these, by systematic development, to the best advantage
possible. 15

In more specific terms, the ETLC articulated the
development activities that it believed would yield the
"best advantage."

Under a heading "Plans and Policy of the

Company," the following items were listed:
To sell 250,000 acres of farming land, reserving all mineral
rights.
To do this by systematic colonization.
To establish a manufacturing city, at a strategic valley point.
To establish an upland town, as a health resort and an
agricultural outlet.
To sell 3,000 acres of land in town and city lots.
To develop 250,000 acres of coal and iron deposits.
To do this largely through subordinate companies, organized under
supervision of the parent Company, in which this Company shall
hold controlling interest wherever control is essential to insure
best results.

14 Ibid., 50; Dictionary of American Biography, Vol. 7, 72-73.
15 Prospectus of the East Tennessee Land Company (New York: The South
Publishing Company, 1890), 23.
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To secure from such interest in these companies, and from the
royalties they will pay, a large and perpetual revenue. 16

Thus, the role that the company envisioned for itself in
the development process was as an overseeing body that
would coordinate these wide-ranging activities.
A large amount of capital was needed.

The company had

a sophisticated financial structure for the time period,
and was organized from the outset to be publicly-owned. 17
When it was incorporated in April of 1889, the amount of
the company's capital stock was specified at $3,000,000.
More than a half million dollars of its stock was
subscribed before the organization of the company,
indicating that this amount was probably bought by those
that became its officers and directors. The ETLC planned on
obtaining the rest of its stock capitalization from
outsiders, and published its prospectus in 1890 to woo
investors.

Much space was devoted to convincing potential

investors that the company's development scheme in the
Upper Tennessee River Valley was a sound investment:
Whoever has carefully read and fully comprehended the pages
preceding, must perceive how small is a capitalization of
$3,000,000 on such a basis as has been described, compared with
the capital of every other company of this kind. The capital
stock of this Company represents actual value, without inflation,
but does not approximate the entire values of the properties on
which it is based. It was the intention of the projectors and
16 Ibid.
17 Navin and Sears point out that some of the largest manufacturing
concerns of the 1880s were either family owned or incorporated and
closely held. Examples include the Singer Manufacturing Company,
Carnegie Steel Company, and the McCormick Harvesting Machine Company.
Although land companies were not industrials, they apparently were
among the first American non-railroad companies to embrace the public
ownership structure. See Navin and Sears, "The Rise of a Market for
Industrial Securities," 109-110.
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incorporators to shape this enterprise so that its stock should
be as solid as that of a national bank. 18

On the last page of the prospectus, potential stock
purchasers were directed to inquire at the company's New
York City headquarters, located in the Times Building.
The company was also sophisticated with respect to its
organizational structure and profit-making strategy.

The

organization of the ETLC was one of compartmentalized, with
different development activities assigned to subsidiary
companies.

Casting itself in the role of parent company,

the ETLC described its plan to use subsidiaries:
... (the company) has organized, and will organize, other
companies, with abundant capital drawn from its own individual
membership and from investors outside, and to these subordinate
companies it will transfer by lease the timber upon its lands, or
the excess thereof beyond the need of settlers, and the minerals
under them, devoting itself chiefly to surface development and
improvement. 19

The three subsidiary companies that the ETLC established in
its first year were the East Tennessee Mining Company, the
Harriman Coal and Iron Railroad, and the Harriman
Manufacturing Company.

The East Tennessee Mining Company

leased all the coal and iron properties owned by the ETLC,
and administered all coal and iron ore extraction
operations on company lands.

The Harriman Coal

&

Iron

Railroad Company's function was to build rail lines over
company lands, including a belt line around a proposed town
site and branch lines into iron and coal extraction areas.
The Harriman Manufacturing Company was to attract industry

18 Prospectus of the East Tennessee Land Company, 44.
19 Ibid., 23.
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to the ETLC's land holdings by providing from one-third to
one-half of the start-up capital for desired firms, in
exchange for significant stock holdings in them (Figure
3.1) . 20

This profit strategy was advanced for the era. The

acquisition of common and preferred stock in the ETLC's
subsidiary companies, and in manufacturing concerns that
received start-up capital from the Harriman Manufacturing
Company was a major profit tactic.

The ETLC explained this

strategy to potential investors:
The Manufacturing Company will thus hold a large interest, as
it does already, in many substantial factories at Harriman, and
through proper officers will exercise careful supervision over
these, making sure they are conducted to the best possible
advantage, and that all means within the power of the Harriman
Manufacturing Company and the East Tennessee Land Company are
used to promote their welfare and assure a wide market for their
products.
.
This plan, it is believed, will carry to the utmost point
yet attained, the spirit and method of co-operation among
manufacturing establishments of different character, so that all
shall work as one concern for their own interest, the interest of
the town, and the consequent greater success of the parent
company .... It follows that the stock to be held in each, by the
Harriman Manufacturing Company, must be a profitable source of
income to that Company, and must make its own stock return
handsome dividends and increase handsomely in value. This is
more certain because the stock which the Harriman Company will
hold in many subordinate companies will be preferred stock, with
six per cent dividend fairly assured upon it, by such preference
from the start.21

The organizational structure that the ETLC set up delegated
many development responsibilities to subsidiaries, but
ultimately insured that revenues would return to it through
common and preferred stock dividends.
The properties alluded to in the ETLC's prospectus
were obtained during the first months after its
20 Two Years of Harriman, Tennessee (New York: The South Publishing
Company, 1892), 44-52.
21 Ibid., 64-69.
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incorporation in 1889.

By March of 1890, less than a year

after its incorporation, the company had purchased 268,124
acres of land in the Upper Tennessee River Valley for
$2,095,879.30. 22

The company got some of this money from

stock sales, but also some from the national bond market.
In late 1889 or early 1890, the ETLC negotiated a
$1,000,000 bond issue with the Central Trust Company of New
York, 23 which had administered trust conversions for the
cottonseed oil {1884) and sugar {1887) industries, as well
as bond issues for several American railroad companies. 24
The bond issue allowed the ETLC to acquire large tracts of
regional land, and to put its plan into operation.
The ETLC characterized its development plan as multifaceted, its emphases were resource extraction, industrial
development, and community building.

The company expressed

its belief in the relationship between the location of raw
materials, industrial production and urbanization:
The selling of city lots, where growth is rapid and where great
industries congregate, is more productive of wealth than a gold
mine. A dozen lusty young cities in the South might be named in
proof of this, and these have but anticipated the great current
of immigration from the North now fairly setting in ... Locate your
town where railroads are, or are bound to be, and where minerals
are abundant close at hand, and you may build as many as you
please during the next decade without overdoing it. "The South
is going to make the iron of this country for the next fifty

22 Prospectus of the East Tennessee Land Company, 43.
23 Harriman Daily Advance, January 30, 1893, January 31, 1893,
February 14, 1893.
24 Navin and Sears, "The Rise of a Market for Industrial Securities,"
119; Chandler, The Visible Hand, 319-328; ETVG, Board of Directors
Minutes, June 30, 1886, May 23, 1887. In the creation of a trust, a
number of companies in a particular industry turned their stock
certificates over to a board of trustees, receiving in turn trust
certificates of equivalent value. Reasons for trust conversion in an
industry usually were related to limiting competition and price
fluctuations.
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years." So declared recently an iron manufacturer of the North.
So believe the most sagacious men who have studied the iron
problem North and South. Grant that they are right, and the
wisdom of prudent town-building is granted as well. For iron
will be made where it can be made cheapest; it can be made
cheapest where iron-plants have place in close proximity to the
iron mines, and where coal supplies exist in the same
neighborhood. To establish furnaces, coke ovens and iron-works,
and to open coal beds at any given point, is to create a town ...
Considerations like these determined the East Tennessee Land
Company to establish the CITY OF HARRIMAN. 25

The City of Harriman was to be the centerpiece of the
ETLC's industrial development scheme in the Upper Tennessee
River Valley.

If the ETLC felt that community building in

association with industrialization was a logical
progression, it also recognized that the endeavor could be
lucrative:
... while so large a proportion of the East Tennessee Land
Company's territory can be sold for agricultural purposes, and at
handsome profit ... the Company expects to reap its chief gains,
after those realized from coal and iron interests, from its work
of town building.26

The location chosen by the ETLC for its industrialtemperence city was at Big Emory Gap, where the Emory River
had eroded a narrow valley through Walden's Ridge.

This

site was approximately 80 miles northeast of Chattanooga
via the Cincinnati Southern Railway, and 50 miles west of
Knoxville via the Walden's Ridge division of the East
Tennessee, Virginia

&

Georgia Railway (Figure 3.2).

The

town was named Harriman, in honor of Colonel Walter C.
Harriman, a Union officer who had operated in the area
during the Civil War and father of ETLC director Walter
Harriman, Jr.

The original city site was on a large oxbow

25 Prospectus of the East Tennessee Land Company, 25-26.
26 Ibid., 25.
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Figure 3.2.

Map Showing Harriman, Tennessee, Adjoining Cities
and Railroad Connections

Source: G.M. Connelly, City Directory of Harriman,
Tennessee (Chattanooga: Times Printing Co, 1890).
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in the Emory River, with the Cincinnati Southern Railway
directly to the west and the East Tennessee, Virginia
Georgia Railway to the north (Figure 3.3).

&

A location

chosen, the ETLC "staked out" a portion of the site on
Christmas Day, 1889, and commissioned a plat for
Harriman. 27

From this point forward, Harriman became the

focus of the ETLC's development strategy in the region.

The Cardiff Coal and Iron Company

The Cardiff Coal

&

Iron Company (CCIC) was also an

enterprise conceived by Northern capitalists.

The

company's origin was rooted in an exploratory expedition
taken by W.P. Rice and some of his associates to the Upper
Tennessee River Valley in the Spring of 1889.

Rice was a

native of Maine who had been an executive with several
financial institutions in Kansas City, Missouri during the
1880s, and who also had presided over the establishment of
the new industrial city of Fort Payne, Alabama in late
1888. 28

Apparently Rice and his group were impressed with

the area, for in the next six months they commissioned an
agent to buy land in the region, and, by March of 1890, the
Cardiff Coal

&

Iron Company had been incorporated.

21 Two Years of Harriman, 11-12.
28 The Cardiff Herald, April 23, 1890, May 7, 1890; W.P. Rice to J.F.
Randolph, December 20, 1890, Cardiff Coal & Iron Company Papers,
Roane County Heritage Commission, Kingston, TN. Rice was the
president of the Fort Payne Coal and Iron Company during the late
1880s and early 1890s.
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Figure 3.3.
Local Map of Harriman City Site

Source: G.M. Connelly, City Directory of Harriman,
Tennessee (Chattanooga: Times Printing Co, 1890).
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In large part, the group of investors that became
principals in the Cardiff Coal & Iron Company were from
Rice's native New England.

The initial president of the

company was B.B. Smalley of Burlington, Vermont, president
of the Ogdensburg and Lake Champlain Railroad, vice
president of the Burlington Trust Company, and former
secretary of the National Democratic Committee.

Other

officers and directors from the New England region were:
General Joshua L. Chamberlain, former four-term Governor of
Maine and president of Boudoin College (Brunswick,Maine);
Charles L. James, head of the Boston lumber firm James

&

Abbott, as well as partner in the finance banking firm of
Cordley

&

Company; Samuel Pingree of Hartford, Vermont,

former Governor of Vermont and member of the state
legislature, as well as Chairman of the Vermont Board of
Railroad Commissioners;

John M. Whipple of Claremont, New

Hampshire, a mentl:?er of the New Hampshire legislature;
Carlos Heard, a partner in the Biddeford, Maine hardware
firm of McKenney & Heard; and Henry C. Young, a junior
partner in the Boston finance banking firm of Cordley
Company. 29

&

Some members of the inaugural board of

directors were businessmen from East Tennessee, such as
J.F. Tarwater, T.G. Montague, and Robert Pritchard.

Each

of these men was a regional business leader: Tarwater was
head of the Rockwood iron-mining firm of Tarwater

&

Brown

29 The Town of Cardiff, and Lands and Mines of the Cardiff Coal and
Iron Company (Cardiff Coal & Iron Company, 1890), unattached insert;
The Cardiff Herald, April 23, 1890.
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and a director of the Roane Iron Company; Montague was
president of the First National Bank of Chattanooga; and
Pritchard was the head of the Chattanooga law firm of
Pritchard, Sizer, and Moore. 30

This combination of

regional and national capitalists as administrators was
used by the company as a selling point when the time came
to cultivate investors.
From the outset, the Cardiff Coal & Iron Company's
development program in the region was focused on
industrialization.

The company's view of the worth of its

land holdings in the Upper Tennessee River Valley was
linked to resources and their utilization in production
processes:
The Allegheny Belt is full of coal and iron and limestone
fluxes, and possesses other useful mineral resources in great
abundance, with vast supplies of timber. It contains places
where many manufactures (and the iron manufacture in particular,
by reason of the richness of the ores and the facility of
charcoal and coking coal) can be carried on to more advantage
than anyplace else in the world ...
With these preliminary considerations, (the Cardiff Coal
and Iron Company) has selected a town site adjoining some of the
richest mineral deposits in the great Allegheny Belt, two hundred
miles nearer than Birmingham to Northern and Western markets,
with the advantage of the good-will and hearty cooperation of the
resident and neighboring population, combined with the experience
of successful managers of similar enterprises in the South, as
the guarantee for its steady development into a flourishing
centre of industry.31

The CCIC planned to administer most aspects of development
on its land, including mineral extraction, the construction
and management of some industrial facilities, and the
development of a new city.

30ibid.
31 The Town of Cardiff, 4-5.

That the company advertised its
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intention to use this approach is suggested in an early
addition of The Cardiff Herald, the local newspaper:
The Cardiff Coal & Iron Co., officered by men of national
reputation, men whose good name is above reproach, has pledged
itself to expend a vast amount in the development of our fair
city.
One million and two hundred thousand dollars in cash to be
put into iron furnaces, coking ovens, rolling mills, rolling
mills, planing mills, churches, store houses, water supplies, ice
manufactories, etc., etc., ad infinitum. 32

The CCIC's comprehensive development strategy
required concomitant capital, which the company obtained
through two avenues.
structure.

The first was a public ownership

When it was incorporated in March of 1890, the

company declared its capitalization at $5,000,000,
consisting of 50,000 shares at a par value of $100 each.

A

prospectus, published to advertise CCIC stock to investors,
emphasized the company's advantages over other similar
enterprises.

Under the heading "Personal and Financial

Strength of the Company," the company suggested why it
would succeed where others had failed:
Unlike many of the corporations organized for Southern
development, a number of the corporators of the Cardiff Iron and
Coal Company consist of respected, wealthy and influential
citizens of the neighborhood where the property is located, which
is a local guarantee of the solidarity and success of the
corporation, and of the friendship of the people and government
of the State of Tennessee, that claims respectful attention.
With them are associated representatives of capital and labor of
other States, and men of approved experience in kindred
enterprises; the whole making an aggregate of wise counsel,
executive ability, and monetary strength such as has been seldom
combined. Too many of the attempts at development in the South
have been prosecuted by promoters without sufficient resources to
counterbalance the mistakes inevitable from the lack of
experience and absence of local associations. From the present
undertaking, every such source of weakness is eliminated. 33

32 The Cardiff Herald, April 30, 1890.
33 The Town of Cardiff, 11-12.
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The second avenue through which the CCIC derived its
initial "monetary strength" was from its association with
the Boston banking firm of Cordley

&

Company.

Two of the

members of the company's board of directors -- Charles
James and Henry Young -- were partners in the banking firm,
and it is probable that capital for early land purchases
came from it in association with the American Loan
Company of Boston. 34

In fact, Cordley

&

&

Trust

Company was very

much involved in land acquisition in the Upper Tennessee
River Valley, sending an agent to the region several months
before the incorporation of the CCIC.
Most of the property eventually acquired by the CCIC
was actually purchased by Henry Young, the agent acting on
behalf of Cordley

&

Company.

Young went to Roane County in

early 1890, and soon after began to survey land and
investigate titles in anticipation of purchasing several
large tracts .

.]\ccording to a resident of Rockwood, who

eventually purchased land from the CCIC:
... Young represented himself as being a member of the banking
house of Cordley & Co., of Boston, Mass., and that his said firm,
in whose behalf he claimed to be acting, as well as upon his own
account, was possessed of large means and practically unlimited
credit, and that there was associated with him and them in said
scheme and enterprise a syndicate of gentlemen of unlimited means
and national repute, who would give to said enterprise all
requisite attention and afford to it all requisite capital to
carry to a full consummation all the plans and schemes of
industry, enterprise and development .•• 35

34The Cardiff Herald, April 23, 1890.
35 Haley & Ingram vs. Henry C. Young (No Date), Complainant Report,
Cardiff Coal & Iron Company Papers, Roane County Heritage Commission,
Kingston, TN., 1-2.
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By April of 1890, 50,000 acres of land in the Upper
Tennessee River Valley had been purchased by Young acting
for Cordley

&

Company and the CCIC.

During that same

month, the CCIC assumed ownership of the land, issuing
Young stock in exchange.

Thus, the Cardiff Coal

Iron

&

Company's initial land holdings in the region were
accomplished almost entirely through the activities of
Northern financiers.
As with the East Tennessee Land Company, the focus of
the CCIC's industrial complex was to be a planned urban
settlement.

The location selected for the city was on the

Cincinnati Southern line, five miles north of Rockwood and
approximately the same distance southwest of the new town
of Harriman (Figure 3.4, 3.5).

The town was named Cardiff,

in hopeful anticipation that the settlement would emulate
the bustling coal mining town of Cardiff, Wales.

The city

site encompassed 2,000 acres between Walden's Ridge on the
northwest and a range of lesser

ridges on the southeast.

The CCIC explained the proposed city's advantageous
location in relation to transportation and urban markets:
... the company's possessions comprise lands not taken at haphazard, but carefully chosen for their natural wealth and
adjoining them the town site (chosen with equal care) at the foot
of Walden's Ridge, in the fertile Tennessee Valley, traversed
north and south by the Cincinnati Southern Railroad (the main
highway of travel and transportation between Cincinnati and
Louisville, the great cities of the Ohio Valley, and Chattanooga
and Birmingham, the great cities of the mineral belt), and so
situated in relation to the mountain gaps eastward, and also to
those westward ... that it is sure to command the lateral lines of
railroad communication which are multiplying in Northeastern
Tennessee. 36
36 The Town of Cardiff, 8.
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Figure 3.4.
Map of Cardiff Coal

&

Iron Company Properties

Source: Cardiff Coal and Iron Company, The Town of Cardiff,
and Lands and Mines of the Cardiff Coal and Iron Company
(Cardiff Coal & Iron Company, 1890).
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Figure 3.5.
Map Showing Location of Cardiff, Tennessee

Source: Cardiff Coal and Iron Company, The Town of Cardiff,
and Lands and Mines of the Cardiff Coal and Iron Company
(Cardiff Coal & Iron Company, 1890).
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The company also had definite ideas about how the internal
structure of Cardiff should be arranged, and turned next to
planning the urban landscape of the settlement.

The Lenoir City Company

The Lenoir City Company (LCC) was established by a
partnership of Knoxville entrepreneurs and New York City
financiers and businessmen.

The early catalyst was E. J.

Sanford, a prominent regional entrepreneur involved in a
wide range of business undertakings in Knoxville and East
Tennessee.

In early 1890, Sanford was at the apex of his

business career: he was president of the Knoxville drug
firm of Sanford, Chamberlain and Albers,

as well as the

Mechanics National Bank of Knoxville; vice president of the
East Tennessee National Bank; and on the board of directors
of the Knoxville Woolen Mills, the Knoxville Iron Company,
the Coal Creek Mining and Manufacturing Company, and the
East Tennessee, Virginia

&

Georgia Railway. 37

Sanford's

ability to spur an urban-industrial development initiative
in the Upper Tennessee River Valley was directly related to
his relationship with another successful East Tennessee
native, Charles Mcclung McGhee.

McGhee, a former resident

of Knoxville, had as previously mentioned been involved in
railroad development in the South since before the Civil
37 Mary U. Rothrock, Ed., The French Broad-Holston Country: A History
of Knox County, Tennessee (Knoxville: East Tennessee Historical
Society, 1946), 479-480.
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War.

In 1886, he had moved from Knoxville to New York City

in order to fulfill his duties with the East Tennessee,
Virginia

&

Georgia Railway, of which he was a vice

president in 1890.

Although he left the area, McGhee

maintained a continuing interest in development in East
Tennessee, and remained an investor in several companies
operating in the region (such as the Roane Iron Company).
Sanford and McGhee had become close friends and business
associates when they were Knoxville residents, and
continued their business dealings after McGhee's departure.
The two had frequently corresponded during the late 1880s,
with McGhee inquiring about investment opportunities in
East Tennessee and Sanford providing regional business
news. 38

The Lenoir City development came to fruition

through this correspondence.
In June of 1887, Sanford suggested to McGhee that an
urban-industrial development in East Tennessee would be an
sound investment.

McGhee rejected the idea for the moment,

but expressed to Sanford what his role would be if it were
ever undertaken:
I fully agree with you in the views that you entertain with
reference to the City ... and would like very much to see the
enterprise undertaken and carried through. But I do not feel
willing that our Syndicate should embark in the enterprise. We
have as you say made a success and I do not feel like embarking
in anything that will take the profits that we have already made.
A capital of one million dollars would be required to ensure the
success of a city and while I would be willing to put in $50,000
38 sanford and McGhee wrote to each other on a fairly steady basis
during the late 1880s and early 1890s. A survey of these letters
provides much useful information about businesses in Knoxville and
East Tennessee during this period. See the McGhee Papers, preserved
at the Mcclung Historical Collection in the Customs Building,
Knoxville, Tennessee.
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as my part of the venture, yet the temper and spirit here is not
now favorable to the giving of the other $950,000. I think if I
would father the scheme and undertake to do so I could secure the
needed amount of money but if I did so I would have to assume the
management of it to some extent and would have to be become
morally responsible to my friends who I would induce to go into
it, this I feel unwilling to do. 39

Without McGhee's leadership in obtaining outside financing,
Sanford abandoned the idea for the immediate future.

Less

than two years later, however, the project was underway,
and McGhee had enlisted his "syndicate" to fund and
participate in the management of the company to be founded.
The syndicate to which McGhee belonged was made up in
large part of New York financiers and businessmen with whom
he had become associated during his work with the East
Tennessee, Virginia

&

Georgia Railway.

These men were

among the most powerful and respected businessmen of their
era, and most had begun their careers working for railroads
in some capacity.

Probably the best known of these was

Samuel Thomas, president of the East Tennessee, Virginia &
Georgia Railway at this time. 40

Also part of the syndicate

with McGhee, Sanford, and Thomas were: Calvin S. Brice,
vice president of the East Tennessee, Virginia
Railway as well as president of the Lake Erie
Railroad; 41

&
&

Georgia
Western

Oliver H. Payne, a principal in the innovative

Standard Oil Company in association with John D.

39McGhee to Sanford, June 10, 1887; Partially quoted in MacArthur,
Charles Mcclung McGhee, 227.
40 ETVG, Board of Directors Minutes, January 8, 1889 and numerous
others.
41 Dictionary of American Biography, Vol. 1, (New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1936), 31-32.

Rockefeller; 42

and John G. Moore and Elverton R. Chapman,

partners in the New York brokerage firm of Moore
Schley. 43

&

McGhee and Sanford also brought some of their

Knoxville relatives and business associates into the
enterprise.

These were E.T. Sanford, J.M. Thornburgh,

Calvin M. Mcclung, A.J. Albers, William P. Chamberlain, and
T.H. Heald. Sanford and Thornburgh were prominent Knoxville
law partners, while Mcclung, Albers, Chamberlain, and Heald
were principals in some of the city's largest businesses
(C.M. Mcclung
Chamberlain

&

&

Co., wholesale hardware, Sanford,

Albers, wholesale and retail drugs;

Knoxville Iron Company; and Black Diamond Coal Co.,
respectively) . 44

Thus, the Lenoir City Company was formed.

Like the East Tennessee Land Company and the Cardiff
Coal and Iron Company, the Lenoir City Company was planned
from the outset to be a publicly-owned enterprise.

Upon

its incorporation with the state in April of 1890, the
company declared $800,000 worth of stock, in the form of
8,000 shares worth $100 each.

The LCC planned to issue

$400,000 of this to the public at par value.

It added a

new twist, however, to the sale of stock to the public.
Each buyer received not only stock certificates, but also a
42 Ibid., Vol. 7, 329-330; Chandler, The Visible Hand, 321-322.
43 Lenoir City Company, Board of Directors Minutes, May 20, 1890;
Navin and Sears, "The Rise of a Market for Industrial Securities,"
129. The board of directors minutes of the Lenoir City Company have
been preserved and are available, as the company continues to
maintain offices at Lenoir City, Tennessee.
44 Prospectus of the Lenoir City Company (Lenoir City Company, 1890),
4. C.M. Mcclung was McGhee's son-in-law, and E.T. Sanford was E.J.
Sanford's son.
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lot or lots in a city development worth the value of the
stock subscription. 45

To cultivate potential investors,

the company assured them of the stability of its
development and the advantages of its stock sale strategy:
Lenoir City is not a "boom town"; it is not the effort of
speculators to build upon some old, worn-out fields, a mushroom
city that cannot withstand future financial storms, and by taking
advantage of popular excitement to sell out the lots to outsiders
at unreal and fancy prices, and then silently retire from the
field, leaving the investors and so to speak, to "hold the bag,"
the poorer from their investment in everything except
experience ...
Having started out with this determination, they realize the
fact, pointed out by reason, that the way to permanently utilize
the unexcelled natural advantages of Lenoir City, is to offer
this property to the public in such a manner that INVESTMENTS
SHALL BE PROFITABLE TO THE INVESTORS, AND THAT EVERY INVESTOR
SHALL BECOME DIRECTLY INTERESTED WITH THEM IN THE ENTERPRISE, and
a zealous and co-operating agent in the upbuilding of the
City." 46

Half of the proceeds of public stock sales were to be used
to "pay for the original purchase of the property and debt
contracted in the formation of the Company. 1147

This

indicates that bonds were probably floated to fund the
early activities of the company, although no primary
evidence has been found to support this.
The focus of the Lenoir City Company's developmental
plans was its city development, to be "one of the
healthiest, most attractive and prosperous manufacturing
and commercial cities in the entire South." 48

The company

based its expectations of industrial development largely on
the proximity of its land holdings to the mineral resources
of the Upper Tennessee River Valley.

In its prospectus,

45 Ibid., 24-25.
46 Ibid., 23.
47 Ibid., 25.
48 Ibid., 8.
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the LCC quoted iron-making experts of the period, I.
Lowthian Bell and Abram S. Hewitt, stating that the
Tennessee Valley was an ideal locale for iron production. 49
It emphasized that industrial facilities locating in Lenoir
City would have access to the region's vast coal deposits.
In fact, the same syndicate that was involved in the the
LCC had a controlling interest in the Coal Creek Mining and
Manufacturing Company (CCMMC), an enterprise principally
involved in coal extraction.

The CCMMC at this time owned

90,000 acres of coal lands in Anderson County, Tennessee,
and the LCC planned to utilize the coal from this property
to promote industry at Lenoir City. 50

The company was also

cognizant of the site's transportation situation, noting:
... Lenoir City will be the meeting point of two great trunk
lines, where the two streams of immigration and capital flowing
southward - from the Eastern and Middle States, by the East
Tennessee, Virginia & Georgia Railway; and from the valleys of
the Ohio and Upper Mississippi rivers, by the Cincinnati-Southern
Railroad - will unite and build up a great industrial center." 51

This combination of resource availability and
transportation-connectedness served as the LCC's major
selling point in convincing investors of the future success
of its proposed development.
The property that was purchased by the LCC for its
development was part of the Lenoir Estate, which had been

49 Ibid., 12.
50MacArthur, Charles Mcclung McGhee, 218-223.

51 Prospectus of the Lenoir City Company (Lenoir City Company, 1~90),
11.
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ceded to General William Lenoir by the State of North
Carolina for service in the Revolutionary War. 52

The

proposed town site consisted of a 2,700 acre tract located
on the north shore of the Tennessee River, near its
confluence with the Little Tennessee River (Figure 3.6).
The site was located on the main line of the East
Tennessee, Virginia

&

Georgia Railway approximately 23

miles southwest of Knoxville and 88 miles northeast of
Chattanooga.

Soon after the purchase of the property, the

LCC commissioned a detailed plat of the proposed urban
area.

The development of Lenoir City became the main

subject of the LCC's activities, as it attempted to
administer the growth of a "commercial and industrial
center of the first importance. 1153

Harriman, Cardiff, and Lenoir City;
The Planning. Selling.
in the Upper

and Peopling of New communities
Tennessee River Valley

As the land companies operating in the Upper
Tennessee River Valley made the development of planned
urban-industrial communities the focus of their activities,
they were faced with decisions about the form and function
52 Ashley T. Hawn, "The Lenoir City Company, An Attempt In Community
Devlopment," (Master's Thesis, University of Tennessee, Knoxville),
7. In part because of this land grant, William Lenoir was an
influential figure in western North Carolina and East Tennessee
during the late 1700s and early 1800s. His vast land holdings were
passed on to his sons at his death in 1839, and they in turn were
important figures in these areas for the balance of the century.
Hence·, the name of the Lenoir City Company and Lenoir City.
53 Prospectus of the Lenoir City Company (Lenoir City Company, 1890),
12.
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Figure 3.6.
The Lenoir City Company's Map
of The Valley of East Tennessee

Source: Lenoir City Company, Prospectus of the Lenoir City
Company (Lenoir City Company, 1890).
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of these settlements.

Company housing was not incorporated

into any of the community plans.

Instead, the companies

used infrastructure improvements and professionally
designed community plans as selling points, and attempted
to make its money on the sale of improved lots to buyers.
In addition to residential tracts, the land companies were
especially interested in selling land to manufacturing
enterprises, which they envisioned would be the major
employment bases of the communities.

Thus, rather than

model company towns, Harriman, Cardiff, and Lenoir City can
be more accurately described as model real estate ventures
and model industrial communities. 54
In planning and developing their model industrial
communities, the land companies operating in the Upper
Tennessee River Valley uniformly drew upon urban sanitary
reform ideals.

With respect to city site choice, each of

the companies justified its city location using the
language of sanitary reform. 55

In describing the location

of Harriman, the East Tennessee Land Company explained
that:
54 The distinction between these terms is made because the land
companies did not retain ownership of land in the subject communities
and did not rent property as a profit strategy (as is often assumed
when the term "company town" is used).
55 The sanitary reform movement was based upon an empirically-grounded
explanation of origin and spread of infectious diseases, often called
the "filth theory" by medical historians. Reformers, for instance,
pointed to filth as the cause of numerous scourges -- among them
yellow fever, cholera, typhoid, scarlet fever, and diptheria. Filth,
depending upon the disease and the observer, could encompass such
conditions as odors arising from decomposing organic waste, stagnant
water, sodden ground, and absence of sunlight. See Jon A. Peterson,
"The Impact of Sanitary Reform Upon American Urban Planning, 18401890," 13-39.
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It is nearly 1,000 feet above sea level, and beyond the yellow
fever range. Its location is cool in summer, warm in winter, and
healthful all of the time. There the days are never tropically
hot, and the nights are deliciously cool. 56

The Cardiff Coal and Iron Company used like terminology to
describe Cardiff's situation:
The town site of Cardiff lies like an undulating ocean at
the foot of Walden's Ridge, and by it is protected from the March
winds--those active agents and confederates of pulmonary
diseases. It is an area within which malarial fevers and
epidemic diseases have never been known. 57

Similarly, the Lenoir City Company summarized the
characteristics of the area in which its community was to
be located:
Lenoir City is situated in the Central South, 1000 feet above
the sea-level, with a climate singularly equable and
exhilarating, midway between the severity of the New England
climate and the heat of the extreme South; lying north of
epidemics, and south of blizzards. No hurricanes, cyclones or
dangerous storms have ever been known in this section of the
country; their forces are shattered on the outer wall of
mountains that engirdles the East Tennessee Valley. All the
conditions of a sanitarium are found here; elevation, pure air,
healthful waters, and an atmosphere dry and bracing, acting as a
tonic on debilitated persons. The elevated location of the City
exempts it from the dangers of overflows and malarial diseases;
its topography assures the advantages of perfect drainage. 58

Each of the companies also translated this awareness of
reform ideals into the development and planning of their
urban industrial communities:

urban infrastructure and

services that were thought to positively impact the
physical and mental health of humans were to be provided.
The East Tennessee Land Company spelled out to potential
investors and buyers that:

56 Prospectus of the East Tennessee Land Company, 35.
51 The Cardiff Herald, April 23, 1890.
58 Prospectus of the Lenoir City Company (Lenoir City Company, 1890),
19-20.
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The fixed policy of this Company, in town-building, is to
establish all original town improvements--to lay the sewers, the
sidewalks and the paving, to put in the water-works, and the
lighting system, and the streetcar systern--and then to operate
all these, and secure the profit thereon, through subordinate
companies which it shall control, by retaining a majority of
stock in each. 59

The Cardiff Coal and Iron Company reported through its
mouthpiece, the Cardiff Herald:
No where is greater care exercised in all matters relative to
the health of a place than in Cardiff. Every precaution is
taken, the utmost vigilance is observed in all sanitary matters.
The sewerage system will be perfect, and the work already done
indicates the policy to be followed. Health is of primary
importance, and while nature has done her share for the place,
sanitary science will keep abreast of the constantly changing
condition of affairs here. 60

Also:
In establishing industrial towns, the advantages of a site
from a business point of view too commonly decide the question of
locality, while the inestimable value of health as a prime factor
in the successful growth and development of all industrial
centers is apparently lost sight of. No such mistake has been
made in locating the town of Cardiff. It would be difficult to
find anywhere in the South, or in fact, in the entire country, a
site where the conditions necessary to the maintenance of a high
standard of health prevail to a greater extent than they do
here. 61

Thus, the land companies recognized the infrastructural
improvements that were to be part of their urban
developments not only as promoting public health, but as
being sound investments in a business sense.
The land companies operating in the Upper Tennessee
River Valley also incorporated moral reform measures in
their urban places.

Like many model company town builders

before them, the companies felt that the work ethic and

59 Prospectus of the East Tennessee Land Company, quoted in Pulliam,
Harriman: The Town That Temperance Built, 31.
6DThe Cardiff Herald, July 23, 1890.
61 Ibid., October 1, 1890.
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business success could be fostered by the promotion of
temperance.

The East Tennessee Land Company made a

concerted effort to identify its development with the
movement, dubbing Harriman "The City of Temperance" during
its early advertising campaign.

The ETLC explained in one

of its publications:
It is a well-known economic fact that sober labor, away from
saloons, yields a positive percentage of gain to the capital
employing it, over labor in a community where the liquor traffic
is allowed. Statistics could here be cited were it necessary, to
show that this is the fact, and that large manufacturing plants
have actually yielded a much larger interest upon their capital
in years when the liquor traffic around them was forbidden and
abolished, than in years when the liquor traffic was permitted,
but with the same financial conditions otherwise. By the policy
of the East Tennessee Land Company the liquor traffic is
prohibited in title deeds, and saloons can never be permitted,
with their inevitable influences upon labor and its product. 62

The Lenoir City Company echoed these sentiments in relation
to city-building.

In its prospectus, under the bold-letter

heading "NO BAR ROOMS," the LCC justified its temperance
policy:
The promotors of this Company, as a matter of business, and
for the protection and general welfare of the people already
living on this property, and of those who will soon make this
City the home of their families, and to prevent disorders and
lawlessness, have determined to put into each deed executed by
the Company a clause forfeiting the title if liquor shall ever be
manufactured or sold on the premises conveyed. All manufacturers
know that it is the convenient dram shop which does the most to
demoralize workmen and impair their usefulness.
This will be especially valuable to the Furnace plants and
all other manufacturing enterprises that are now and soon will be
established here. 63

The emphasis of the companies was, therefore, on the
creation of social conditions that would encourage stable

62 Two Years of Harriman, 94.
63 Prospectus of the Lenoir City Company, 19.
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industrial workforces, facilitating efficient production
and, in turn, the success of their urban-industrial places.
The land companies made property and home ownership
defining elements of the urban places they were developing.
This was related to two goals which the companies were
trying to attain.

The first was intrinsic to the place-

making strategy employed in the development of urban
settlements such as Pullman and Hopedale: that model
company towns should be considered first and foremost as
business ventures.

The companies' investment in land and

improvements could be recovered most quickly through the
sale of lots.

The second was related to the longer-term

profitability of the urban developments: contributing to
the creation of a favorable labor environment for
industrial production.

In relation to this, the East

Tennessee Land Company wrote:
No class of workingmen ever is so profitable to its employers as
the class which can come and does come, by reason of its labor,
into the ownership of its own homes, covets permanency of
employment, strives after superiority, and seeks that mutual
welfare which labor and capital should each assure to each.
Already the number of homes owned at Harriman by the workingmen
employed there surpasses, as is believed, that of any other town
of like proportion. 64

In making the decision to sell the lots in their cities,
the land companies were forfeiting total property control
for immediate monetary returns, while maintaining the
ability to dictate the character of development that took
place in them.

64 Two Years of Harriman, 94.
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Spatial Strategies on the Landscape: The City Plans

Because the land companies expected industry to be the
basis of the growth and development of their cities, the
plans that they commissioned for their cities took into
account the needs of manufacturers and potential residents.
The companies, operating under the increasingly accepted
logic that skillful place-making could improve labor pools
and industrial production, spent a considerable amount of
the capital they had obtained in attempting to do so.

But

what spatial characteristics did the companies perceive as
desirable for efficient industrial production?

With total

control over the planning process, one would assume that
the companies employed spatial strategies in their city
plans that they believed would assist them in achieving
economic and social goals.
The city pl_ans created by the land companies had some
components in common (Figures 3.7, 3.8, 3.9).

One of

these was a general grid pattern of streets and blocks,
with service alleys bisecting most blocks.

The grid

pattern of subdivision was not distinctive, and suggests
the companies' concern with ease of subdivision and
obtaining large numbers of lots to sell in their city
sites.

Each of the plans also set aside large tracts of

land for industrial use adjacent to railroad lines.
Undoubtedly, this design feature was incorporated as an
attraction to manufacturers considering location in the
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Figure 3.7.
Harriman City Plan

Source: Roane County Register of Plans, Book C-2, 326-327.
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Figure 3.8.
Cardiff City Plan

Source: Roane County Register of Plans, Cabinet 1, Slide 4.
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Figure 3.9.
Lenoir City Plan

Source: Lenoir City Company, Prospectus of the Lenoir City
Company (Lenoir City Company, 1890).
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cities.

Railside sites would make loading and unloading of

raw materials and finished products easy and efficient, and
would contribute to the low-cost operation of any
industrial facility.
The East Tennessee Land Company chose a tract within
an oxbow of the Emory River for Harriman (Figure 3.7). The
grid subdivision pattern was altered somewhat to fit the
hexagonal shape created by the river and a proposed rail
belt line.

Some more distinctive urban reform-related

elements of the plan were a block set aside for public
buildings which faced Roane, Walden, Trenton and Morgan
Streets, and the designation of an extensive public park
(Block 36).

Lots were not subdivided to uniform size

throughout the city site.

Residential lot sizes were

significantly larger (50 x 190 compared to 25 x 1271/2) in
an area bounded by Clinton, Union, Clifty, and Walden
Streets, that occupied a ridge looking down on the rest of
the area.
The Cardiff Coal and Iron Company's plan for Cardiff
incorporated the grid plan in most of the area north of
Georgia Avenue (Figure 3.8).

The Cincinnati Southern rail

line bifurcated the city site, and land was designated for
a depot at a central location on the north side of the
tracks.

Lots sizes were larger to the south of Georgia

Avenue, and in one section of this area, curvilinear
streets and irregularly shaped lots were laid out.

The

design of this residential area contrasted sharply with the
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subdivision pattern of the rest of the site, mimicking
features of Olmsteadian model suburbs. 65

This area was

also set apart by a change in street naming protocol, with
streets named after American statesmen, politicians, and
commanders rather than states or cities.
The most distinctive feature of the Lenoir City
Company's plan for Lenoir City was the provision for public
space (Figure 3.9).

Within the grid plan, public spaces

such as Madison Square, Oakwood, The City Mall, the City
Hall and Market, and The Piran Court Square interrupted the
general pattern.

This reflected an urban reform

orientation towards open space as essential to maintaining
public health.

As in the other plans, some areas of the

site were subdivided into larger lot sizes, including a
sizable section in the northwestern part of the site and a
smaller one in the extreme east adjacent to "The Strand."
A block was also designated for public schools and other
public buildings (Block 7).
The companies' perceptions of their planned urban
landscapes were articulated in advertisement literature.
The literature indicates preconceived ideas about the
arrangement of urban-industrial landscapes, and suggests
intentional spatial stratification of land uses and

65 olmstead felt that the suburb should provide a setting for domestic
life free of the commotion, crowding, and physical chaos that
characterized the central areas of industrial cities. His suburban
designs usuually featured curvilinear streets, large irregularly
shaped lots, and public open spaces, as well as sewer and water
systems.
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societal groups. The East Tennessee Land Company described
Harriman in part in the following manner:
Cumberland Street ... traverses the crest of the high ridge
which runs across the town, and upon this street are many
residences of an excellent class ... At the eastern end of this
street ... stands the elegant home of Mr. Frederick Gates, in whose
brain Harriman was conceived ... his home commands a splendid
prospect of the city which he and his colleagues have
established.
Still another Cumberland Street home ... is the residence of
Mr. S.K. Paige, President of the Paige Manufacturing Company,
which vies with that of Mr. Gates ... in costliness and
architectural design. From this, as from all residence sites in
this part of town, a magnificent view of Emory Gap is had, with
much of the town spread out below you upon the lower slopes .
... Even the homes of the cheapest class, such as abound in
the manufacturing district, upon Clifty, Sewanee, Carter, Emory,
and other streets, are noteworthy for their neatness, and their
general average as above homes of a similar class in other
manufacturing places. 66

It is obvious from this description that the ETLC
envisioned different areas of the city site for various
classes of residents.

The ridge area was to be an upper

class residential area, and the areas below on the
periphery of the site adjacent to manufacturing facilities
were to be for the working classes.

The spatial

delineation was clear enough in the company's eyes that
specific streets could be associated with the residential
areas of particular socioeconomic groups.

Although not as

specifically articulated, the other companies demonstrated
similar methods of partitioning their urban landscapes.
The Lenoir City Company summarized the features of its city
site thus:
By reference to the map of the Lenoir City site ... it will
be seen that the East Tennessee, Virginia & Georgia Railway
traverses the central portion of the City from north-east to
south-west, and that Town Creek flows through the central portion
66rbid., 32-42.
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from north-west to south-east, at nearly right angles to the
railroad, thus dividing the site into four quadrangular
divisions.
That portion which is north of the railroad and west of Town
Creek will be the residence portion of the City, with several
longitudinal and lateral streets near the railroad. The central
and northern portions of this division consist of a succession of
beautiful hills and vales covered with magnificent groves, which
are most suitable for residential purposes.
Upon that portion lying south of the railroad and west of
Town Creek, on a river front at considerable distance from the
City site, will be located the larger and heavier factories, such
as blast furnaces, steel works, saw mills and lumber yards.
Upon that portion lying south of the railroad and west of
Town Creek, will be established woodworking plants, wagon spoke,
handle and furniture factories, and canning establishments. On
either side of Town Creek, cotton and woolen mills, and all kinds
of textile factories will be located.
The northern portion of the remaining division, lying north
of the railroad and east of Town Creek, will be laid off into
lots, and sold to operatives and wage workers on the most liberal
terms. 67

Again, the LCC had specific, preconceived ideas about how
urban land was to be used prior to selling its land.

Strategies to Realities: The Selling of Urban Land

The land companies turned their perceptions and
aspirations •into realities through their land sale methods.
In the case of Harriman, initial sales were accomplished
through a company-administered auction.

The East Tennessee

Land Company advertised its land sale in newspapers in New
York City, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and throughout
New England during January and February of 1890.

From the

company's offices at No. 96 Broadway in New York's
financial district, letters and leaflets were sent to
prospective buyers and investors (Figure 3.10) . 68
67 Prospectus of the Lenoir City Company, 21-22.
68 Pulliam, The Town That Temperance Built, 10.
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ETLC's sale ran from February 26 to February 28, 1890 and
attracted from 3,000 to 4,000 prospective buyers from all
over the eastern United States.

During the three day

period, 574 lots were sold for a total of $604,703 (Figure
3.11) . 69

Although the sale was conducted under an open

auction format, there is evidence that the company was
involved in determining the price at which lots were sold.
According to an account of the sale:
Just such a land sale was probably never seen before in this
country, under such conditions, and its like may never be
witnessed again. Faith in the Company's character, and
confidence in the location of the town, had created enthusiasm of
a remarkable degree ... It would have run the aggregate sales to a
round million dollars, had not the Company sought in unusual ways
to discount the speculative spirit, and hold men down to
reasonable business bidding. 70

What the ETLC determined to be "reasonable business
bidding" was dependent upon its preconception of how space
was to be used in Harriman.

When the company became

involved in the bidding process, it more than likely
imposed prices that it felt were fair and appropriate for
lots in various parts of the city site.

Thus, the results

of the ETLC's handling of the land sale were more than
satisfactory monetary returns and the maintenance of
company influence on land values and land use through
intervention in the auction process.
The Cardiff Coal and Iron Company and the Lenoir City
Company also attempted to influence land use in their city
through their land sale methods.

Each of the companies

69 Harriman Daily Advance, April 8, 1890.
70 city Directory of Harriman, Tennessee, Volume I, 1892 (Chattanooga,
TN: G.M. Connelly, 1892), 26.
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Figure 3.11.
The Great Land Sale at Harriman, Tennessee

Source: Roane County Heritage Commission Photograph
Collection, Kingston, Tennessee.
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assigned values to lots in their cities before any buyers
bid on them.

Land in Cardiff was sold at an auction

similar to that held by the East Tennessee Land Company.
In addition to national newspaper advertisements, the CCIC
commissioned at least one agent to travel to major cities
of the United States and Canada soliciting buyers and
investors in advance of the land sale. 71

The Cardiff sale

began on April 22, 1890 and continued for three days.

A

total of thirty-five Pullman rail cars, bringing an
estimated 4,000 prospective buyers from the New England
states, New York, Cincinnati, Louisville, Atlanta, and
several other cities arrived in Cardiff for the sale
(Figure 3.12).

By the end of the auction, the CCIC had

sold over a million dollars worth of lots, for prices
ranging from $500 to $7,000. 72

The method of sale was

described by the CCIC:
A definite price has been fixed upon each offered lot, which will
be the maximum price for the Company to receive therefore. The
lots will be put up at auction and sold to the highest bidder for
whatever price they bring, whether it amounts to more or less
than the maximum price, but all premiums (of $50 or any multiple
thereof bid on lots) above the maximum price will be returned to
the successful bidder in the stock of the Company, full paid and
non-accessable ... 73

71 F.R. Cordley to J.F. Randolph, August 23, 1890; F.R. Cordley to
J.F. Randolph, September 3, 1890; F.R. Cordley to J.F. Randolph,
September 10, 1890; F.R. Cordley to J.F. Randolph, September 15,
1890; F.R. Cordley to J.F. Randolph, September 22, 1890; H.H. French
to J.F. Randolph, September 22, 1890; H.H. French to J.F. Randolph,
September 24, 1890, Cardiff Coal & Iron Company Papers, Roane County
Heritage Commission, Kingston, TN. John F. Randolph was an agent of
the Cardiff Coal and Iron Company, and traveled widely in advertising
the company's activities and soliciting investors. The letters cited
above discussed Randolph's activities as agent, and were mailed to
him on the job in Boston, Ottawa, Toronto, and Detroit.
72Ibid., April 30, 1890.
13 The Cardiff Herald, April 23, 1890.
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Figure 3.12.
The Cardiff Land Sale

Source: Roane County Heritage Commission Photograph
Collection, Kingston, Tennessee.

This method selling lots allowed the company to quantify
its vision of how land should be used within the city site
by placing apriori values on specific pieces of land.

For

instance, lots that the company thought should used for
prime commercial sites or high-class residential areas
would be assigned high prices, and those for lower-class
worker housing lower prices.
The Lenoir City Company treated urban land in
essentially the same way in their development, although it
did not conduct a public auction.

The company assigned

values to lots in advance, and placed those values on a map
of the city site that was distributed with each company
prospectus (Figure 3.9).

Lots were not sold outright, per

se, but were included as bonuses when a purchase of Lenoir
City Company stock was made.

The company described this

process, which it dubbed the "Mutual Plan":
A large tract of land belonging to the Company, lying in the
center of the locality where the City is to be built has been
already laid off in streets and lots, and an accurate map has
been made of the entire property showing in detail these streets
and lots. These lots have been estimated in value, the
valuations being as nearly uniform as possible, after making
allowances for the different locations and sizes of the various
lots and the uses to which they can be put ...
These lots ... are to be disposed of by the Company in
connection with the $400,000 of stock, in the following manner:
THIS $400,000 WORTH OF STOCK WILL BE SOLD TO THE PUBLIC AT PAR.
EVERY PURCHASER OF THIS STOCK WILL, HOWEVER, RECEIVE NOT ONLY
PAID-UP STOCK TO THE AMOUNT OF HIS SUBSCRIPTION BUT ALSO A LOT
(OR LOTS) WHOSE ESTIMATED VALUE IS EQUAL TO THE AMOUNT OF HIS
SUBSCRIPTION.74

Of course, the locations and sizes of lots within the city
site were determined by the LCC when it imposed its plan
14 Prospectus of the Lenoir City Company, 24-25.
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upon the landscape, and the company had not wished to
create a uniform settlement pattern when it subdivided the
former Lenoir Estate.
What kinds of urban places were created in the Upper
Tennessee River Valley by these land companies?
Reconstruction of urban morphology and social l~ndscape is
possible from the large and well-preserved collection of
materials on the early development of Harriman, Tennessee.

The Results of Land company Development Strategy;
Harriman. Tennessee
The first step in the East Tennessee Land Company's
realization of its plan for Harriman was its land sale.
Prices paid for city lots varied greatly, but generally,
lot price variation corresponded to land uses which the
company had envisioned (Figure 3.13).

Lots that sold for

less than $500 usually were located in the periphery of the
original platted area, to the south of Carter Street and
the east of Clifty Street, the area intended for "homes of
the cheapest class" encompassing Clifty, Carter, and Emory
streets. 75

The other instance of lots sold for under $500

was in an area not shown on the original plat, i.e. west of
the East Tennessee, Virginia

&

Georgia Railway line.

Lots

bought for above $2,000 were located in the ridge area on
Cumberland and Walden Streets, or along Roane Street to the
75 Information on lot sale prices was obtained from the Harriman Daily
Advance, April 8, 1890. This information was cross-checked against
Roane County deed records.
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Figure 3.13.
Inaugural Land Sale Lot Prices,
February, 1890

Data: Harriman Daily Advance, April 8, 1890;
Roane County Deed Records.
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west.

The ETLC had described the ridge area, and

Cumberland Street in particular, as an upper-class
residential area in its literature.

Roane Street had been

envisioned as the main commercial boulevard in the city,
the company promising that it would "in due time [be] the
central thoroughfare of Harriman ... [which] will approximate
three miles in length. 1176

Thus the ETLC was successful in

translating its envisioned land use regime into a
stratified real estate market through its land sale.
For all of the planning that went into the early
development of Harriman, the East Tennessee Land Company
was forced to add two residential areas only three months
after the inaugural land sale.

Apparently, the company

realized that it had not made adequate provisions for
unskilled and semi-skilled workers, needed in various
industrial facilities, but unable to afford property in
most of the originally platted city area.

The two

"additions" were laid out approximately one mile northwest
of the original city site, separated from it by the East
Tennessee, Virginia and Georgia line and a tract of
unplatted, undeveloped land.

The company explained the

need for these additions:
In May, 1890, an addition was platted one mile east for the
special accomodation of workingmen who could not afford such
prices as had been for a time established by the auction sale,
and one hundred neat houses were built and occupied that year.
It is known as Walnut Hills Addition, and forms a thriving suburb
of the city proper, of which it is a corporate part. It has a
school and a church, and number over 600 population. Oak View

1 6Two Years of Harriman, 28.
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Addition joins it, nearer the ridge, where colored residents have
grouped themselves, with their own churches and schools ... 77

Two important ideas were expressed in this description of
the additions.

First, the new residential areas were

"additions," subordinate and apart from Harriman.

They

were separated from the original city site by a mile buffer
and had their own institutions such as schools and
churches. Second, these new areas were developed for
defined groups of people.

Walnut Hills was a residential

area for the lower paid blue-collar white working class
(workingmen), while Oak View was the section where any
African-Americans working in the city would "group
themselves."

This initial ommission of working-class

residential areas from the plan gives an indication of the
ETLC's priorities: they were more concerned with making
money from sales of urban land than they were in creating
the labor conditions needed for industrial production.
Construction of the city began in the months before
the land sale and intensified in the months after it.
Initially, temporary shacks were built to house workers and
businesses in the settlement (Figures 3.14).

This

"Shacktown" area was gradually abandoned as permanent
structures were constructed.

The ETLC graded the entire

city site, and carved streets and blocks out of the
previously undeveloped landscape (Figure 3.15).

In its

first two years of operation, the company expended over
$50,000 in street improvements; established municipal
77 rbid., 24-26.
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Figure 3.14.
Shacktown, 1890

Source: Roane County Heritage Commission Photograph
Collection, Kingston, Tennessee.
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Figure 3.15. Development of the Harriman City Site
N
0
\.0

Source: Roane County Heritage Commission Photograph
Collection, Kingston, Tennessee.

electric power and water infrastructure; funded the
construction of a public school building at a cost of more
than $6,000; constructed an exposition building to be used
for public meetings; began construction of a public sewer
system; and completed construction of an imposing company
headquarters building. 78

The East Tennessee Land Company

headquarters building was designed to be a symbol of the
permanence and future prosperity which Harriman would
attain. According to the company, it was:
... a substantial brick and stone structure, erected upon
square reserved for public buildings ... The four Norman towers
of the office building give it a peculiar appearance of grace
and strength combined. It is pronounced the finest building of
any kind in Roane County, and the finest private office
building in the State. 79

By 1892, the ETLC reported that nine industrial
enterprises had located in Harriman, as the result of the
activities of the Harriman Manufacturing Company.

The

largest of these was the Lookout Rolling Mills, which had
formerly operated in Chattanooga, and employed 250 to 300
workers (Figures 3.16).

Other production facilities

included a furniture factory, a machine works, a brick
works, an agricultural implement factory, a tack factory,
and a tool works.

Several of these had previously been in

operation in other locations such as Knoxville,
Chattanooga, Lancaster, Ohio, and Auburn, New York.

The

stock held by the Harriman Manufacturing Company in these

18 city Directory of Harriman, Tennessee, 30; Harriman Advance, March
1, 1890.

19 Two Years of Harriman, 48.
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Figure 3.16. The Lookout Rolling Mills, Harriman, Tennessee, 1891
Source: Roane County Heritage Commission Photograph
Collection, Kingston, Tennessee.
N
I-'
I-'

industries in 1892 was $268,000. 80 After two years of
applying its development strategy, the ETLC seems to have
been successful in building an industrial base in Harriman.

Interpreting Harriman

Also in 1892, the first and only Harriman city
directory was produced.

Its publisher, G.M. Connelly,

proclaimed:
The upbuilding of a great city will undoubtedly be the result of
the united labors of the cormnunity which so liberally supported
the publication of Vol. I, of the Harriman City Directory. No
town of double the population has ever exhibited such enterprise.
The book is as complete in its arrangement as all large
directories.

The East Tennessee Land Company at this time must have seen
the city directory as just another symbol of Harriman's
urban legitimacy.

The "enterprise" of Harriman's early

population and the ETLC in encouraging and cooperating with
Mr. Connelly in the publication of the directory, besides
lending credence to Harriman as an emerging industrial
city, has served another purpose which they never could
have foreseen.

It provides the only data available to

interpret the social landscape created by the East
Tennessee Land Company in Harriman.
In 1892, the Harriman City Directory announced that
Harriman's population had grown to 3,762 from one farm
family in January of 1890.

The directory reported the

name, address, occupation, and race of each head-ofaolbid., 72-76.
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household in the city in 1892.

Analysis of these data show

that Harriman was a spatially-stratified urban settlement
with respect to class and race in 1892.

When the heads-of-

household in 1892 Harriman are grouped into social classes
according to occupation,

a distinct residential pattern is

evident (Figure 3.17) . 81

The central ridge area of the

original city site was dominated by high-and-low-status
white-collar residents;

very few unskilled or skilled blue

collar workers lived in this area.

On the periphery of the

original city site, somewhat lower in elevation adjacent to
the industrial district, were the streets on which skilled
blue-collar and low-status white-collar workers
predominated.

A small number of unskilled blue-collar

headed families also lived in this peripheral area.

By far

the largest number of unskilled blue-collar heads lived in
Walnut Hills and Oak View Additions to the west of the
railroad tracks.

Some skilled blue-collar workers lived in

this section, as well as a small number of low white-collar
workers.

No high-status white-collar heads lived west of

the railroad tracks.
The visual perception of a residential separation of
classes is supported by statistical testing.

Two and three

area Chi-Square analyses of 1892 Harriman show non-random
proportional distributions of occupational class groups.
The two area analysis was performed using the originally
platted area east of the East Tennessee, Virginia and
81 As in Chapter II, Zunz's occupational classification scheme was
used to place residents in class groups.
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Figure 3.17.
Occupational Class Map of Harriman, Tennessee, 1892

Data: Harriman City Directory, 1892; Sanborn Insurance
Maps, 1895.
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Georgia tracks, and the later platted additions to the west
of the tracks (Figure 3.18).

The two-area analysis shows a

significant overrepresentation of unskilled blue-collar
heads in the area to the west of the tracks, and a
significant underrepresentation of both the high and low
white-collar class groups (Table 3.1). 82

The results are

reversed in the analysis of the original plat area, with an
overrepresentation of low and high white-collar heads, and
a marked underrepresentation of unskilled blue-collar
workers (Table 3.2).

These disparities translate into

significant Chi-Square values for each area, indicating a
non-random proportional spatial distribution of the class
groups.

The three area analysis was performed using the

following areas: a core area of the original plat, bounded
by Carter Street on the south and Clifty Street on the
east; a peripheral area of the original plat, separated
from the core area by the same streets; and an area to the
west of the railroad tracks (Figure 3.19).

A significant

underrepresentation of unskilled and skilled blue-collar
heads is evident in the core area, as is an
overrepresentation of low and, especially, high whitecollar workers (Table 3.3, 3.4). The most striking
residential pattern in the periphery was a paucity of

82 statements of over or under representation of class groups are made
in reference to the number of given class group heads-of-household
expected under an assumption of random proportional spatial
distribution. This assumption is made when using the Chi-Square
analysis.
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Figure 3 .18.
Study Areas for Two-Area Chi-Square Analysis
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Table 3.1.
Chi-Square Calculation (2 Area Analysis)
(Area West of Tracks)
(O-E)2/ E

Obs.

Exp.

(O-E)

(O-E)2

unskilled blue-collar

64

26

38

1444

skilled blue-collar

37

40

3

low white-collar

9

34

25

625

18.38

high white-collar

0

10

10

100

10.00

55.53
.23

9

x2 = 84.14
Table 3.2.
Chi-Square Calculation (2 Area Analysis)
(Main Plat)
(O-E) 2 / E

(O-E)

(O-E) 2

50

37

1369

79

76

3

low white-collar

90

65

25

625

9.61

high white-collar

28

19

9

81

4.26

Obs.

Exp.

unskilled blue-collar

13

skilled blue-collar

27.38
.19

9

x2

= 41.44
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Figure 3.19.
Study Areas for Three-Area Chi-Square Analysis
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Table 3.3.
Chi-Square Calculation (3 Area Analysis)
(Area West of Tracks)
(O-E) 2 / l!l

Obs.

Ez:p.

(O-E)

(O-E)2

unskilled blue-collar

64

26

38

1444

55.53

skilled blue-collar

37

40

3

9

.23

low white-collar

9

34

25

625

18.38

high white-collar

0

10

10

100

10.00

x2

= 84.14

Table 3.4.
Chi-Square Calculation (3 Area Analysis)
(Core Area)
Obs.

Ez:p.

(O-E)

0-:&:) 2 /

(O-E)2

B

3

21

18

324

15.43

skilled blue-collar

21

32

11

121

3.78

low white-collar

43

28

15

225

8.04

high white-collar

22

14

196

24.50

unskilled blue-collar

8

x2

= 51.75
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unskilled blue-collar heads compared to expectation (Table
3.5).

Again,the Chi-Square value for each area was

significant, indicating a nonrandom spatial distribution of
class groups.
The spatial distribution of 1892 Harriman residents by
race shows a pattern of almost complete residential
segregation (Figure 3.20).

The vast majority of African-

Americans lived west of the railroad tracks in Oak View
Addition. 83

In fact, there was only one instance of

African-Americans living to the east of the tracks in the
original city site, where a boarding house for single men
was located.

Thus, the ETLC's vision of Harriman as a

racially segregated industrial city was indeed a reality in
1892.

Taking Harriman Apart

Although Harriman was spatially stratified to a large
degree by class 84 , the stratification was not uniform.

An

investigation of the spatial relationships between
individual class groups provides insight into the type of
urban community that Harriman was in 1892.

Index of

83 The 1892 Harriman City Directory did not give exact street
addresses for residents of Oak View Addition. It did, however,
designate Oak View as a residence area for heads-of-household, which
gave a general indication of residence location.
84 The grouping of heads-of-household into occupational class groups
is also useful in discerning income earning levels of particular
occupations based on previous research. This makes the analysis of
spatial stratification by income group possible, in addition to class
groups per se. See Zunz, The Changing Face of Inequality.
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Table 3.5.
Chi-Square Calculation (3 Area Analysis)
(Peripheral Area)
(O-E)2

(O-z)2/ E

19

361

12.45

44

11

121

2.75

48

38

10

100

2.63

6

11

5

25

2.25

Obs.

Exp.

(O-E)

unskilled blue-collar

10

29

skilled blue-collar

55

low white-collar
high white-collar

x2

=

20.08
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Figure 3. 20.
Residence By Race, Harriman, Tennessee, 1892

Data: Harriman City Directory, 1892; Sanborn Insurance
Maps, 1895.
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residential segregation analyses, utilizing the same areal
divisions as in the Chi-Square tests, were conducted to
explore these relationships (Tables 3.6, 3.7).

Both the

two and three area analyses show the residential
distributions of low white-collar and skilled blue-collar
workers to be most similar (16% and 28%, respectively), and
the distributions of low white-collar and unskilled bluecollar to be most dissimilar (44% and 64%) • 85

Overall, the

distribution of unskilled blue-collar heads was the single
most dissimilar when compared to those of the other class
groups in both analyses.

When compared to the residential

distributions of high and low white-collar workers, the
pattern of unskilled blue collar workers was very
concentrated west of the railroad tracks (Figures 3.21,
3.22).

There were very few cases in which unskilled blue-

collar heads lived on the same block with white collar
heads. The residential patterns of skilled and unskilled
blue collar heads were more similar, especially in Walnut
Hills Addition where there were numerous instances where
households of these classes were on the same block and
adjacent to each other (Figure 3.23).

However, the most

similar residential patterns were exhibited by skilled
blue-collar heads and low white-collar heads, who often
lived on the same blocks, especially on the periphery
streets of the original site (Figure 3.24).

This indicates

85 The index of residential segregation is a variation of the index of
dissimilarity areal association measure. It is a measure of
differences between areal associations and, therefore, an inverse
measure of areal association.
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Table 3.6.
Index of Residential Segregation by Occupation Class
(2 Area)
1

2

3

4

1 unsk. blue-collar
2 skil. blue-collar

28%

3 low white-collar

44%

16%

4 high white-collar

33%

30%

19%

* percent value denotes the amount of one occupational
class group that would have to be moved to to be
integrated with another given occupational class
group

Table 3.7.
Index of Residential Segregation by Occupation Class
(3 Area)
1

2

3

4

1 unsk. blue-collar
2 skil. blue-collar

41%

3 low white-collar

64%

28%

4 high white-collar

41%

37%

32%
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Figure 3.21.
Residential Patterns of Unskilled and High-White Collar
Heads-of-Household in Harriman, 1892

Data: Harriman City Directory, 1892; Sanborn Insurance
Maps, 1895.
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Figure 3.22.

Residential Patterns of Unskilled Workers and Low-White
Collar Heads-of-Household in Harriman, 1892

Data: Harriman City Directory, 1892; Sanborn Insurance
Maps, 1895.
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Figure 3.23.

Residential Patterns of Unskilled Workers and Skilled BlueCollar Heads-of-Household in Harriman, 1892

Data: Harriman City Directory, 1892; Sanborn Insurance
Maps, 1895.
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Figure 3.24.

Residential Patterns of Skilled Workers and Low WhiteCollar Heads-of-Household in Harriman, 1892

Data: Harriman City Directory, 1892; Sanborn Insurance
Maps, 1895.
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that these groups had similar earnings levels, enabling
them to buy land in the same areas of the city.

It also

suggests that residential spatial stratification in
Harriman was perhaps based more on income level than on
class group.
The East Tennessee Land Company envisioned Harriman as
an industrial center that would grow into an important
regional city.

The company's vision included sanitary and

urban reform ideals, and temperance provisions that would
make for a healthy and productive urban-industrial
workforce.

When the company was faced with decisions

relating to the spatial layout of its model industrial
city, it chose to create an urban landscape that was
segmented by income and race.

The ETLC's plan became

reality through its administration of urban land sales, and
the selective provision of infrastructure and capital.

By

1892, Harriman's sociospatial landscape mirrored the
company's perception of the industrial division of labor
that should exist in a manufacturing center.

Unskilled

blue-collar workers and African-Americans, those who would
provide the majority of industrial labor, were placed in
their own separated enclaves.

This imitated the spatial

situation which had become dominant in northern cities with
respect to foreigners and free blacks drawn by industrial
employment opportunities since before the Civil War:
segregation. 86

Thus, the East Tennessee Land Company had

86 c. Vann Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1966), 17-21.
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created a socially and racially segregated industrial city
in the Upland South, years before a Jim Crow law was ever
passed in the state of Tennessee. 87
The ETLC and the other land companies were not able to
continue to operate at the large scale that they had begun
their activities in the late 1880s.

Their impressive

development schemes were interrupted by circumstances in
the early 1890s; grand plans were put on hold, modified, or
abandoned as optimism gave way to economic depression.

87 The first Jim Crow law in Tennessee, involving streetcars, was not
enacted until 1903. Laws pertaining to residential segregation by
race were not intiated in the South until 1910. Ibid., 97-101.
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Chapter IV
RESULTS OF INDUSTRIAL-URBAN DEVELOPMENT
IN THE UPPER TENNESSEE RIVER VALLEY

A Change in the National Economic Situation;
The Financial Panic of 1893
The economic downturn that affected the entire country
during the early to mid 1890s impacted the land companies
in the Upper Tennessee River Valley as well. The Panic of
1893, during which the New York Stock Exchange endured
several severe drops, initiated a depression that lasted
for more than three years. It was one of the most severe
depressions in American history.
The decade of the 1890s opened with the nation
approaching the end of a business-cycle expansion.

Foreign

trade had been favorable since the mid-1880s, and European
capitalists had invested large amounts of capital in
railroads, cattle ranching, and other business enterprises.
Employment was increasing, output was growing, and general
economic conditions were positive in the United States. 1
The generally positive conditions that existed in the
country through 1892 belied significant harbingers of
economic downturn.

There was a significant recession in

England in 1890, marked by the failure of the large and
prestigious Baring Brothers investment banking house, a
1Gilbert C. Fite and Jim E. Reese, An Economic History of the United
States (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1973), 271-272.
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pioneer merchant banking founded in 1763 which had long
served as an intermediary between British investors and
American entrepreneurs. 2

By November of 1890, the Baring

House had overextended itself in Argentine speculation.
Argentina collapsed, leaving Baring Brothers with a large
amount of its resources locked up in now-worthless land and
securities.

Although the Bank of England bailed Barings

Brothers out, the near-failure of the country's foremost
banking house shocked European investors.

This caused a

run on gold by English investors, many of whom liquidated
their stock holdings in American companies. 3

The result

was a net loss of $68 million in gold exported from the
United States in 1890. 4
Another destabilizing situation by 1890 was the
struggle for bimetalism.

Congress had passed a measure in

1873 that discontinued the further minting of the standard
silver dollar. 5

The United States had also returned to a

policy of specie payments in 1879, following passage of the
Resumption Act by Congress in 1875. 6

The result of these

2Joseph Wechsburg, The Merchant Bankers (Boston: Little, Brown &
Company, 1966), 99-102.
3Richard Kellett, The Merchant Banking Arena (New York: St. Martin's
Press, 1967), 118-123.
4Harry N. Scheiber, Harold G. Vatter, and Harold U. Faulkner,
American Economic History (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1976),
307.
5 rn 1873, the silver dollar was worth $1.02 in gold and it was no
longer profitable to coin it. Silver was scarce at this time and
very little had been presented to the mints for coining. Congress's
action was not highly controversial at this time, and passage of the
act was seen as merely as legislative recognition that silver dollars
were not being coined.
6At the close of the Civil War, the United States was suffering from
the effects of inflationary methods of war finance. Paper money had
been issued to the extent of over $400 million, and in addition a
part of the war effort had been financed through sales of government
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two bills was a contraction of the currency supply in the
United States.

Events of the next few years would serve to

ally the two constituencies alienated by these policies:
the inflationists and the silver interests.

Inflationists

were those who were opposed to the devaluation of currency
and credit contraction for a variety of reasons.

Debtor

farmers of the Western states fighting against declining
foodstuff prices and manufacturers eager for cheap money to
finance expansion and pay off previously incurred long-term
debt were the principal inflationist groups.

The silver

interests became active in the mid-1870s, when the
situation with regard to silver changed rapidly.

During

the early to mid 1870s, Germany, Holland, Sweden and Norway
adopted the gold standard and the Latin Monetary Union
(France, Switzerland, Belgium, Italy, and Greece) limited
the coinage of silver.

These developments in combination

with the discovery of large silver deposits in Nevada
created a glut of bullion on the market, causing prices to
drop sharply.
American silver interests reacted to these price
drops, becoming increasingly politically active and calling
for the reinstatement of silver coinage in the United

securities to national banks. In the early aftermath of the war, the
general sentiment in Washington was that paper money should be
retired by the federal government in order to permit a return to
price and income levels of the pre-war gold standard. This sentiment
was soon challenged, however, led by farmers fighting against
declining foodstuff prices and manufacturers eager for cheap money to
finance expansion and pay off previously incurred long-term debt.
This struggle delayed the passage of the Resumption Act until 1875,
when the "inflationists" were temporarily defeated.
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States to increase the demand for silver and raise prices.
Political pressure from the inflationists resulted in the
passage of the Bland-Allison Act of 1878, which provided
for the purchase of not less than two million dollars and
not more than four million dollars a month worth of silver
bullion to be coined into silver dollars. 7

To the

disappointment of inflationists, however, the Bland-Allison
Act failed to halt the decline in the value of silver or
the downward trend of prices during the twelve years that
it was in force.

Because of this, the inflationists kept

up their pressure for governmental purchase of more silver,
and in 1890 were successful in lobbying for the passage of
the Sherman Silver Act.

The act required the Secretary of

the Treasury to purchase 4.5 million ounces of silver
bullion a month, and in payment for it issue Treasury notes
redeemable in either gold or silver.

The silver purchased

under this act was almost the entire output of American
mines, and approximately double that required by the BlandAllison Act.8
By the early 1890s, the silver movement and Europe's
general economic downturn threatened the maintenance of the
gold standard in the United States.

The amount of silver

to be purchased under the Sherman Act was too large to be
readily absorbed by the United States Treasury, as notes
issued for silver were more often than not redeemed for
7Kenyon E. Poole, "Money and Banking, 1865-1919" in Harold F.
Williamson, Ed., The Growth of the American Economy (Englewood
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1951), 554-555.
8American Economic History, 305-306.
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gold at a later date.

Through this process, $156 million

in Treasury Notes was added to the national money supply
between 1890 and 1893, leading to a significant loss of
gold from the national reserve over this period.

At the

same time, skittish European investors were withdrawing
their capital from American companies at a heightened pace
as their confidence in the American economy and the dollar
waned.

In 1893 alone, the United States suffered a net

loss of $87 million in gold exported. 9
The dwindling supply of gold caused by the Sherman
Silver Act and foreign withdrawal of capital from the
United States had dire consequences.

In 1893, for the

first time since the reinstitution of the gold standard,
national gold reserves dropped below the traditional $100
million which many people regarded as the minimum treasury
reserve.

The breaking of the $100 million reserve barrier

began speculatiop that the gold reserve was in jeopardy,
causing trepidation among businessmen and investors who
regarded maintenance of the gold standard as paramount.

As

this speculation continued, the net result was a general
loss of confidence in the soundness of the dollar. 10
During the early months of 1893 there was a sharp
downward trend in stock prices on the New York Stock
Exchange, as a rush ensued to dispose of stocks, bonds, and
other securities.

Loss of confidence in the monetary

system also produced runs on banks, especially in the South
9rbid., 307.
10 An Economic History of the United States, 272.
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and West.

In turn, these banks called on larger eastern

financial institutions for their reserves.

These demands

strained the capital reserves of these foremost financial
institutions, creating a situation in which loans became
almost impossible to obtain and the hoarding of gold and
currency was common. 11
Large-scale business failure characterized the
economic downturn in the United States in 1893.

Two of the

most troubling examples of this were the Philadelphia

&

Reading Railroad, which went into receivership in February
of 1893, and the National Cordage Company which followed in
May.

These corporations were among the foremost businesses

in the United States, and their failures did not bode well
for the national economy.

In fact, more than 15,000

commercial failures involving liabilities of $346.8 million
occurred during 1893.

In addition, more than 600 banking

institutions and 74 railroad corporations failed during the
same year.

The Panic of 1893 was followed by three years

of economic depression, during which business failures were
accompanied by falling agricultural prices, high
unemployment levels, and declining industrial production.
It wasn't until the latter part of 1896 that the depression
began to break, as the Silverites were defeated and a shift

11 Harold M. Somers, "The Performance of the American Economy, 18661918" in Harold F. Williamson, Ed., The Growth of the American
Economy (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1951), 652-653.
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in the balance of foreign trade stemmed the outflow of gold
from the national reserve. 12

Boom Turns to Bust; National Pepression and the
Land companies of the JJ-'!per Tennessee River valley
The economic depression that was under way by 1893 had
profound effects on companies operating in the Upper
Tennessee River Valley.

In fact, the only large industry-

related company in the region that remained in its predepression form by 1896 was the Roane Iron Company.

The

mid-1890s held failure and reorganization for the others,
ended the large-scale infusion of capital into the region
that had characterized the late 1880s and early 1890s.
The first casualty was the Cardiff Coal and Iron
Company.

The Cardiff Company, begun with such bright

aspirations, soon found the economic conditions of the
early 1890s to be prohibitive.

During its land sale in

April of 1890, the CCIC sold over a million dollars worth
of property in its city site.

This total was never

collected. Buyers were only required to pay one-third of
the total purchase price at the auction, with the other
two-thirds due in six months and one year, respectively.
As economic conditions grew steadily worse during the year
following the sale, a significant number of property buyers
defaulted on their installments.

At the same time, the

12 American Economic History, 306-307; An Economic History of the
United States, 272.
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CCIC's creditors were demanding payment on the large loans
which the Company had taken out to purchase land.

The

change in the national and regional economic environment
left the CCIC in a bad situation.

During its early period

of activity in 1889 and early 1890, conditions were
positive, and the Company had acted on the assumption that
these conditions would continue.

By mid-1891 it was

obvious, however, that investors were retaining their
capital in times of increasing uncertainty.

This left the

CCIC with bills and no money to pay them with.

Its plan of

paying off its debts with the proceeds of continued land
sales was no longer viable.

The company was sued by land

buyers and creditors during 1891.

The former sued for

improvements and infrastructure not provided to the city
site as promised, the latter for loan payments not made on
time.

The CCIC went into receivership in June of 1891.
These events limited Cardiff's future.

The CCIC had

begun just early enough to appear to be a profitable
venture, but too late to develop a solid base before the
economic downturn.

Most of the company's grand plans were

stopped by the receivership.

This created more suits by

investors and land purchasers who felt that the company had
not made good on its pledge to "build" the town and provide
it with certain infrastructure (a blast furnace, graded and
paved streets, water and sewer systems, a hotel). Charles
Haley's description of events was representative of the
opinions held by Cardiff investors:
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Of the large amount of money agreed to be expended ..• only a
small amount was spent, just enough to fool the bidders at the
public sale in April, and to cajole the buyers into paying the
six
month notes maturing in September and October following.
Then the whole work was abandoned.

The hotel which had been

partially constructed was left uncovered and exposed to the
elements, the streets washed into gullies, the trenches for the
furnace filled up whole fraud and sham has been blown up and
dissipated. 13

Although Haley was no doubt biased about the initial
intentions of the Cardiff company, he accurately described
the situation in the town in 1892.

Most of the

infrastructure that the CCIC was supposed to have built was
not completed before the company's financial troubles in
mid-1891.

This led to the abandonment of several projects

and the completion of few.

Because the development and

growth of the city was predicated in large part upon
projects initiated by the company, this situation made its
future tenuous.
Events associated with the Panic of 1893 proved to be
the end of the CCIC and the City of Cardiff.

The company

had survived its two years in receivership mainly on the
strength of proceeds from the sale of coal mined on its
lands to iron production facilities in East Tennessee.

The

effects of the Panic caused many of these facilities to
decrease production or shut down completely, creating a
corresponding reduction in demand for coal.

This was

devastating to the CCIC, since income from land and stock
sales had been almost nonexistant since mid-1891.

The

company declared bankruptcy and discontinued operations in

13 Haley and Ingram vs. Henry C. Young, Complainant Report, 12-13.
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the Upper Tennessee River Valley in 1893.

A Chattanooga

publication described Cardiff in 1895:
... the collapse came, and today the town does not contain
twenty people. The only signs of it that can be seen are a few
deserted stores, rain-washed streets, overgrown with grass and
weeds and the electric light poles which ornament the vacant
fields. 14

In the end, all of the ambitious plans made for Cardiff
were for naught, as the planned city did not last long
enough even to rate a mention in the federal census of
1900.
The East Tennessee Land Company and the City of
Harriman also were adversely impacted by the economic
conditions of the early 1890s.

The ETLC and its planned

city had benefitted from an early start in the region
(April 1889), and because of this had been able to complete
several projects associated with the development of
Harriman by 1893 (the ETLC Building, several business
buildings along Roane Street, the Belt Line Railway, street
grading on the city site, among others).

Between 1890 and

1892, the company was fairly successful in obtaining
capital through its land sale (held in early 1890) and the
sale of stock.

A decision made in mid-1890 to raise

additional money for the development by obtaining one
million dollars worth of first mortgage bonds through the
Central Trust Company of New York was one the ETLC would
regret in the years to come, however.

The company used

this money to finance improvements for the City of
14 Chattanooga Tradesman, XXXII (1895), 116.
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Harriman, and to subsidize the establishment of its
satellite companies and new industries and businesses.
Unfortunately, neither the satellite companies or the new
industries and businesses earned sufficient profits in the
ensuing years to pay even the interest on this large
mortgage. By late 1892, the ETLC found it very difficult to
meet payments on the loan.
In September of 1892, a program was initiated called
"The Million Dollar Plan" which was an attempt to
recapitalize the company through the issuance of first-lien
and second-lien preferred stock. The goal of the plan was
to sell this stock, use the proceeds to pay off the Central
Trust bonds, and return the company to a sound financial
situation.

The company declared the plan an overwhelming

success in January of 1893, when it informed the public
that it had received subscriptions for the entire one
million dollar amount. The account of this announcement in
the local newspaper indicates the amount of importance
attributed to the plan:
The Directors have satisfied themselves that the subscriptions
to the new stock are bonified and can be relied upon.
They are
further satisfied that the One Million of Dollars which these
will yield will meet the entire bonded and floating
indebtedness on the Company, and relieve its immense properties
from incumberance ... the success of the Million Plan is
immediate, the effects of it will be increasingly shown, and
the final results should tell wonderfully for the benefit of
Harriman and all concerned in its future 15

The events of 1893, however, dampened enthusiasm for
the Million Dollar Plan.

Although the stock offered by the

1 5Harriman Daily Advance, January 27, 1893.
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ETLC had technically been fully subscribed, the subscribers
had not paid the money to the company by mid-1893.

This is

when the most extreme drop in the stock market took place,
and when financial institutions were under the most demand
for capital.

The Central Trust Company demanded payment

from the ETLC, and when it was not forthcoming, filed suit
in federal court.

This resulted in the company's filing

for bankruptcy in November of 1893.

Receivers over the

next four years sold off the ETLC's assets, in an effort to
recoup any money that could be paid to creditors.

Thus

1893 marked the end of significant development activities
by the ETLC in the Upper Tennessee River Valley.
The City of Harriman was able to survive, however, due
to its strong start and the determination of its
predominantly Prohibitionist population.

Although many

industries shut down during the Panic, some, including the
railroads operated throughout the depression.

Remaining

residents also initiated other institutions during the
depression period that brought activity to Harriman.
Prominent among these was the founding of the American
Temperence University in 1894, which was housed in the
former ETLC building.

In the ensuing years, as many as 250

students attended the University, to learn in an
environment free from "smoking, gambling, theft, lying,
profanity, obscenity and drunkeness. 1116

16 Louise Davis, "Town Built for Teetotalers," The Tennesseean
Magazine, Sunday, November 19, 1972, 16-18.
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Lenoir City was the latest of the land company
developments to be initiated, and because of this did not
find itself in as dire a debt situation as its
predecessors.

The Lenoir City Company was not incorporated

until April of 1890 and its stock and land sale was not
held until September of the same year.

This later start

proved important because the LCC was able to perceive
impending economic conditions to some extent, and avoid
larger-scale speculative spending and debt accumulation.
By June of 1892, however, the company was experiencing
problems paying on the debt that it had accrued.

Sales of

property had been much slower than expected, and the board
of directors attributed this to "the unusual and stringent
conditions of the money market." 17

Charles Mcclung, a

prominent Knoxville businessman, came to the company's aid
and paid the debt, effectively removing the lein from its
property. 18

The situation did not improve in the next six

months, however.

Company records indicate that by November

of 1892, the LCC had sold only 144 of the 3,448 lots
platted in Lenoir City. 19
Lenoir City ultimately survived the depression of the
1890s because of the work and dedication of E.J. Sanford
and Charles McGhee.

Sanford, the originator of the Lenoir

City scheme, took responsibility for overseeing many of the
early activities of the company.

He, more than anyone,

17 Lenoir City Company, Board of Directors Minutes, June 1, 1892.
18 Ibid.
19 rbid., November 12, 1892.

worked to make the development successful in an uncertain
economic environment.

His dedication to the project was

reflected in a letter to his friend McGhee in 1891:
I have not yet lost faith in Lenoir, and I feel it will all
work out yet, although as I stated before I have had more
disappointments in it than in than any other business attempt
in my life. 20

Besides his financial influence, McGhee spent considerable
time attempting to attract industry to Lenoir City.

His

biggest success, and probably the savior of the development
during the 1890s, was the Lenoir Car Company.

McGhee

convinced J.H. Bass, an experienced rail car producer from
Fort Wayne, Indiana, to locate a new facility in Lenoir
City. He then went to the board of the Lenoir City Company
and made a strong suggestion that a fifty acre tract of
land adjacent to the ETV&G mainline be given to the Car
Company. 21

The Lenoir Car Company immediately became the

major employer in the town, and remained so for the next
thirty years.
Each of the land companies ceased large-scale
operations after the economic downturn of 1893.

The late

1880s and early 1890s had been a watershed for investment
because of the positive national economic situation, and
the corresponding availability of development capital.

In

the years following the Panic of 1893, the American economy
was unstable at best, and financial institutions and
investors were skittish about any type of speculative
20 E.J. Sanford to C.M. McGhee, November 27, 1891.
21 Lenoir City Company, Board of Directors Minutes, March 13, 1893.
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venture.

In addition, by the mid-to-late 1890s it had

become apparent that the characteristics of the local iron
ore deposits would hinder the region in becoming a major
iron and steel production center.

Thus, the land company

investment era ended in the Upper Tennessee River Valley.
The Roane Iron Company remained in business the
longest of any of the subject companies in the Upper
Tennessee River Valley.

It managed to produce pig iron at

Rockwood continuously through the depression of the mid1890s, although production slowdowns took place.

Even

after the depression had ended, however, Rockwood did not
become a major regional production center for iron or
steel.

The reason for this was articulated by Hiram

Chamberlain in his October, 1887 letter to Charles McGhee
when he stated "I think it better that we have some foreign
iron very low in phosporous in our mixture. 1122

Chamberlain

knew that the high phosphorous iron ore in the Rockwood
area could not make high quality steel.

This was a

significant problem for Roane Iron in the ensuing decades
because it precluded the company from making costcompetitive iron and steel products.

Theoretically, it

could be done, but only with iron ore from another source
with a lower phosphorous content. Although the company
experimented with using outside iron ore, each of these
attempts was abandoned because of prohibitive cost. Because
it could not produce for the emerging market for steel
22 chamberlain

to McGhee, October 25, 1887.
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products, the Roane Iron Company remained a small regional
producer, and Rockwood a small industrial town in the Upper
Tennessee River Valley. The potential that Hiram
Chamberlain and James Wilder dreamed of when they began
their endeavor, was realized at a place farther down the
Tennessee Valley -- Birmingham, Alabama. 23
The Roane Iron Company continued operations until
1929.

The company experienced a period of prosperity

during World War I, when iron products were needed for the
war effort.
however.

This demand disappeared after the war,

Freight rates on the transport of its pig iron to

the northeast rose rapidly, decreasing competitiveness.
The southern iron market was dominated by production at
Birmingham, which was higher-quality and lower-cost.

Roane

Iron endured several mine disasters during the mid-1920s,
which resulted in lost lives and worker compensation
payments of more than $200,000 (over one-fifth of the total
capitalization of the company).

These circumstances, in

concert with plunging iron market prices in 1929, caused
the company to suspend operations for good in January of
1930. 24

23 one of the major advantages of the Birmingham production site was
the availability of large deposits of low phosphorus iron ore, which
was favorable for steel production.
24 william Howard Moore, "Rockwood: A Prototype of the New South,"
M.A. Thesis, University of Tennessee, Knoxville, 1965.
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The Results of Industrial capital Investment in the
Upper Tennessee River valley; The Modification of Economic
and settlement Patterns in the Early Twentieth century
The settlement patterns which had emerged from the
agricultural economy in the Upper Tennessee River Valley
prior to 1860 were altered by industrial capital investment
during the study period.

In 1880, twelve years after the

Roane Iron Company began operation, Rockwood was the most
populated urban settlement in the region (Table 4.1).

By

1900, Harriman supplanted Rockwood as the largest city, and
both were more than triple the size of the river towns of
Loudon and Kingston.

These two periods of capital

investment etched a completely new settlement structure in
the region in less than thirty years.
The transformation of the economy of the Upper
Tennessee River Valley between 1870 and 1900 was also
drastic.

In 1870, the value of farm products in the study

area was more than two and a half times that of
manufactured products (Tables 4.2, 4.3).

This situation

persisted through 1880, although the ratio of the value of
agricultural products to manufactured products decreased.
In 1890, the value of manufactured products exceeded the
value of agricultural products for the first time.

This

was mostly the product of investment by the Roane Iron
Company, as the land companies were just beginning
operation when the census was conducted.

By 1900, a major
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Table 4 .1.
Population of Upper Tennessee River Valley
Towns, 1860-1900, 1990.

Town

1860

1870

1880

1890

1900

1990

Cardiff

430

Harriman

716

3,442

7,119

*

*

6,147

Lenoir City
Loudon
Kingston

*

*

832

942

875

4,026

307

739

858

*

548

4,552

649

1,011

2,305

2,899

5,348

Rockwood

*

Not Available

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census,
Ninth Census, 1870: Population Manuscripts; Tenth
Census, 1880: Population Manuscripts, Tennessee,
Roane County; Compendium of the Ninth Census, 1870;
Compendium of the Tenth Census, 1880; Compendium of
the Eleventh Census, 1890; Compendium of the
Twelveth Census, 1900; Twenty-First Census,
Population, Tennessee.

Table 4.2.
Industrial Production in the Upper Tennessee
River Valley, 1870-1900.

lJWl
county

.l.B.8..0.

Capital

Value of

Number

Invested

Products

Employed

Loudon

Capital

Value of

Number

Invested Products Employed

$157,100

Roane

$162.750

$235.321

160

$774.250

TOTAL

$162,750

$235,321

160

$931,350

$254,730

83

$327.082

455

$531,812

538

llQ.Q.
Capital

Value of

Number

county

Invested

Products

Employed

Loudon

$77,089

Roane
TOTAL

Capital

Value of

Number

Invested Products Employed

$99,199

118

$873,936

$921,489

311

$671.370

$669.212

388

Sl.449.838

s1.s11.221

600

$748,479

$768,411

506

$2,323,774

$2,433,240

911

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census,
Ninth Census, 1870: Manufactures, Tennessee; Tenth
Census, 1880: Manufactures, Tennessee; Eleventh
Census, 1890: Manufactures, Tennessee; Twelveth
Census, 1900: Manufactures, Tennessee.
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Table 4.3.
Agricultural Production in the Upper Tennessee
River Valley, 1870-1900 .

County

.l..8.1.Q.

.l.B..8..0.

.l..B..9..0.

.1.9..Q.Q.

Value of

Value of

Value of

Value of

Farm Prod.

Farm Prod.

Farm Prod.

$368,420

$348,900

$514,591

Farm Prod.

Loudon

Roane

$619.768

$512.937

$341. 490

$678.831

TOTAL

$619,768

$881,357

$650,390

$1,193,422

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census,
Ninth Census, 1870: Agriculture, Tennessee; Tenth
Census, 1880: Agriculture, Tennessee; Eleventh
Census, 1890: Agriculture, Tennessee; Twelveth
Census, 1900: Agriculture, Tennessee.
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economic shift was evident, as the value of manufactured
products exceeded $2.4 million, and more than doubled the
value of agricultural products.

From 1870 to 1900,

industrial employment increased more than five-fold from
160 workers to 911 in the study region (Table 4.2).

The Geography of Capital Flight:
The Upper Tennessee River valley in the Twentieth century

The introduction of industrial capital into the Upper
Tennessee River Valley during the period between the close
of the Civil War and the turn-of-the-century created rapid
and intense change in the region's landscape, economy, and
settlement pattern.

The withdrawal of much of this capital

in the years after 1893 also had ramifications for the
region's future.

The Upper Tennessee River Valley became a

"played out" region; land companies ceased or slowed
operations, proposed production facilities were never
built, develpment schemes ended abruptly.

The economy of

the region in this post-depression
period became oriented towards activities that were labor
intensive, as opposed to capital intensive.
Small-scale industry employed significant numbers of
workers in the region following the demise of the land
companies.

In Harriman, several of the smaller companies

initiated during the land company era (wood products and
agricultural implements) remained in operation.

In Lenoir
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City, the Lenoir Car Company, a producer of railroad
passenger cars and equipment, became the major employer for
forty years after its establishment in 1893.

Farther down

the valley, the City of Rockwood continues to be sustained
largely by the Roane Iron Company.
During the first two decades of the twentieth century,
the hosiery and textile industries became increasingly
important in the Upper Tennessee River Valley.

In 1905, a

local businessman named J.F. Tarwater established the
Rockwood Hosiery Mills in Rockwood, Tennessee. 25

Seven

years later, in 1912, the Harriman Hosiery Company was
incorporated in Harriman by Taewater and his associates. 26
The hosiery industry was labor intensive, and both mills
employed primarily women.

This type of small-scale, low-

wage industrial activity would prove to be important to the
region's future, as the hosiery mills became the largest
employers in these cities by the 1930s.
In rural areas of the Upper Tennessee River Valley,
mixed farming, mining, and lumbering were the dominant
activities.

Farming had been important in the river

bottomland areas of the region since its initial
settlement.

Coal mining and logging were initiated during

the industrial and corporate capital phases, and continued
as relatively small quantities of these raw materials were
transported to production areas outside of the region.

In

the twentieth century, the Upper Tennessee River Valley
25 Moore, "Rockwood," 45-46.
26Pulliarn, Harriman, 501-503.
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increasingly became a resource exporting area rather than a
production area.
The Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) was established
by the United States government in 1933, was charged with
"the unified development of the [Tennessee] river, its
tributaries, and the whole watershed area. 1127
Specifically, TVA was to undertake policies that would:
improve the navigability and provide flood control on the
Tennessee River; provide for the reforestation and proper
use of marginal lands in the Tennessee Valley; facilitate
agricultural and industrial development in the Valley; and
create a corporation for the operation of government
properties at or near Muscle Shoals, Alabama. 28

As part of

its development program, the Tennessee Valley Authority
built two dams in the Upper Tennessee River Valley -- Watts
Bar Dam and Fort Loudon Dam.

Watts Bar Dam was constructed

approximately ten miles downstream from Rockwood, while the
Fort Loudon project was located at Lenoir City. The shortterm effects of this federal investment were increased
availability of jobs, an influx of population and a
concomitant increase in demand for goods and services, and
an economic boost for the region.

This boom period only

lasted a few years, however, as construction jobs ended and
TVA technical and support staff left the region.

The dams

did make the Tennessee River navigable during the entire
course of the year, and provide flood control. However, the
27 Govan and Livingood, The Chattanooga Country, 450.
28 rbid.

261

long-term impact on the overall economy of the Upper
Tennessee River Valley was negligable.
In the modern era, the Upper Tennessee River Valley is
a relatively isolated region.

Thousands of people per day

drive through it on Routes 40 and 75, yet very few ever
stop within its boundaries.

Little has changed since 1940,

because little capital has been invested in the region in
the last fifty years.

The Upper Tennessee River Valley of

the 1990s is a region shaped by small-scale, local capital.
Rockwood, Harriman, and Lenoir City -- the cities
established during the latter nineteenth century

are the

regional central places in 1995. They possess
characteristics of typical American small towns -- such as
discount stores and fast food restaurants

but remain as

relicts from a time when the Upper Tennessee River Valley
was an attractive region for industrial capital investment.
They remind us of the adaptability of capitalism -- how
capital investment can be diverted from one place to other.

Chapter V
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

summary
This study has detailed the primacy of outside
investment in the economic and settlement pattern changes
which took place in the Upper Tennessee River Valley during
the period between 1865 and 1910.

The analysis has

revealed two distinct periods of advanced capitalist
investment: the first between the close of the Civil War
and 1885, during which the Roane Iron Company began
operation in the region; and, a second which encompassed
the late 1880s and early 1890s, during which three land
companies initiated development activities.
At the outset of the study, two major themes were
identified as essential to linking regional transformation
and place-making in the Upper Tennessee River Valley to the
way in which capital was accumulate~ and utilized.

These

were: 1. Access to Capital and Urban-Industrial
Development; and 2. The Involvement of Business
Organizations in Making Places.

The first theme relates to

the ability of business organizations to obtain capital to
perform desired tasks.

During the first period of capital

investment in the study region, capital availability was
limited by the ownership structure of businesses, as well
as the limited access to large-scale loan capital centered
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in major cities of the Northeast. In the second period,
however, companies that operated in the region were more
successful at securing large amounts of capital through
more open ownership structures, and connections they had to
the New York and Boston money markets.
Access to capital ties into the second theme of
business involvement in the creation of urban places,
because capital availability in some part determined
spatial strategies and what types of urban-industrial
development were feasible.

The extent of involvement and

investment in the creation of places was a reflection of
the goals that the companies hoped to achieve by producing
housing, services. planned developments, and commercial
functions.

Analysis of the companies that operated in the

study region during the post-Civil War to turn-of-thecentury period reveals that varied development and placemaking strategies were employed, creating distinct urban
morphologies and social patterns on the landscape.

Each of

these contributed to the regional transformation that took
place in the Upper Tennessee River Valley during the
period.
These themes provide a basis for addressing some
specific questions that were posed at the outset of the
study.

Among these were questions regarding the origin of

the capital used for industrial development in the Upper
Tennessee River Valley.

Most of the development was funded

by capital from outside of the region.

The earliest
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factory-scale industrial activity at Rockwood in 1867 was
initiated by a group of former Union soldiers exposed to
the region during wartime.

These former soldiers funded

development at Rockwood by bringing a small group of
Indiana and Ohio investors into the scheme.

The impetus

for this initial capital investment was the availability of
resources needed for iron production.

Iron ore, coal, and

lime deposits were present in and around Walden's Ridge.
John Wilder and Hiram Chamberlain -- experienced iron
makers -- recognized the juxtaposition of these resources
as significant, as they had observed the new coal-fuel iron
smelting process in the North. Thus, for the first time,
the Upper Tennessee River Valley became attractive to
investors of industrial capital based on the needs of
current technology.
Policies enacted by the state government in Nashville
in the aftermath of the war facilitated industrial
development in Tennessee in the early post-war period.
William Brownlow's reconstruction administration was the
first in Tennessee to encourage industrialization. During
the mid and late 1860s, legislative bills were introduced
specifically inviting outside industrialists and
capitalists to invest in the state.

State associations

were founded for industry and immigration, to aid and
encourage industrialization.

This created a positive

environment for industrial investment, in that projects
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such as the one conceived by Wilder and Chamberlain were
sought after by the state government.
The development that took place during the second
period of investment in the Upper Tennessee River Valley
was also funded by outside capital. This development was
predicated on regional conditions that had emerged during
the preceding decades. One of these was the successful
operation of the Roane Iron Company's facility at Rockwood.
Roane Iron had proved that pig iron could be produced for
profit in the region in the years after 1867.

This was

very important for the agents of change during the second
period of investment -- the land companies -- because it
was evidence that the industrial activity which was to be
the basis of their city developments could and would become
a reality.

A second condition which served as an impetus

to the capital investment of the late 1880s and early 1890s
was the construction of railroad lines in the region. By
1880, the Cincinnati-Southern line was completed through
western Roane County connecting Cincinnati, Ohio with
Chattanooga, Tennessee.

The East Tennessee Virginia

&

Georgia Railway expanded into the region as well during the
latter 1880s, acquiring the locally-owned Walden's Ridge
Railroad and expanding it to connect with the CincinnatiSouthern and the Knoxville

&

Ohio Railroads.

The existence

of a well-developed rail system made the Upper Tennessee
River Valley attractive to further investment because
transportation access was perceived to be integral to the
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success of industrial enterprise and new city developments.
The East Tennessee Land Company expressed this investment
logic in their prospectus:
The railroads now built and building and projected, would make
Harriman grow like the lustiest young town in all the West,
were there no mineral interests to give it impetus and growth.
And these railroads must bring to it a wealth of timber, of
produce, of iron and of coal soon rivaling the resources of any
long-established town ... 1

The outside capital that was invested in the region
during the second period came through the activities of
land companies.

These land companies -- the Cardiff Coal

and Iron Company, the East Tennessee Land Company, and the
Lenoir City Company -- had innovative organizational and
financial structures for the period.

They were organized

as public entities, and sold stock to the public as a means
of obtaining operating capital.

They also were able to

access major capital markets to obtain trust certificates
and mortgages that provided large amounts of capital.

The

land companies gained access to capital markets through the
influential businessmen that were their principals.

Men

such as Clinton B. Fisk, Ferdinand Schumacher (the East
Tennessee Land Company), W.P. Rice, B.B. Smalley (the
Cardiff Coal and Iron Company), Charles McGhee and Samuel
Thomas (the Lenoir City Company) had previous experience
with the capital market from their railroad and industrial
dealings.

All of these men were native northerners except

for McGhee 2 , and they were outsiders who were involved in
1Prospectus of the East Tennessee Land Company, 33.
2Although a native of Knox County, during the late 1880s and early
1890s Charles McGhee lived in New York City and was a vice president 267

developing the region for profit.

Thus, again during the

third period of investment, northerners were the major
organizing and orchestrating forces behind the development
of the Upper Tennessee River Valley.
Although development that took place during both
periods of investment was instrumental to the regional
change that took place between 1865 and 1910, the character
of development during the periods differed somewhat.
During the early period of investment, the Roane Iron
Company was the principal business organization
administering development.

Roane Iron was an incorporated

entity, but a small group of businessmen owned and managed
it.

Because of this the company had a limited capital

base, and its objectives corresponded with this situation.
The company concentrated its efforts on the construction
and operation of an iron production facility in the Upper
Tennessee River yalley.

Other development activities by

Roane Iron were subordinate to and resultant of the
operation of blast furnaces at the Rockwood site.

This

included iron ore and coal mining, the construction of spur
rail lines, the provision of worker housing, and ultimately
community formation.

The activities of land companies

during the second period of investment contrasted with this
pattern.

They attempted to coordinate and administer many

projects as part of an overall development strategy.

These

of the East Tennessee, Virginia & Georgia Railway. This situation
made him one of a very small group of native East Tennesseeans during
this period who were in a position to influence development in the
Upper Tennessee River Valley.
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projects included mineral extraction, industrial
production, railroad building, and community planning.

The

availability of large amounts of start-up capital made this
comprehensive development strategy possible.

Land

companies did not concentrate on industrial development
alone, but diversified their efforts from the outset in
order to make money from many activities.

Thus,

development administered by business entities during the
second period was larger-scale and more diversified than
that of the earlier period.
The differences in the development approaches of
companies operating in the Upper Tennessee River Valley
during the two investment periods were also manifested in
their urban place-making strategies.

A major distinction

that can be made is the degree of planning that went into
company-funded urban development during the respective
investment periods.

Evidence indicates that during the

first investment period, the Roane Iron Company did not
plan the urban landscape of Rockwood in advance.

In fact,

the Roane Iron Company did not file a plan for Rockwood
until 1887
the site.

19 years after the it began producing iron at
As a result, during its early years, the

community was developed in unplanned spurts of housing
construction related to the labor needs of iron production.
The morphology that emerged from this activity over time
was a block pattern, created as streets and residence areas
were hastily added to the initial nucleation.

This urban
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development pattern is similar to one documented by
Gillenwater in his study of coal towns in the Pocahontas
Coal Field of Southern West Virginia.

He noted that some

unplanned coal towns exhibited block morphologies,
especially those which were located in level valley areas,
such as Rockwood. 3
The Roane Iron Company maintained ownership of land in
Rockwood during the first twenty years of the settlement's
existence, and provided housing for mine and mill workers.
The production site was isolated, and the company viewed
housing construction as a necessity to maintain needed
labor for production.

The return that Roane Iron expected

on this investment was reliable labor in the blast
furnaces, and rent payments which were drawn directly from
paychecks.

A company store was also established early on,

to serve the population of Rockwood.

Roane Iron owned and

operated the store, which was the only retail outlet in the
settlement during the 1860s and 1870s.

Thus, the Roane

Iron Company's development of Rockwood followed the
nineteenth century early pioneer company town pattern: the
company owned the land, built housing, and operated
businesses in an effort to contribute to the success of
some more important primary activity, such as industrial
production or resource extraction. 4

Roane Iron did not

3Mack H. Gillenwater, "Cultural and Historical Geography of Mining
Settlements in the Pocahontas Coal Field of Southern West Virginia,
1880-1930," Ph.D. dissertation, University of Tennessee, Knoxville,
1972, 55-61.
4shifflett, Coal Towns, 48-51; Shifflett has identified three general
stages in the development of southern Appalachian coal company towns:270

have the capital or inclination to pre-plan Rockwood or to
make the settlement a model industrial city.

The company

developed Rockwood as a necessary by-product of the
operation of the iron production facility.
The urban places developed by land companies during
the third investment period were planned in advance of any
settlement or industrial activity.

Rather than by-

products, they were to be the centerpieces of development
schemes, and major sources of profit for the companies.
Land within the these cities was to be sold by the
companies rather than rented. The land companies took much
time, effort, and capital in the initial planning process
in order to make their new cities desirable for investment.
These efforts included the incorporation of popular
environmental and sanitary reform concepts -- such as wide
streets, public open spaces, water systems, sewer systems,
electric light systems, and street grading and
macadamization.

The strategy behind the inclusion of these

features was twofold: they were to make land within the
cities more desirable and saleable to potential investors
and residents; and make the cities themselves ideal places
for industrial activity because of the positive affects
such environments would have on industrial workers.
The city plans that were commissioned by the land
a pioneer or frontier stage, during which towns were first being
built in isolated resource extraction areas; a second paternalistic
stage, in which operators paid more heed to the needs of the laborers
and provided more infrastructure and amenities; and a third phase in
which production decreases and the towns age and decay leading up to
the end of production.
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companies were products of specific notions about how urban
areas should be structured.

Environmentalism and sanitary

reform ideas were part of this, as were ideas about how
space should be allocated and defined within the city.

In

their commercial literature, the land companies described
in detail how land was to be used.

Commercial, industrial,

public, and residential areas were defined in the planning
process in an effort to develop cities "superlative in all
respects."

In addition, the residential areas were further

defined, as the companies delimited specific residential
areas for particular class and income groups, and developed
subdivision patterns and pricing schemes to correspond with
these.
Analysis of the City of Harriman shows that
significant spatial separation existed between class and
race groups living in the urban settlement.

Evidence also

indicates that that the companies had preconceived ideas
about who was to live where, and how land was to be used
generally in the cities.

The explanations for these

patterns is tied to the profit strategy employed by the
companies.
Scrutiny of land company place-making initiatives
indicates that they were model real estate ventures.

That

is, the utmost concern of the companies was to sell land,
and to obtain the maximum profit in doing so.
Infrastructure improvements and aesthetically pleasing
designs were used as selling points.

So, too, was the
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availability of land for the variety of skill groups that
would settle in industrial cities.

The companies wanted to

sell everyone as much property as they could afford.

An

oversight made by the East Tennessee Land Company in the
development of Harriman lends insight into this process.
The company sold land in its original town site for prices
ranging from $400 to $7,550 throughout 1890.
price per lot during this period was $1050.

The average
The ETLC soon

realized that these prices were prohibitive for semi-andunskilled workers that were going to be needed for labor in
production facilities.

In response to this, two new

residential additions were established, approximately a
mile to the west of the original town site.

Walnut Hills

and Oak View Additions were to be residence areas for white
blue-collar workers and blacks, respectively.

The

intriguing question is "Why weren't these residence areas
provided in the original plan?"

The answer to this

question lies in the profit strategy of the East Tennessee
Land Company.

The company was more concerned with selling

higher-priced land to people who had money to buy it, than
it was with providing housing opportunities for industrial
workers.

This was a very different approach than that used

in industrial company towns, where providing shelter for
industrial labor was the primary impetus for place-making.
Thus, the principal profit-making strategy of the land
companies was linked to the urbanization process itself.
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The social landscape that emerged in land company
cities was in large part a product of this profit strategy.
There is no doubt that the companies had preconceived ideas
about the spatial structures of their urban landscapes.
These ideas were not, however, primarily related to hatred
or prejudice.

They were based on profit potential.

The

companies wanted to make money selling land to a variety of
income groups, and planned their settlements accordingly.
The companies did separate these residence areas spatially
within their plans, drawing on patterns that were prevalent
in northern cities.

This was especially true with respect

to unskilled blue-coller workers. However, the fact that
wholesale class segregation was not in effect is
illustrated by the fact that low white-collar workers and
skilled blue-collar workers (different occupational class
groups with comparable income levels) had similar residence
patterns in Harriman.

This indicates that spatial

segregation by income group existed in land company cities,
and that this was a product of profit motive, rather than
some more sinister social control agenda.
With respect to blacks living in Harriman, spatial
segregation was almost total.

In all probability, the East

Tennessee Land Company had not initially contemplated that
blacks would be living in its planned city.

When the

company realized that blacks would be needed as part of the
industrial workforce, it had to deal with the issue of
providing housing areas for them.

The company's solution
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was Oak View Addition, a residential enclave separate from
white housing areas.

It is important to note, however,

that the ETLC did recognize the right of blacks to have
community institutions such as churches and schools, which
was more than was available for them in many areas of the
South during this period.

The motive for the spatial

separation of blacks from the main city area was basically
the same as that for the separation of white unskilled
blue-collar workers -- the maintenance of harmony, and
property values, in the model real estate ventures.

conclusions
While this study aimed primarily at proving the
importance of phases of capitalism in determining the
characteristics of regions, two further, and from a
theoretical perspective, less anticipated findings emerged,
ones which might inform further study.

These relate to

characteristics of capitalism and how they play out within
regions.

The Maturation of capitalism and Regional Development
The results of this analysis indicate that as
capitalism went through the three phases (from mercantile
to industrial to corporate) in the study region, it became
more intimate.

That is, it gained the ability to act more

directly to inform and alter regional characteristics.
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This was a product of increasing amounts of capital
available for investment within the region, as well as the
increasing vulnerability of the range of regional
activities to organization by and for profit.
Capitalism during the mercantile phase provided a
market for goods.

Although the mercantile phase introduced

changes in the economy and the everyday lives of people in
the region, these changes were indirect. Merchants took
what local producers had to offer, and gave them things in
return.
By the industrial phase, capitalism was directly
organizing industrial production.

This had a significant

impact on the economy of the region (increasing orientation
towards industrial rather than agricultural production) as
well as the lifestyle of its population (industrial workers
vs. yeoman farmers). The Roane Iron Company bought large
amounts of land, initiated resource extraction, and
employed those resources in a manufacturing process to
produce higher-value commodities.

In

carrying out these

activities, the Company also provided employment for
hundreds of workers, built the housing where they ate and
slept in their time away from the mills and mines, and
administered the store where they bought their food.
In the corporate phase, capitalism penetrated regional
life to an unprecedented level.

The land companies

purchased large amounts of land, planned cities, and
pursued development strategies designed to make money from
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the many activities associated with urbanization. The
companies employed these strategies to take advantage of
all possible profit niches, but their results reached
beyond these.

In addition to further altering the regional

landscape and economy, corporate capitalism went one step
further to consciously influence a major aspect of human
identity -- culture.
Analysis reveals that land company place-making
initiatives were based on specific ideas about what urban
places should be, and how their residents should live their
lives.

These ideas had their origins in identifiable

social movements that were emerging in the United States
during this period.

In effect, the land companies

propagated these ideas, and made them fundamental aspects
of their place-making efforts, in an attempt to assure
their success.
With respect to the development of industrial cities,
the land companies used similar approaches.

Each of the

cities was to be a temperance settlement, with no
consumption or production of alcoholic beverages permitted.
Alcohol consumption was equated with "disorder and
lawlessness" 5 by the companies, while temperance was felt
to encourage "sober labor ... [which] yields a positive
percentage of gain to the capital employing it. 116

Thus,

temperance was to be a means of preserving law and order in

5Prospectus of the Lenoir City Company, 19.
6 Two Years of Harriman, 94.

the cities, while at the same time increasing industrial
efficiency and profit margin.
The land companies also uniformly invoked several
tenets of the sanitary reform movement in the development
of their urban places.

These included aspects such as

sanitary site selection, the provision of sewerage systems,
water systems, paved streets, and parks.

Sanitary site

selection was felt to provide "all of the conditions of a
sanitarium ... elevation, pure air, healthful waters ... ,"
which would prevent disease and sickness. 7

Water, sewer,

and street systems as companents of the built environment
were also part of efforts to maintain "high standard(s) of
health," and prevent sanitation problems that had emerged
in American cities during the previous decades. 8

The

companies were aware not only that these infrastructural
improvements would be effective in creating a more sanitary
and safe urban environment, but that they were expected and
desired by the people who might invest in their cities.
The model of urban development employed by land
companies in the study region emcompassed what Boyer refers
to as "the two faces of urban moral reform in the 1890s." 9
One of the faces, or strategies, of reform was the coercive
approach, in which measures were aimed at individuals in
order to uproot vice and impose a higher standard of civic
virtue.

The goal was to undertake social control measures

1Prospectus of the Lenoir City Company, 20.
8The Cardiff Herald, July 23, 1890.
9soyer, Urban Masses and Moral Order in America, 175.

278

that would preclude the urban problems that had become
commonplace in other American cities.

Boyer describes the

temperance movement as "the quintessential coercive
reform," in that the saloon was viewed as a major bastion
of urban vice. 10

The second "face" of urban reform

utilized by the land companies involved consciously
planning the city's physical environment as a means of
elevating its moral tone.

The aim of positive

environmentalism was not to destroy urban vice through
rhetoric or legal repression, but "by creating the kind of
city where objectionable patterns of behavior, finding no
nuture, would gradually wither away. 1111

This normally

involved the provision of parks, playgrounds, and
facilities for concerts, lectures, and art exhibits.

In

many instances, sanitary reform ideals were also included
as components of positive urban environments, with a
relationship being drawn between cleanliness, health, and
the character of city dwellers. 12
The increasing intimacy displayed during the corporate
phase has both positive and negative results.

Results that

could be considered positive in the Upper Tennessee River
Valley were things such as sanitary living conditions,
infrastructure provision (water supply, sewage, streets,
lighting), introduction of technology, and well planned
urban areas.

On the other hand, control of local

lOibid., 181-182.
llrbid., 221.
12 Peterson, "The Impact of Sanitary Reform," 13-39.
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conditions during the corporate phase increasingly shifted
from the indigenous population to non-local business
organizations.

Regional culture traits and complexes were

coopted and characterized as inferior to outside ideas and
innovations.

Whether the results were positive or

negative, advanced capitalism meant increasing intimacy in
a regional context.

The Role of Human Agency and Happenstance in the
Emergence of capital Phases
The findings of this study indicate that although
individual actions are important in determining when
capital phases become prevalent in particular regions, they
seldom prevail over broader circumstances.

There are

several examples of the importance of human agency in the
Upper Tennessee River Valley. The Reconstruction era in
Tennessee provided opportunities for industrial development
that did not exist previously.

Governor William Brownlow

initiated an industrial development program that encouraged
outside industr~alists to invest and produce in Tennessee.
Men such as John Wilder and Hiram Chamberlain invested
their industrial capital in the state partially because of
this business environment.

Wilder and Chamberlain, in

turn, more than likely would not have been exposed to the
Upper Tennessee River Valley had it not been for the
historical circumstances of the Civil War.

Thus, the

inception of factory production and the industrial
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capitalist phase would have occurred under different
circumstances.
A singular example of the impact of individual action
in the Upper Tennessee River Valley is Charles Mcclung
McGhee.

McGhee was an individual who played a tremendous

role in the development of the region.

It is safe to say

that had it not been for his actions, the development
pattern that emerged in the study region would have been
very different.

McGhee was unique because he was a native

East Tennesseean who had connections to some of the most
important and influential businessmen in the United States.
He used these connections to direct development capital
into the Upper Tennessee River Valley.

For example, during

the early-to-mid 1880s McGhee was instrumental in assisting
the Roane Iron Company obtain New York funding for the
production of steel at Chattanooga, as well as rail orders
from the railroad companies with which he was involved.
Roane Iron's expansion into steel production would have
been impossible without these loans, and it is very
unlikely that the Company would have gotten them without
McGhee's aid.

The same is true of the steel rail orders.

Later, in 1890, McGhee again became personally involved in
a development scheme in the Upper Tennessee River Valley
the Lenoir City Company.

In this instance, McGhee

convinced a group of his New York business associates
(members of his syndicate), to invest in the Lenoir City
urban-industrial scheme.

Again, it is doubtful that the
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Lenoir City Company would have gotten off the ground were
it not for McGhee's assistance.
Other individuals were also very important in the
establishment and operation of land companies in the Upper
Tennessee River Valley.

Entrepreneurs such as Ferdinand

Schumacher, B.B. Smalley, Joshua Chamberlain, Samuel
Thomas, Calvin Brice, and Oliver Payne were veterans of the
business world.

They were higher-ups in large American

railroad companies and large industrial entities, and had
access to sources of capital in New York City and
experience with innovative ways to accumulate capital. When
these men made the decision to become involved in business
ventures in the Upper Tennessee River Valley, the region
became connected to these sources of capital, and was
altered significantly as a result.
Having acknowledged the importance of human agency in
ushering in capi~alist phases, it is appropriate to
recognize its limitations.

The individual actors operating

in the Upper Tennessee River Valley began with much greater
aspirations than were ever realized there.

If they had

been able to orchestrate capitalist development completely,
the region would have become a major national industrial
center -- however, it didn't.

This is because the

individuals who were important in bringing capital
investment to the Upper Tennessee River Valley could not
alter more basic technological or economic trends emerging
in the United States.

Factors such as the switch from iron
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to steel and the depression of the 1890s were powerful
enough to cause regional development schemes to fail
despite the best efforts of people such as Hiram
Chamberlain, Charles McGhee, Frederick Gates, and E.J.
Sanford.

Thus, happenstance operating at many levels could

further or negate the efforts of capitalist actors.

The

success stories were wrought of the coincidence of the
efforts of capitalists and circumstances at many other
levels.
Though the subject companies and cities of the Upper
Tennessee River Valley were losers in this capitalist
competition, they provide valuable information about the
capital and place-making connection.

Capital accumulation

methods were important to urban place-making, in that
development opportunities and options were determined by
capital availability.

The land companies analyzed in this

study were found to utilize new and effective ways of
obtaining capital, which was used to develop urban places
for profit.

Land companies were peculiar in this respect,

and may have been the earliest business entities to attempt
to accrue profit mainly from the urbanization process. This
may provide the impetus for further research, in that
little has been written on land companies, and evidence
indicates that many such companies operated in other areas
of the American South during the study period.
In the 1990s, the products of these companies remain
in the Upper Tennessee River Valley as well as places such
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as Middlesboro, Kentucky, Fort Payne, Alabama, Anniston,
Alabama, and South Pittsburg, Tennessee, among others.
There are probably many more that endure on the landscape,
most of which resulted in similar short-term economic
failure, left as backwater regions and localities.

They,

like the towns of the Upper Tennessee River Valley, have in
all likelihood become small local urban places in regions
on the margins of the twentieth century capital landscape.
However, in the century between the study period and the
present, capitalism has increased its capacity to influence
everyday life.

In the last decade of the twentieth

century, capitalism can go almost anywhere in the pursuit
of profit.

It can work in backward areas as well as

advanced ones in the form of chain retailing (K-Mart and
WalMart), fast food restaurants (McDonald's and Burger
King), and mini-marts (Circle Kand 7-11).

Thus, life-

shaping capitalism has returned to the Upper Tennessee
River Valley and other similar regions in the modern era,
however, arguably without the urbane refinement of the
original visions of Harriman, Cardiff, and Lenoir City.
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APPENDIX A
OCCUPATIONAL CLASSIFICATION ADAPTED FROM ZUNZ (1982)

High White-collar occp,pations

physician, lawyer, dentist, merchant, architect,
large business owner

Low White-co11ar occp,pations

clerk, salesman, bookkeeper, insurance agent,
civil engineer, schoolteacher, contractor

Skilled Blue-collar Qcgp,pations

carpenter, machinist, iron puddler, iron molder,
plumber, railway engineer, cabinetmaker,
printer, blacksmith

semiskilled and unskilled Blue-Collar Occupations

laborer (various), janitor, porter, watchman,
policeman, peddler, messenger, domestic, waiter

297

VITA

John Edward Benhart, Jr. was born in Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania on September 4, 1966.

He attended grammar

school, junior high school, and high school in the
Shippensburg, Pennsylvania Area School District.

He received

his high school degree in June of 1984.
In September of 1984, he began undergraduate studies at
the University of Pittsburgh at Johnstown.

Two years later

in 1986, he transferred to the University of Pittsburgh Main campus.

He was granted the Bachelor of Arts degree from

the University of Pittsburgh in Urban Planning in May of
1988.
In August 1988, he initiated his graduate studies in the
Geography Department at the University of Miami, Florida.
While at the University he served as the Geography Department
representive to the Graduate Student Association for the
1989-1990 school year. He was awarded the Master of Arts
degree from the University of Miami in December 1990.
In August of 1990, he was accepted into the doctoral
program of the Department of Geography at the University of
Tennessee, Knoxville.

While at the University, he worked as

a teaching assistant, GIS lab manager, and instructor. His
specialty fields were urban, economic, transportation, and
historical geography.

He received his Doctor of Philosophy

degree in Geography from the University of Tennessee,
Knoxville in August of 1995.

298

